Yeah the quality of life in Poland is ahead of most of the world, and in most comparisons there’s no equivalence in circumstances, The Poland vs developing economy GDP per capita differences range from ~10x (Nigeria) to 30x (Niger, CAR).
I re-examined my Syria example and I think many of the returnees could feasibly be individuals with very poor economic prospects in their host countries—specifically, those in the bottom quartiles of incomes in Lebanon, Iraq, or Jordan, which collectively host 1.6 million Syrians. Some of these individuals may have also lived in camps, which total 275,000 people (though these two figures overlap). For them and those who have left in the past few months of fighting, returning to Syria could offer an opportunity to start better lives and they are likely to be the bulk of the 1 million returnees in the first 6 months.
My argument for returns was more focused on the idea that if these developing countries experience economic booms, people might choose to return there, even if the countries are still somewhat poorer. But this would be a more long-term consideration, its hard to predict and brain-drains by definition make this less likely to happen. Nevertheless, this scenario seems particularly relevant to modern South American examples, like Guyana, about 50% of Guyanese people are part of the diaspora. If Guyana’s recent economic boom is sustained, well-redistributed, and if the government manages to defend their borders, (big asks I know) it could potentially bring many Guyanese back.
One quick response I have is that Poland is a bit of a straw man—much smaller numbers go back to very por countries like Nigeria.
Yeah the quality of life in Poland is ahead of most of the world, and in most comparisons there’s no equivalence in circumstances, The Poland vs developing economy GDP per capita differences range from ~10x (Nigeria) to 30x (Niger, CAR).
I re-examined my Syria example and I think many of the returnees could feasibly be individuals with very poor economic prospects in their host countries—specifically, those in the bottom quartiles of incomes in Lebanon, Iraq, or Jordan, which collectively host 1.6 million Syrians. Some of these individuals may have also lived in camps, which total 275,000 people (though these two figures overlap). For them and those who have left in the past few months of fighting, returning to Syria could offer an opportunity to start better lives and they are likely to be the bulk of the 1 million returnees in the first 6 months.
My argument for returns was more focused on the idea that if these developing countries experience economic booms, people might choose to return there, even if the countries are still somewhat poorer. But this would be a more long-term consideration, its hard to predict and brain-drains by definition make this less likely to happen. Nevertheless, this scenario seems particularly relevant to modern South American examples, like Guyana, about 50% of Guyanese people are part of the diaspora. If Guyana’s recent economic boom is sustained, well-redistributed, and if the government manages to defend their borders, (big asks I know) it could potentially bring many Guyanese back.
All the numbers are quite rough.