Hiii! Do you know someplace where I can read up on that? Ty!
I’m afraid I don’t have anything great to hand. I can give you a quick summary of the arguments though. (I realise this is not what you asked for, but I figure better than nothing, which is realistically my alternative action).
There are I think three main arguments:
UNRWA operates very differently from all other UN refugee programs because it viewed refugee status as hereditary. For most conflicts, the aim is to find a safe place for displaced people to live… their children should become citizens of their new home. Only in this case are the grandchildren viewed as having a strong moral claim to return to a land they have never seen, which (combined with their high birth rate) means the size of the refugee population has increased over time, rather than decreasing. Apparently even if someone requests to be de-listed as a refugee because they are happily settled elsewhere, UNRWA will refuse and still count them (and their descendents). This is convenient for Israel’s enemies who like the perpetuation of the problem.
UNRWA distributes textbooks and pays teachers that promote hatred of Israel and Jews, celebrate terrorists and jihad, and denies the viability of peace. Some of these textbooks are part of the Palestinian government curriculum which UNRWA claims it has no choice but to distribute; other material is produced by UNRWA employees directly.
Hamas directly operate communications, command centers, and weapon storage out of or underneath UNRWA offices, with at least the tacit support of UNRWA.
There are other criticisms of them (e.g. they allow aid to be expropriated by Hamas, UNRWA employees took part in the October 7th massacre, UNRWA helped hold hostages) but the three I mentioned above are the key ones for UNRWA having negative long-term effects.
I appreciate you laying out the arguments you’ve heard. Given how serious and contested these claims are, I think it’s important to include sources or indicate your level of confidence/agreement, otherwise it’s very hard for readers to assess whether these arguments are well-supported, disputed, or based on outdated information. Without that context, there’s a real risk of unintentionally spreading misinformation or giving a false sense of certainty. Several points articulated in your bullets are not aligned with my understanding of international law or refugee status, and the reference to Palestinian birth rates in the first bullet made me uncomfortable and concerned about where some of this information was sourced from.
On the point about UNRWA’s definition of refugee status: my understanding is that, under international law, refugee protections remain in place until people can either safely return home or voluntarily settle elsewhere.[1] For Palestinians, UNRWA’s approach reflects the reality that safe, voluntary return has not been possible for decades. Whether one agrees with it or not, it’s not unprecedented for refugee status to continue across generations when no durable solution has been reached. There are other areas with protracted crises, like Somalia, where there are multiple generations of refugees registered by UNHCR in camps like Dadaab in Kenya.[2]
And on the point “only in this case are the grandchildren viewed as having a strong moral claim to return to a land they have never seen”it’s worth noting that Israel’s Law of Return grants “every Jew in the world the right to settle in Israel”[3]/acquire Israeli citizenship, including those whose families haven’t ever lived there or haven’t for generations. This means some some groups/types of people are supported to come or return while Palestinians are not. I believe this makes the principles at play more complex than this current framing suggests.
Larks’ claims seem pretty easy to verify, and I think you failed to address all of them.
In 1965, UNRWA changed the eligibility requirements to be a Palestinian refugee to include third-generation descendants, and in 1982, it extended it again, to include all descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, regardless of whether they had been granted citizenship elsewhere. This is not how refugee status is determined for basically any other group. Interestingly, under this definition, the majority of the world’s Jews would have refugee status as well (GPT-5 estimates over 99% of Jews fit this definition). I think this is pretty relevant to your objection about Israel’s Law of Return. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/17/unrwa-has-changed-the-definition-of-refugee/
Israeli intelligence assesses that some 10% of all UNRWA employees in Gaza have ties to terror organizations, in addition to at least 12 employees it says were involved in the October 7 terror onslaught in southern Israel, according to a new report.
My heart goes out to the civilians in Gaza, and I hope a peaceful resolution can be found for this conflict soon. But UNRWA doesn’t seem like a high integrity organization, and I seriously doubt donating to them is the best way to help the people of Gaza.
