In that case, it would IMO be better to change âtotal utilitarianismâ to âutilitarianismâ in the article. Utilitarianism is different from other forms of consequentialism in that it uses thoroughgoing aggregation. Isnât that what Harsanyiâs theorem mainly shows?
Hmm, it does show that itâs a linear addition of utilities (as opposed to, say, the sum of their logarithms). So I think itâs stronger than saying just âthoroughgoing aggregationâ.
Iâm not very familiar with the terminology here, but I remember that in this paper, Alastair Norcross used the term âthoroughgoing aggregationâ for what seems to be linear addition of utilities in particular. Thatâs what I had in mind anyway, so Iâm not sure I believe anything different form you. The reason I commented above was because I donât understand the choice of âtotal utilitarianismâ instead of just âutilitarianism.â Doesnât every form of utilitarianism use linear addition of utilities in a case where population size remains fixed? But only total utilitarianism implies the repugnant conclusion. Your conclusion section IMO suggests that Harsanyiâs theorem (which takes a case where population size is indeed fixed) does something to help motivate total utilitarianism over other forms of utilitarianism, such as prior-existence utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism or average utilitarianism. You already acknowledged in your reply further above to that it doesnât do much of that. Thatâs why I suggested rephrasing your conclusion section. Alternatively, you could also explain in what ways you might think the utilitarian alternatives to total utilitarianism are contrived somehow or not in line with Harsanyiâs assumptions. And probably Iâm missing something about how you think about all of this, because the rest of the article seemed really excellent and clear to me. I just find the conclusion section really jarring.
Alastair Norcross used the term âthoroughgoing aggregationâ for what seems to be linear addition of utilities in particular
Ah, my mistake â I had heard this definition before, which seems slightly different.
I just find the conclusion section really jarring.
Thanks for the suggestion â always tricky to figure out what a âstraightforwardâ consequence is in philosophy.
I changed it to this â curious if you still find it jarring?
Total utilitarianism is a fairly controversial position. The above example where (1,1)=(2,0) can be extended to show that utilitarianism is extremely demanding, potentially requiring extreme sacrifices and inequality.
It is therefore interesting that it is the only decision procedure which does not violate one of these seemingly reasonable assumptions.
Ah, my mistake â I had heard this definition before, which seems slightly different.
Probably I was wrong here. After reading this abstract, I realize that the way Norcross wrote about it is compatible with a weaker claim that linear aggregation of utility too. I think I just assumed that he must mean linear aggregation of utility, because everything else would seem weirdly arbitrary. :)
I changed it to this â curious if you still find it jarring?
Less so! The âtotalâ still indicates the same conclusion I thought would be jumping the gun a bit, but if thatâs your takeaway itâs certainly fine to leave it. Personally I would just write âutilitarianismâ instead of âtotal utilitarianism.â
Hmm, it does show that itâs a linear addition of utilities (as opposed to, say, the sum of their logarithms). So I think itâs stronger than saying just âthoroughgoing aggregationâ.
Iâm not very familiar with the terminology here, but I remember that in this paper, Alastair Norcross used the term âthoroughgoing aggregationâ for what seems to be linear addition of utilities in particular. Thatâs what I had in mind anyway, so Iâm not sure I believe anything different form you. The reason I commented above was because I donât understand the choice of âtotal utilitarianismâ instead of just âutilitarianism.â Doesnât every form of utilitarianism use linear addition of utilities in a case where population size remains fixed? But only total utilitarianism implies the repugnant conclusion. Your conclusion section IMO suggests that Harsanyiâs theorem (which takes a case where population size is indeed fixed) does something to help motivate total utilitarianism over other forms of utilitarianism, such as prior-existence utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism or average utilitarianism. You already acknowledged in your reply further above to that it doesnât do much of that. Thatâs why I suggested rephrasing your conclusion section. Alternatively, you could also explain in what ways you might think the utilitarian alternatives to total utilitarianism are contrived somehow or not in line with Harsanyiâs assumptions. And probably Iâm missing something about how you think about all of this, because the rest of the article seemed really excellent and clear to me. I just find the conclusion section really jarring.
Ah, my mistake â I had heard this definition before, which seems slightly different.
Thanks for the suggestion â always tricky to figure out what a âstraightforwardâ consequence is in philosophy.
I changed it to this â curious if you still find it jarring?
Probably I was wrong here. After reading this abstract, I realize that the way Norcross wrote about it is compatible with a weaker claim that linear aggregation of utility too. I think I just assumed that he must mean linear aggregation of utility, because everything else would seem weirdly arbitrary. :)
Less so! The âtotalâ still indicates the same conclusion I thought would be jumping the gun a bit, but if thatâs your takeaway itâs certainly fine to leave it. Personally I would just write âutilitarianismâ instead of âtotal utilitarianism.â