Claude helped with this post. Thoughts are mine
AI is different. Not different in degree but different in kind: extreme enough that the precedent doesnāt carry over. The reasoning and counterarguments we apply to current humans, or to other intelligent beings, simply donāt apply, because AI is extremely different. Three of the most common cases show the shape of it.
The pattern
Each case: an empirical/āhistorical argument that risk is overstated.
Control. Weāve controlled coerced populations for millennia, so we can control AIs. ā Different: slaves could revolt yet had broadly human goals and limited power; superintelligence is more capable and more alien.
Optimization. Humans and chimps arenāt strict optimizers, and strict optimization may not even be coherent given sparse data and the need to generate hypotheses from priors ā so why expect it of AI? ā Different: enough intelligence finds proxies to optimize and workarounds we canāt foresee.
Recursive self-improvement. Current systems show none ā no firm fires its coders to buy compute; the binding constraints are physical compute buildout and compute-dependent algorithmic progress. ā Different: a system a step above us routes around constraints we think are binding.
General form: any base rate or analogy is dissolved by positing a future system of sufficient magnitude that the comparison breaks.
Thesis
The load-bearing premise of AI x-risk arguments is āAI is different.ā Therefore, the strength of it merits some specific investigation
Here, Iād argue that assuming this premise as strongly as is often done is epistemically fraught:
This prior is philosophical, not empirical.
Philosophical arguments of this kind predict the world badly.
Because the premise is self-sealing, it ā rather than any fact ā drives the enormous spread in p(risk) across well-informed people.
Part 1 ā philosophical, not empirical.
Each rebuttal above is an a priori claim about what sufficient intelligence entails (optimization power, workaround-finding), derived from a concept of intelligence, not from observed instances. Tellingly, current AI is exempted from historical comparisons in a way we wouldnāt be tempted to do for a different change like the internet, a political event, or social media. That concession relocates the claim from the empirical register (where base rates run against it) to the conceptual/āfuture register (where no data can reach it).
The self-sealing works through three moves: reference-class escape (the object is āsuperintelligence,ā outside any sample); capability-as-universal-solvent (any bottleneck dissolves under enough intelligence); disanalogy on demand (the system is underspecified enough to differ in whatever way the argument needs). The premise cannot lose ā skepticsā evidence slides off, believersā scenarios are never refuted by present systems. A prior that no observation can move is exactly what produces 0.01-vs-0.5 splits among people sharing the same facts.
Part 2 ā it proves too much.
Outside view.
Longquoting Dwarkesh:
āIāve been reading The House of Government recently. Itās a fascinating account of people involved in the Russian Revolution. There were many different factions of people who were disillusioned with the Czarist regimeāthe anarchists, the Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, the social revolutionaries, the Decembrists. They intensely debated the dichotomies which were most salient to them given their milieu.
The ādecisive battleā ⦠covered all the usual points of disagreement: the āworking classā versus āthe peopleā; the āsober calculationā versus āgreat deeds and self-sacrificeā; āobjectivismā versus āsubjectivismā; and āuniversal laws of developmentā versus āRussiaās uniqueness.ā
Yet none of them anticipated the considerations we now recognize to be far more relevant to economic development: dispersed knowledge, voluntary exchange, and entrepreneurial innovation.
I think about this whenever my Bay Area friends debate AGIāwill there be a software-only singularity, adversarial misalignment, training gaming, explosive growth, etc, etc? Maybe the frameworks weāre using and the questions weāre asking are fundamentally misguided.
Given this topic is so epistemically murky that someone smart can come up with a new consideration that alters your key conclusions, how much should you update on the most recent compelling story youāve heard?ā
Here is an even stronger, more deductive presentation of this argument, the predictāpostdict gap:
We still canāt agree on the causes of events that already happened with full archives ā how much the internet contributed to GDP, what actually ended slavery. If retrodiction from extensive factual knowledge fails, prediction of an unprecedented system from armchair deductive argument should fail worse.
Arguments of this form have a poor forecasting record; āAI is differentā is one. As the crux of many AI safety arguments, itās important to have strong reasons to believe it to overcome the above.
(Copying my comment from Substack)
Thanks! This post was interesting and helped clarify my thoughts on some relevant issues. Still, I want to push in the other direction.
I think historical data poses its own sets of flaws and limitationsāand there are certain questions that it cannot easily answer. Therefore, I still think one should from philosophical/āconceptual analysis since thereās often no better approach to answering the questions. To be concrete, here are two main categories of questions that AI forecasting is looking to answer and where conceptual analysis must be used.
1. Timelines and capabilities forecasting
Here, I think the historical data about other technologies and their diffusion is pretty good to predict AIās diffusion in the economy.
But to answer questions like āwill AI automate all human-level cognitive laborā, I think it would be dubious to only look through the history of other transformative technology and conclude āno because electricity/āTV/āinternet/āphones did notā. There is a much clearer mechanism for AI to automate these tasks than any of those past technologies, and therefore the historical data just isnāt that persuasive to me.
2. What risks does TAI pose and how should we mitigate them
Here I think conceptual analysis is much more valuable. There are benefits of doing some economic modelling to see how to react to issues like job loss etc., especially for the near-term. But for questions like āhow likely is human disempowerment from powerful AIā, I donāt see any good alternative to conceptual thinking. I really like Forethoughtās post about what to focus on here which encompasses non-alignment problems and basically focuses on high level strategic questions since those are easier to predict:
Of course, there are lots of possible issues with conceptual thinking that you mention in the post. Where Iām at is just accepting that no approach is especially good and that we should keep some amount of epistemic humility in our arguments since itās very easy to be deeply confused in both directions.