“But UNRWA doesn’t seem like a high integrity organization, and I seriously doubt donating to them is the best way to help the people of Gaza. “
Almost none of the things you cite are relevant to whether access for UNRWA being allowed is particularly likely to reduce the hunger currently in Gaza, relative to access for other aid agencies which seems a very big part of what determines whether it is “the best way”. I actually don’t think donations to UNRWA will help because there is no chance in hell of Israel letting them in, and it would be better to try to get them to let in MSF or some other aid agency instead, but that is a separate point.
I guess you could hold that UNRWA are genuinely a major factor in keeping the conflict going, and that this means that marginal further funding for them has a non-negligible but I think that is extremely implausible: Hamas would exist with or without UNRWA, and presumably whoever the major providers of schools in Gaza are they will teach in a way roughly compatible with Hamas’ demands and current Palestinian public opinion. I expect the marginal impact of donation to UNRWA or UNRWA access to Gaza to feed people for a few days on the conflict to be zero by any mechanism other than one that goes directly through the effects of more Gazans being fed by literally any organization.
Out of interest, do you think Israel should do more to let in other aid organizations, like say MSF, than they are currently doing?
I appreciate you taking the time to respond. I’ve replied to a few of your points below.
(1) I don’t have objections to Israel’s Law of Return per se. But I wanted to raise the point that Jews who cannot trace ties back to Israel in living memory, or have converted to Judaism, receive rights and opportunities that Palestinians whose parents/grandparents were expelled do not. If ancestral ties are valid grounds for some groups, why not for others? Do you agree this is a double standard?
(2) I think it’s important to be specific and provide direct examples about “problematic and hateful” content in textbooks. As outsiders, we’re often dealing with contested histories through second-hand accounts, and when history is politicized there are always profoundly different narratives. Someone seen as a martyr or hero by one group can be viewed as a terrorist by another—much like how Nelson Mandela or John Brown were perceived differently depending on time, place, and identity. I don’t say this to excuse violence or antisemitism, but to note that perspective matters and it is hard to judge these claims without specific examples.
For example, several early Israeli political leaders were leaders of violent paramilitary groups denounced by some countries for terrorism. Menachem Begin was a leader of Irgun, and went on to become a Prime Minister of Israel and win a Nobel Peace Prize in 1978. Yitzhak Shamir was a leader of Lehi (the Stern Gang), which killed more than 100 Palestinians in Deir Yassin, and went on to become a Prime Minister of Israel. It is not hard for me to imagine that they are honored in some narratives as founders and leaders, and criticized harshly in other narratives for violent acts against civilians. I’d be interested to know how these figures are discussed in Israeli curricula—just as I’d like to see concrete examples from Palestinian curricula—but I don’t have firsthand knowledge of how either side teaches these histories. I would welcome suggestions on where I can find more information about this, including primary sources.
(4) When aid is restricted by blockades and movement limits, looting and diversion often increase; when aid flows more freely (like during the ceasefires) diversion tends to decrease. Even if some aid is stolen by Hamas, that’s not a moral or legal reason to deprive civilians of food and medicine. Cutting off aid risks constituting collective punishment, which is illegal under international law. In principle, do you believe humanitarian aid should be withheld from any civilian population if there’s a risk some might be diverted to an armed group? Or does the obligation to prevent mass civilian death take precedence?
(6) I cannot access the full article, but no civilians of any nationality should ever be taken hostage or subjected to collective punishment for the actions of their government or ruling group. The destruction of hospitals and medical facilities by the IDF, and the collapse of medical access in Gaza, affects both hostages and Palestinian civilians. Attacks on healthcare facilities should stop immediately.
While I understand concerns over education content and potential affiliation of UN staff, these problems seem secondary to the immediate crisis on the ground. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian children have been out of school for two years, most homes, schools and hospitals have been destroyed, and now the entire population is facing catastrophic hunger—while the supplies to save them are just miles away. Currently only UNRWA has the staff on the ground to distribute it at the scale needed. If there were a viable path for NGOs to surge aid according to humanitarian principles, without UN/UNRWA involvement, I would support that. The immediate humanitarian emergency must take precedence.
