No, the OP’s argument is assuming that the lives of farmed animals is net negative. It’s saying that farmed animal welfare might at most be neutral, which would mean that, on expectation, farmed animal welfare is harmful. Nevertheless, it would be less harmful than ignoring farmed animal welfare would be, which means farmed animal welfare is still net positive.
Meanwhile, the argument in your link argues that farmed animal welfare may be net negative, but it relies on the opposite assumption that the lives of farmed animals may be net positive.
However, I think deontologists reject this kind of interpretation of their views. For one, trying to fit their views into a expected value or decision-theoretic framework basically assumes consequentialism from the outset, which they reject.
Therefore the asymmetry might be useful to remind us that if we care about animal suffering, we might also need to care about animal flourishing [4]. Perhaps this involves conservation, or other interventions- I’m not sure.
You can do good by preventing more harm (e.g. suffering) than you cause, and I think this would be the typical vegan EA response.
To the extent which reducing demand for chicken prevents or delays the slaughtering of existing chickens, I don’t see why there is an asymmetry. I place positive value on chickens living their chicken lives (when those lives are net-positive, whatever that means). Go beyond that and you get into population ethics.
But more importantly, I think this post uses the term “good action” strictly to mean “action which has positive expected value,” while the common usage of “good” is broader and can include actions which are merely less negative than an alternative.
But in order to have net positive lives, we need to do something more than follow consumer-choice based principles.
I agree. Veganism is (for most vegans, I believe) mostly about reducing the harm you inflict on the world. It’s clear you can’t ever get to 0. Even if your life is net positive, somewhere along the way you always harm somebody or some being. And while veganism itself certainly has this asymmetry you refer to, it seems a lot of vegans take steps beyond that in the more positive direction, such as
being effective altruists and in that way trying to do more good in the world
go into activism or animal rights advocacy
work at animal shelters or even just taking care of a stray animal
So I don’t think the risk of neglecting the positive side of things is all that high. Certainly makes sense to take it into consideration though, and I appreciate your post!
Sorry if I misunderstood, but does this rest on the assumption that farmed animal welfare is net negative? More on this here: http://interestingthingsiveread.blogspot.com/2018/12/veganism-may-be-net-negative-but-we.html
No, the OP’s argument is assuming that the lives of farmed animals is net negative. It’s saying that farmed animal welfare might at most be neutral, which would mean that, on expectation, farmed animal welfare is harmful. Nevertheless, it would be less harmful than ignoring farmed animal welfare would be, which means farmed animal welfare is still net positive.
Meanwhile, the argument in your link argues that farmed animal welfare may be net negative, but it relies on the opposite assumption that the lives of farmed animals may be net positive.
I think these are relevant:
https://fakenous.net/?p=1529
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/nous.12210
https://philpapers.org/rec/TARMUF
However, I think deontologists reject this kind of interpretation of their views. For one, trying to fit their views into a expected value or decision-theoretic framework basically assumes consequentialism from the outset, which they reject.
You can do good by preventing more harm (e.g. suffering) than you cause, and I think this would be the typical vegan EA response.
To the extent which reducing demand for chicken prevents or delays the slaughtering of existing chickens, I don’t see why there is an asymmetry. I place positive value on chickens living their chicken lives (when those lives are net-positive, whatever that means). Go beyond that and you get into population ethics.
But more importantly, I think this post uses the term “good action” strictly to mean “action which has positive expected value,” while the common usage of “good” is broader and can include actions which are merely less negative than an alternative.
I agree. Veganism is (for most vegans, I believe) mostly about reducing the harm you inflict on the world. It’s clear you can’t ever get to 0. Even if your life is net positive, somewhere along the way you always harm somebody or some being. And while veganism itself certainly has this asymmetry you refer to, it seems a lot of vegans take steps beyond that in the more positive direction, such as
being effective altruists and in that way trying to do more good in the world
go into activism or animal rights advocacy
work at animal shelters or even just taking care of a stray animal
So I don’t think the risk of neglecting the positive side of things is all that high. Certainly makes sense to take it into consideration though, and I appreciate your post!