1.The identity problems is known to be difficult, but here I assume that continuity of consciousness is not needed for it. Only informational identity is enough.
2. The difference between quantum—or big world- immortality is that we can select which minds to create and exclude N+1 moments which are damages or suffering.
Let us assume that a typical large but finite volume contains n happy simulations of you and n⋅10−100 suffering copies of you, maybe Boltzmann brains or simulations made by a malevolent agent. If the universe is infinite, you have infinitely many happy and infinitely suffering copies of you and it is hard how to interpret this result.
I think that there is way to calculate relative probabilities even in infinite case and it will converge to 1:1⋅10−100. For example, there is an article “The watchers of multiverse” which suggest a plausible way to do so.
1.The identity problems is known to be difficult, but here I assume that continuity of consciousness is not needed for it. Only informational identity is enough.
2. The difference between quantum—or big world- immortality is that we can select which minds to create and exclude N+1 moments which are damages or suffering.
Let us assume that a typical large but finite volume contains n happy simulations of you and n⋅10−100 suffering copies of you, maybe Boltzmann brains or simulations made by a malevolent agent. If the universe is infinite, you have infinitely many happy and infinitely suffering copies of you and it is hard how to interpret this result.
I think that there is way to calculate relative probabilities even in infinite case and it will converge to 1:1⋅10−100. For example, there is an article “The watchers of multiverse” which suggest a plausible way to do so.
Thank you for the link to the paper. I find Alexander Vilenkins theoretical work very interesting.