Without that context, there’s a real risk of unintentionally spreading misinformation or giving a false sense of certainty. Several points articulated in your bullets are not aligned with my understanding of international law or refugee status, and the reference to Palestinian birth rates in the first bullet made me uncomfortable and concerned about where some of this information was sourced from.
The fact that Palestinians have high birth rates is, as far as I know, completely uncontroversial. Prior to your comment I have never encountered a single person who would question this! I was hoping to be able to timebox this discussion rather than provide detailed citations for what I thought were relatively undisputed facts, but since you insist:
The Palastinian Ministry of Health say the crude birth rate is over 26/1000. For context, South Korea, a country with a very low birth rate, is around 5/1000, over 80% lower.
According to ‘Palestine Remembered’, the crude birth rate among Palestinian refugees is even higher—over 30.
Not only is this fact uncontroversial, it is vital for understanding the conflict. The total number of original refugees was much smaller than today; if their birth rates had been low rather than high, or their descendants living abroad not counted, the total number today would be dramatically smaller.
my understanding is that, under international law, refugee protections remain in place until people can either safely return home or voluntarily settle elsewhere.[1]
I think this is incorrect in both directions.
Firstly, I think in many a lot of cases there has been no concern for the voluntary nature settlement. If we compare just to other post WWII population movements, I am not aware of any right of return being granted to (the descendants of) Germans forcibly migrated to Germany, nor Indians and Pakistanis after partition, not Jews fleeing Arab countries. With good reason—doing so would cause a lot of conflict for little gain.
Secondly, voluntary settlement elsewhere does not end UNRWA registration. You are welcome to look up the criteria for being removed from the UNRWA list—as far as I know the only escape is death (or being found to be incorrectly registered). You can be happily living as a citizen of another country, and your children and grandchildren after you, but the UNRWA will still consider them to be refugees.
Firstly, I think in many a lot of cases there has been no concern for the voluntary nature settlement.
On the question of resettlement and return, international law is clear: a power cannot lawfully expel a population and then deny their right to return. A permanent removal or resettlement that is not voluntary could constitute a forcible transfer, prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This is why it would not be lawful for Israel or the U.S. to pressure or force Palestinians to relocate elsewhere, even if another country was willing to accept them. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13) affirms the right of every person to return to their country, and UN General Assembly Resolution 194 specifically guarantees that right to Palestinian refugees. That principle doesn’t expire after a generation, it remains in force until there is a durable, rights-respecting solution, whether through repatriation, compensation, or voluntary resettlement.
Prior to your comment I have never encountered a single person who would question this! I was hoping to be able to timebox this discussion rather than provide detailed citations for what I thought were relatively undisputed facts, but since you insist:
I should have been clearer in my initial comment. I don’t dispute that the birth rate is higher in the West Bank and Gaza than in some other places. But context matters in understanding what a “high” birth rate actually means, and why that statistic is relevant. According to the most recent data from the World Bank, the crude birth rate (CBR) in the West Bank and Gaza is 27 per 1,000 - higher than Israel (19) or the U.S. (11) but lower than the average for low-income countries (35) and close to the average for the Middle East and North Africa (23) and lower-middle income countries (21). Comparing the West Bank and Gaza to South Korea is not a meaningful benchmark in my opinion.
What concerned me was the framing. Discussing birth rates of marginalized communities is often a shortcut to presenting them as a “demographic threat,” a logic that has historically been used to justify harmful policies. It reduces people to numbers instead of recognizing them as individuals with rights, dignity, and autonomy over their family lives. That’s why I asked about your sources—not because I can’t find basic statistics, but because I wanted to engage in good faith and understand the framing and intent behind that point.
Only in this case are the grandchildren viewed as having a strong moral claim to return to a land they have never seen, which (combined with their high birth rate) means the size of the refugee population has increased over time, rather than decreasing…This is convenient for Israel’s enemies who like the perpetuation of the problem.
And from the most recent comment:
The total number of original refugees was much smaller than today; if their birth rates had been low rather than high, or their descendants living abroad not counted, the total number today would be dramatically smaller.
