Not what I was saying. More like, itâs a weak argument to merely say âmy position generates a sensible-sounding conclusion and thus is more likely to be trueâ, and it would surprise me if eg a highly-upvoted EA Forum post used this kind of circular reasoning. Or is that what youâre defending?
I suppose I agree that weâre not obliged to give every crackpot view equal airtimeâI just disagree that âpets have net negative livesâ is such a view.
To be clear: the view I argued against was not âpets have net negative lives,â but rather, âpets ought not to exist even if they have net positive lives, because we violate their rights by owning/âcontrolling them.â (Beneficentrism makes no empirical claims about whether pets have positive or negative lives on net, so it would make no sense to interpret me as suggesting that it supports any such empirical claim.)
Itâs not âcircular reasoningâ to note that plausible implications are a count in favor of a theory. Thatâs normal philosophical reasoningâreflective equilibrium. (Though we can distinguish âsensible-soundingâ from actually sensible. Not everything that sounds sensible at first glance will prove to be so on further reflection. But youâd need to provide some argument to undermine the claim; it isnât inherently objectionable to pass judgment on what is or isnât sensible, so objecting to that argumentative structure is really odd.)
Iâm still skeptical of using âobviousnessâ/ââplausibilityâ as evidence of a theory being correctâas a mental move it risks proving too much. Multiple theories might have equally obvious implications. Plenty of previously-unthinkable views would have been seen to be deeply un-obvious.
You have your intuitions and I have mineâwe can each say theyâre obvious to us and it gets us no further, surely? Perhaps Iâm being dense.
Omelas is a very good place, and itâs deeply irrational to condemn it. We can demonstrate this by noting that from behind a veil of ignorance, where you had an equal chance to be any affected individual (including the kid in the basement), it would be prudent to gamble on Omelas.
If it was so straightforwardly irrational (dare I say itâinsensible), Le Guin would presumably never have written the story in the first place! Not everyone behind the veil of ignorance would take the gamble, despite the naked assertion that âit would be prudentâ to do so.
If it was so straightforwardly irrational (dare I say itâinsensible), Le Guin would presumably never have written the story in the first place!
This is bad reasoning. People vary radically in their ability to recognize irrationality (of various sorts). In the same way that we shouldnât be surprised if a popular story involves mathematical assumptions that are obviously incoherent to a mathematician, we shouldnât be surprised if a popular story involves normative assumptions that others can recognize as obviously wrong. (Consider how Gone with the Wind glorifies Confederate slavery, etc.)
Itâs a basic and undeniable fact of life that people are swayed by bad reasoning all the time (e.g. when it is emotionally compelling, some interests are initially more salient to us than others, etc.).
You have your intuitions and I have mineâwe can each say theyâre obvious to us and it gets us no further, surely?
Correct; you are not my target audience. Iâm responding here because you seemed to think that there was something wrong with my post because it took for granted something that you happen not to accept. Iâm trying to explain why thatâs an absurd standard. Plenty of others could find what I wrote both accurate and illuminating. It doesnât have to convince you (or any other particular individual) in order to be epistemically valuable to the broader community.
If you find that a post starts from philosophical assumptions that you reject, I think the reasonable options available to you are:
(1) Engage in a first-order dispute, explaining why you think different assumptions are more likely to be true; or
(2) Ignore it and move on.
I do not think it is reasonable to engage in silencing procedural criticism, claiming that nobody should post things (including claims about what they take to be obvious) that you happen to disagree with.
[Update: struck-through a word that was somewhat too strong. But ânot the sort of thing I usually expect to find on the forumâ implicates more than just âI happen to disagree with this,â and something closer to âyou should not have written this.â]
Not what I was saying. More like, itâs a weak argument to merely say âmy position generates a sensible-sounding conclusion and thus is more likely to be trueâ, and it would surprise me if eg a highly-upvoted EA Forum post used this kind of circular reasoning. Or is that what youâre defending?
I suppose I agree that weâre not obliged to give every crackpot view equal airtimeâI just disagree that âpets have net negative livesâ is such a view.
To be clear: the view I argued against was not âpets have net negative lives,â but rather, âpets ought not to exist even if they have net positive lives, because we violate their rights by owning/âcontrolling them.â (Beneficentrism makes no empirical claims about whether pets have positive or negative lives on net, so it would make no sense to interpret me as suggesting that it supports any such empirical claim.)
Itâs not âcircular reasoningâ to note that plausible implications are a count in favor of a theory. Thatâs normal philosophical reasoningâreflective equilibrium. (Though we can distinguish âsensible-soundingâ from actually sensible. Not everything that sounds sensible at first glance will prove to be so on further reflection. But youâd need to provide some argument to undermine the claim; it isnât inherently objectionable to pass judgment on what is or isnât sensible, so objecting to that argumentative structure is really odd.)
Iâm still skeptical of using âobviousnessâ/ââplausibilityâ as evidence of a theory being correctâas a mental move it risks proving too much. Multiple theories might have equally obvious implications. Plenty of previously-unthinkable views would have been seen to be deeply un-obvious.
You have your intuitions and I have mineâwe can each say theyâre obvious to us and it gets us no further, surely? Perhaps Iâm being dense.
In Donât Valorize The Void you say:
If it was so straightforwardly irrational (dare I say itâinsensible), Le Guin would presumably never have written the story in the first place! Not everyone behind the veil of ignorance would take the gamble, despite the naked assertion that âit would be prudentâ to do so.
This is bad reasoning. People vary radically in their ability to recognize irrationality (of various sorts). In the same way that we shouldnât be surprised if a popular story involves mathematical assumptions that are obviously incoherent to a mathematician, we shouldnât be surprised if a popular story involves normative assumptions that others can recognize as obviously wrong. (Consider how Gone with the Wind glorifies Confederate slavery, etc.)
Itâs a basic and undeniable fact of life that people are swayed by bad reasoning all the time (e.g. when it is emotionally compelling, some interests are initially more salient to us than others, etc.).
Correct; you are not my target audience. Iâm responding here because you seemed to think that there was something wrong with my post because it took for granted something that you happen not to accept. Iâm trying to explain why thatâs an absurd standard. Plenty of others could find what I wrote both accurate and illuminating. It doesnât have to convince you (or any other particular individual) in order to be epistemically valuable to the broader community.
If you find that a post starts from philosophical assumptions that you reject, I think the reasonable options available to you are:
(1) Engage in a first-order dispute, explaining why you think different assumptions are more likely to be true; or
(2) Ignore it and move on.
I do not think it is reasonable to engage in
silencingprocedural criticism, claiming that nobody should post things (including claims about what they take to be obvious) that you happen to disagree with.[Update: struck-through a word that was somewhat too strong. But ânot the sort of thing I usually expect to find on the forumâ implicates more than just âI happen to disagree with this,â and something closer to âyou should not have written this.â]
Iâm going to bow outâwasnât my intention to try to âsilenceâ anybody and Iâm not quite sure how we got there!