I can also imagine being persuaded that AI alignment research is as important as I think but something else is even more important, like maybe s-risks or some kind of AI coordination thing.
Huh, my impression was that the most plausible s-risks we can sort-of-specifically foresee are AI alignment problems—do you disagree? Or is this statement referring to s-risks as a class of black swans for which we don’t currently have specific imaginable scenarios, but if those scenarios became more identifiable you would consider working on them instead?
Huh, my impression was that the most plausible s-risks we can sort-of-specifically foresee are AI alignment problems—do you disagree? Or is this statement referring to s-risks as a class of black swans for which we don’t currently have specific imaginable scenarios, but if those scenarios became more identifiable you would consider working on them instead?
Most of them are related to AI alignment problems, but it’s possible that I should work specifically on them rather than other parts of AI alignment.
An s-risk could occur via a moral failure, which could happen even if we knew how to align our AIs.