Some of these statements (emphasis mine) could be read to imply that fewer Palestinians would be preferable politically. That framing is what makes me uncomfortable, especially at a time when Palestinians are being killed and displaced daily, illegal settlements in the West Bank are being expanded, and political rhetoric is increasingly dehumanizing.
Framing the growth or continued existence of a group as a “problem” has historically been used to justify dispossession, violence, and worse. In the U.S., when people frame the birth rates of Black, immigrant, or minority communities as too high compared to white Americans; or criticize Orthodox Jews or other religious communities for having too many children, that framing is widely understood as harmful and dehumanizing.
The suggestion that the greater number of Palestinians alive or registered with UNRWA makes resolving the political situation harder (or that the growing Palestinian population justifies limiting their right to return) shifts the conversation from how to uphold rights for everyone, and toward treating the very existence of one group the issue. And if demographics are “vital for understanding the conflict” then Israel’s growth—through birth and immigration—should be part of that conversation too.
I was drawn to EA because of its emphasis on valuing all life. In that spirit, I try to approach even charged conversations with care and precision, doing my best to avoid framings that could dehumanize any group. This discussion ended up taking more time than either of us probably anticipated, and I genuinely appreciate you taking the time to engage in it with me.
What purpose does it serve to suggest they should have smaller families?
Ok, I am tapping out. I didn’t want to be involved in this conversation in the first place, and only replied because you and Dawn asked for clarification and sourcing which I assumed was a good faith attempt to learn about the world. But I see now you are more interested in picking a fight and casting aspersions on an imaginary person. Since this person apparently holds a bunch of views I don’t hold—like that people should have smaller families—the person clearly isn’t me, so there’s not much point my continuing to engage.
Hiii! Do you know someplace where I can read up on that? Ty!
I’m afraid I don’t have anything great to hand. I can give you a quick summary of the arguments though. (I realise this is not what you asked for, but I figure better than nothing, which is realistically my alternative action).
There are I think three main arguments:
UNRWA operates very differently from all other UN refugee programs because it viewed refugee status as hereditary. For most conflicts, the aim is to find a safe place for displaced people to live… their children should become citizens of their new home. Only in this case are the grandchildren viewed as having a strong moral claim to return to a land they have never seen, which (combined with their high birth rate) means the size of the refugee population has increased over time, rather than decreasing. Apparently even if someone requests to be de-listed as a refugee because they are happily settled elsewhere, UNRWA will refuse and still count them (and their descendents). This is convenient for Israel’s enemies who like the perpetuation of the problem.
UNRWA distributes textbooks and pays teachers that promote hatred of Israel and Jews, celebrate terrorists and jihad, and denies the viability of peace. Some of these textbooks are part of the Palestinian government curriculum which UNRWA claims it has no choice but to distribute; other material is produced by UNRWA employees directly.
Hamas directly operate communications, command centers, and weapon storage out of or underneath UNRWA offices, with at least the tacit support of UNRWA.
There are other criticisms of them (e.g. they allow aid to be expropriated by Hamas, UNRWA employees took part in the October 7th massacre, UNRWA helped hold hostages) but the three I mentioned above are the key ones for UNRWA having negative long-term effects.
I appreciate you laying out the arguments you’ve heard. Given how serious and contested these claims are, I think it’s important to include sources or indicate your level of confidence/agreement, otherwise it’s very hard for readers to assess whether these arguments are well-supported, disputed, or based on outdated information. Without that context, there’s a real risk of unintentionally spreading misinformation or giving a false sense of certainty. Several points articulated in your bullets are not aligned with my understanding of international law or refugee status, and the reference to Palestinian birth rates in the first bullet made me uncomfortable and concerned about where some of this information was sourced from.
