To be clear: the view I argued against was not āpets have net negative lives,ā but rather, āpets ought not to exist even if they have net positive lives, because we violate their rights by owning/ācontrolling them.ā (Beneficentrism makes no empirical claims about whether pets have positive or negative lives on net, so it would make no sense to interpret me as suggesting that it supports any such empirical claim.)
Itās not ācircular reasoningā to note that plausible implications are a count in favor of a theory. Thatās normal philosophical reasoningāreflective equilibrium. (Though we can distinguish āsensible-soundingā from actually sensible. Not everything that sounds sensible at first glance will prove to be so on further reflection. But youād need to provide some argument to undermine the claim; it isnāt inherently objectionable to pass judgment on what is or isnāt sensible, so objecting to that argumentative structure is really odd.)
Iām still skeptical of using āobviousnessā/āāplausibilityā as evidence of a theory being correctāas a mental move it risks proving too much. Multiple theories might have equally obvious implications. Plenty of previously-unthinkable views would have been seen to be deeply un-obvious.
You have your intuitions and I have mineāwe can each say theyāre obvious to us and it gets us no further, surely? Perhaps Iām being dense.
Omelas is a very good place, and itās deeply irrational to condemn it. We can demonstrate this by noting that from behind a veil of ignorance, where you had an equal chance to be any affected individual (including the kid in the basement), it would be prudent to gamble on Omelas.
If it was so straightforwardly irrational (dare I say itāinsensible), Le Guin would presumably never have written the story in the first place! Not everyone behind the veil of ignorance would take the gamble, despite the naked assertion that āit would be prudentā to do so.
If it was so straightforwardly irrational (dare I say itāinsensible), Le Guin would presumably never have written the story in the first place!
This is bad reasoning. People vary radically in their ability to recognize irrationality (of various sorts). In the same way that we shouldnāt be surprised if a popular story involves mathematical assumptions that are obviously incoherent to a mathematician, we shouldnāt be surprised if a popular story involves normative assumptions that others can recognize as obviously wrong. (Consider how Gone with the Wind glorifies Confederate slavery, etc.)
Itās a basic and undeniable fact of life that people are swayed by bad reasoning all the time (e.g. when it is emotionally compelling, some interests are initially more salient to us than others, etc.).
You have your intuitions and I have mineāwe can each say theyāre obvious to us and it gets us no further, surely?
Correct; you are not my target audience. Iām responding here because you seemed to think that there was something wrong with my post because it took for granted something that you happen not to accept. Iām trying to explain why thatās an absurd standard. Plenty of others could find what I wrote both accurate and illuminating. It doesnāt have to convince you (or any other particular individual) in order to be epistemically valuable to the broader community.
If you find that a post starts from philosophical assumptions that you reject, I think the reasonable options available to you are:
(1) Engage in a first-order dispute, explaining why you think different assumptions are more likely to be true; or
(2) Ignore it and move on.
I do not think it is reasonable to engage in silencing procedural criticism, claiming that nobody should post things (including claims about what they take to be obvious) that you happen to disagree with.
[Update: struck-through a word that was somewhat too strong. But ānot the sort of thing I usually expect to find on the forumā implicates more than just āI happen to disagree with this,ā and something closer to āyou should not have written this.ā]
To be clear: the view I argued against was not āpets have net negative lives,ā but rather, āpets ought not to exist even if they have net positive lives, because we violate their rights by owning/ācontrolling them.ā (Beneficentrism makes no empirical claims about whether pets have positive or negative lives on net, so it would make no sense to interpret me as suggesting that it supports any such empirical claim.)
Itās not ācircular reasoningā to note that plausible implications are a count in favor of a theory. Thatās normal philosophical reasoningāreflective equilibrium. (Though we can distinguish āsensible-soundingā from actually sensible. Not everything that sounds sensible at first glance will prove to be so on further reflection. But youād need to provide some argument to undermine the claim; it isnāt inherently objectionable to pass judgment on what is or isnāt sensible, so objecting to that argumentative structure is really odd.)
Iām still skeptical of using āobviousnessā/āāplausibilityā as evidence of a theory being correctāas a mental move it risks proving too much. Multiple theories might have equally obvious implications. Plenty of previously-unthinkable views would have been seen to be deeply un-obvious.
You have your intuitions and I have mineāwe can each say theyāre obvious to us and it gets us no further, surely? Perhaps Iām being dense.
In Donāt Valorize The Void you say:
If it was so straightforwardly irrational (dare I say itāinsensible), Le Guin would presumably never have written the story in the first place! Not everyone behind the veil of ignorance would take the gamble, despite the naked assertion that āit would be prudentā to do so.
This is bad reasoning. People vary radically in their ability to recognize irrationality (of various sorts). In the same way that we shouldnāt be surprised if a popular story involves mathematical assumptions that are obviously incoherent to a mathematician, we shouldnāt be surprised if a popular story involves normative assumptions that others can recognize as obviously wrong. (Consider how Gone with the Wind glorifies Confederate slavery, etc.)
Itās a basic and undeniable fact of life that people are swayed by bad reasoning all the time (e.g. when it is emotionally compelling, some interests are initially more salient to us than others, etc.).
Correct; you are not my target audience. Iām responding here because you seemed to think that there was something wrong with my post because it took for granted something that you happen not to accept. Iām trying to explain why thatās an absurd standard. Plenty of others could find what I wrote both accurate and illuminating. It doesnāt have to convince you (or any other particular individual) in order to be epistemically valuable to the broader community.
If you find that a post starts from philosophical assumptions that you reject, I think the reasonable options available to you are:
(1) Engage in a first-order dispute, explaining why you think different assumptions are more likely to be true; or
(2) Ignore it and move on.
I do not think it is reasonable to engage in
silencingprocedural criticism, claiming that nobody should post things (including claims about what they take to be obvious) that you happen to disagree with.[Update: struck-through a word that was somewhat too strong. But ānot the sort of thing I usually expect to find on the forumā implicates more than just āI happen to disagree with this,ā and something closer to āyou should not have written this.ā]
Iām going to bow outāwasnāt my intention to try to āsilenceā anybody and Iām not quite sure how we got there!