On the point about UNRWA’s definition of refugee status: my understanding is that, under international law, refugee protections remain in place until people can either safely return home or voluntarily settle elsewhere.[1] For Palestinians, UNRWA’s approach reflects the reality that safe, voluntary return has not been possible for decades. Whether one agrees with it or not, it’s not unprecedented for refugee status to continue across generations when no durable solution has been reached. There are other areas with protracted crises, like Somalia, where there are multiple generations of refugees registered by UNHCR in camps like Dadaab in Kenya.[2]
And on the point “only in this case are the grandchildren viewed as having a strong moral claim to return to a land they have never seen”it’s worth noting that Israel’s Law of Return grants “every Jew in the world the right to settle in Israel”[3]/acquire Israeli citizenship, including those whose families haven’t ever lived there or haven’t for generations. This means some some groups/types of people are supported to come or return while Palestinians are not. I believe this makes the principles at play more complex than this current framing suggests.
https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/refugees
https://www.unrwa.org/transfer-refugee-status-descendants-unique-unrwa-0
https://www.nbn.org.il/life-in-israel/government-services/rights-and-benefits/the-law-of-return/
Larks’ claims seem pretty easy to verify, and I think you failed to address all of them.
In 1965, UNRWA changed the eligibility requirements to be a Palestinian refugee to include third-generation descendants, and in 1982, it extended it again, to include all descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, regardless of whether they had been granted citizenship elsewhere. This is not how refugee status is determined for basically any other group. Interestingly, under this definition, the majority of the world’s Jews would have refugee status as well (GPT-5 estimates over 99% of Jews fit this definition). I think this is pretty relevant to your objection about Israel’s Law of Return. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/17/unrwa-has-changed-the-definition-of-refugee/
The European Parliament condemned “problematic and hateful contents encouraging violence, spreading antisemitism and inciting hatred in Palestinian school textbooks” and in “supplementary educational materials developed by UNRWA staff”. https://www.timesofisrael.com/european-parliament-condemns-incitement-in-palestinian-unrwa-textbooks/
The IDF discovered a sophisticated Hamas data center in tunnels directly beneath UNRWA’s Gaza headquarters in the upscale Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City. https://www.timesofisrael.com/directly-beneath-unrwas-gaza-headquarters-idf-uncovers-top-secret-hamas-data-center/
UN Watch has compiled numerous allegations of aid theft, including recorded calls with Gaza residents claiming “Hamas systematically steals equipment and food, including stealing from UNRWA warehouses” https://unwatch.org/evidence-of-unrwa-aid-to-hamas-on-and-after-october-7th/
Israeli intelligence assesses that some 10% of all UNRWA employees in Gaza have ties to terror organizations, in addition to at least 12 employees it says were involved in the October 7 terror onslaught in southern Israel, according to a new report.
British-Israeli hostage Emily Damari told British Prime Minister Keir Starmer that she was held by Hamas at UNRWA facilities in Gaza and denied medical treatment after being shot twice. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-02-02/ty-article/.premium/report-freed-hostage-emily-damari-was-held-in-unrwa-facilities-during-gaza-captivity/00000194-c57b-d533-a3b6-cd7fe68b0000
My heart goes out to the civilians in Gaza, and I hope a peaceful resolution can be found for this conflict soon. But UNRWA doesn’t seem like a high integrity organization, and I seriously doubt donating to them is the best way to help the people of Gaza.
“But UNRWA doesn’t seem like a high integrity organization, and I seriously doubt donating to them is the best way to help the people of Gaza. “
Almost none of the things you cite are relevant to whether access for UNRWA being allowed is particularly likely to reduce the hunger currently in Gaza, relative to access for other aid agencies which seems a very big part of what determines whether it is “the best way”. I actually don’t think donations to UNRWA will help because there is no chance in hell of Israel letting them in, and it would be better to try to get them to let in MSF or some other aid agency instead, but that is a separate point.
I guess you could hold that UNRWA are genuinely a major factor in keeping the conflict going, and that this means that marginal further funding for them has a non-negligible but I think that is extremely implausible: Hamas would exist with or without UNRWA, and presumably whoever the major providers of schools in Gaza are they will teach in a way roughly compatible with Hamas’ demands and current Palestinian public opinion. I expect the marginal impact of donation to UNRWA or UNRWA access to Gaza to feed people for a few days on the conflict to be zero by any mechanism other than one that goes directly through the effects of more Gazans being fed by literally any organization.
Out of interest, do you think Israel should do more to let in other aid organizations, like say MSF, than they are currently doing?
I appreciate you taking the time to respond. I’ve replied to a few of your points below.
(1) I don’t have objections to Israel’s Law of Return per se. But I wanted to raise the point that Jews who cannot trace ties back to Israel in living memory, or have converted to Judaism, receive rights and opportunities that Palestinians whose parents/grandparents were expelled do not. If ancestral ties are valid grounds for some groups, why not for others? Do you agree this is a double standard?
(2) I think it’s important to be specific and provide direct examples about “problematic and hateful” content in textbooks. As outsiders, we’re often dealing with contested histories through second-hand accounts, and when history is politicized there are always profoundly different narratives. Someone seen as a martyr or hero by one group can be viewed as a terrorist by another—much like how Nelson Mandela or John Brown were perceived differently depending on time, place, and identity. I don’t say this to excuse violence or antisemitism, but to note that perspective matters and it is hard to judge these claims without specific examples.
For example, several early Israeli political leaders were leaders of violent paramilitary groups denounced by some countries for terrorism. Menachem Begin was a leader of Irgun, and went on to become a Prime Minister of Israel and win a Nobel Peace Prize in 1978. Yitzhak Shamir was a leader of Lehi (the Stern Gang), which killed more than 100 Palestinians in Deir Yassin, and went on to become a Prime Minister of Israel. It is not hard for me to imagine that they are honored in some narratives as founders and leaders, and criticized harshly in other narratives for violent acts against civilians. I’d be interested to know how these figures are discussed in Israeli curricula—just as I’d like to see concrete examples from Palestinian curricula—but I don’t have firsthand knowledge of how either side teaches these histories. I would welcome suggestions on where I can find more information about this, including primary sources.
(4) When aid is restricted by blockades and movement limits, looting and diversion often increase; when aid flows more freely (like during the ceasefires) diversion tends to decrease. Even if some aid is stolen by Hamas, that’s not a moral or legal reason to deprive civilians of food and medicine. Cutting off aid risks constituting collective punishment, which is illegal under international law. In principle, do you believe humanitarian aid should be withheld from any civilian population if there’s a risk some might be diverted to an armed group? Or does the obligation to prevent mass civilian death take precedence?
(6) I cannot access the full article, but no civilians of any nationality should ever be taken hostage or subjected to collective punishment for the actions of their government or ruling group. The destruction of hospitals and medical facilities by the IDF, and the collapse of medical access in Gaza, affects both hostages and Palestinian civilians. Attacks on healthcare facilities should stop immediately.
While I understand concerns over education content and potential affiliation of UN staff, these problems seem secondary to the immediate crisis on the ground. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian children have been out of school for two years, most homes, schools and hospitals have been destroyed, and now the entire population is facing catastrophic hunger—while the supplies to save them are just miles away. Currently only UNRWA has the staff on the ground to distribute it at the scale needed. If there were a viable path for NGOs to surge aid according to humanitarian principles, without UN/UNRWA involvement, I would support that. The immediate humanitarian emergency must take precedence.
The fact that Palestinians have high birth rates is, as far as I know, completely uncontroversial. Prior to your comment I have never encountered a single person who would question this! I was hoping to be able to timebox this discussion rather than provide detailed citations for what I thought were relatively undisputed facts, but since you insist:
The Palastinian Ministry of Health say the crude birth rate is over 26/1000. For context, South Korea, a country with a very low birth rate, is around 5/1000, over 80% lower.
According to ‘Palestine Remembered’, the crude birth rate among Palestinian refugees is even higher—over 30.
Here is AP news reporting on a UN ‘warning’ about high Palestinian birth rates.
Here is an article in Pubmed about birth rates being high.
Even the UNRWA agrees the birth rate among Palestinians has been and remains high, though they credit themselves with reducing it.
Not only is this fact uncontroversial, it is vital for understanding the conflict. The total number of original refugees was much smaller than today; if their birth rates had been low rather than high, or their descendants living abroad not counted, the total number today would be dramatically smaller.
I think this is incorrect in both directions.
Firstly, I think in many a lot of cases there has been no concern for the voluntary nature settlement. If we compare just to other post WWII population movements, I am not aware of any right of return being granted to (the descendants of) Germans forcibly migrated to Germany, nor Indians and Pakistanis after partition, not Jews fleeing Arab countries. With good reason—doing so would cause a lot of conflict for little gain.
Secondly, voluntary settlement elsewhere does not end UNRWA registration. You are welcome to look up the criteria for being removed from the UNRWA list—as far as I know the only escape is death (or being found to be incorrectly registered). You can be happily living as a citizen of another country, and your children and grandchildren after you, but the UNRWA will still consider them to be refugees.
On the question of resettlement and return, international law is clear: a power cannot lawfully expel a population and then deny their right to return. A permanent removal or resettlement that is not voluntary could constitute a forcible transfer, prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This is why it would not be lawful for Israel or the U.S. to pressure or force Palestinians to relocate elsewhere, even if another country was willing to accept them. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13) affirms the right of every person to return to their country, and UN General Assembly Resolution 194 specifically guarantees that right to Palestinian refugees. That principle doesn’t expire after a generation, it remains in force until there is a durable, rights-respecting solution, whether through repatriation, compensation, or voluntary resettlement.
I should have been clearer in my initial comment. I don’t dispute that the birth rate is higher in the West Bank and Gaza than in some other places. But context matters in understanding what a “high” birth rate actually means, and why that statistic is relevant. According to the most recent data from the World Bank, the crude birth rate (CBR) in the West Bank and Gaza is 27 per 1,000 - higher than Israel (19) or the U.S. (11) but lower than the average for low-income countries (35) and close to the average for the Middle East and North Africa (23) and lower-middle income countries (21). Comparing the West Bank and Gaza to South Korea is not a meaningful benchmark in my opinion.
What concerned me was the framing. Discussing birth rates of marginalized communities is often a shortcut to presenting them as a “demographic threat,” a logic that has historically been used to justify harmful policies. It reduces people to numbers instead of recognizing them as individuals with rights, dignity, and autonomy over their family lives. That’s why I asked about your sources—not because I can’t find basic statistics, but because I wanted to engage in good faith and understand the framing and intent behind that point.
And from the most recent comment:
Some of these statements (emphasis mine) could be read to imply that fewer Palestinians would be preferable politically. That framing is what makes me uncomfortable, especially at a time when Palestinians are being killed and displaced daily, illegal settlements in the West Bank are being expanded, and political rhetoric is increasingly dehumanizing.
Framing the growth or continued existence of a group as a “problem” has historically been used to justify dispossession, violence, and worse. In the U.S., when people frame the birth rates of Black, immigrant, or minority communities as too high compared to white Americans; or criticize Orthodox Jews or other religious communities for having too many children, that framing is widely understood as harmful and dehumanizing.
The suggestion that the greater number of Palestinians alive or registered with UNRWA makes resolving the political situation harder (or that the growing Palestinian population justifies limiting their right to return) shifts the conversation from how to uphold rights for everyone, and toward treating the very existence of one group the issue. And if demographics are “vital for understanding the conflict” then Israel’s growth—through birth and immigration—should be part of that conversation too.
I was drawn to EA because of its emphasis on valuing all life. In that spirit, I try to approach even charged conversations with care and precision, doing my best to avoid framings that could dehumanize any group. This discussion ended up taking more time than either of us probably anticipated, and I genuinely appreciate you taking the time to engage in it with me.
Ok, I am tapping out. I didn’t want to be involved in this conversation in the first place, and only replied because you and Dawn asked for clarification and sourcing which I assumed was a good faith attempt to learn about the world. But I see now you are more interested in picking a fight and casting aspersions on an imaginary person. Since this person apparently holds a bunch of views I don’t hold—like that people should have smaller families—the person clearly isn’t me, so there’s not much point my continuing to engage.
Thanks for the summary!