Second note that none of these sources actually do any data analysis or try to examine original data about the markets or supply chains; they are armchair papers. My whole point is that depending on which of several reasonable assumptions one makes, different conclusions will be drawn. The only way to adjudicate this is to actually figure out whatâs going on in the real world, and neither of these sources attempts to do that. Hint: neither of them gives an empirically-derived concrete estimate for individual-level elasticity.
This seems fair and seems like the strongest argument here. Even M&H only say they âbriefly sketch the contours of a positive argument for consumer efficacyâ.
While I think this doesnât undermine your point that people could come to reasonable differing conclusions about this case, itâs worth pointing out the same is true about counterfactuals for basically all charity and altruistic work based on similar arguments, so this case doesnât seem categorically special. Some level of guesswork is basically always involved, although to different degrees, and levels of ârobustnessâ can differ:
GiveWell has estimates for the value of counterfactual spending by other actors, but it mostly only reflects government actors, plus the Global Fund. What about Open Phil and smaller donors? (Maybe they can be ignored based on Open Philâs own statements, and assuming smaller donors donât pay attention to these funding levels, and so donât respond.) Some of the numbers they do use are also just guesses. They go further than basically anyone else, but is it far enough? How much less cost-effective could they be?
For individuals doing altruistic work, if they didnât do it (e.g. they didnât take the job), what would others have done differently, and with what value? (âReplaceabilityâ.)
There are other effects on things we donât or canât measure. Does the charity undermine governance and do harm in the long run as a result? What about the effects on nonhuman animals, farmed and wild? What about the potential impacts much further into the future, through economic growth, climate change or space colonization? This gets into cluelessness and the McNamara fallacy.
Yes all fair, and Iâd say it goes beyond counterfactuals. Iâm not sure people fully realize how sensitive many conclusions are to all sorts of assumptions, which are often implicit in standard models. I am on record disagreeing strongly with John Halstead about the likely cost-effectiveness of advocating for economic growth, and I feel similarly about much of the longtermist agenda, so this isnât specific to animals. My personal sense is that if you can save an existing human life for a few thousand dollars (for which the evidence is very clear, although point taken that the marginal impact isnât definitively pinned downâhowever Iâd guess within a factor of two,), thatâs an extremely high bar to overcome.
This seems fair and seems like the strongest argument here. Even M&H only say they âbriefly sketch the contours of a positive argument for consumer efficacyâ.
While I think this doesnât undermine your point that people could come to reasonable differing conclusions about this case, itâs worth pointing out the same is true about counterfactuals for basically all charity and altruistic work based on similar arguments, so this case doesnât seem categorically special. Some level of guesswork is basically always involved, although to different degrees, and levels of ârobustnessâ can differ:
GiveWell has estimates for the value of counterfactual spending by other actors, but it mostly only reflects government actors, plus the Global Fund. What about Open Phil and smaller donors? (Maybe they can be ignored based on Open Philâs own statements, and assuming smaller donors donât pay attention to these funding levels, and so donât respond.) Some of the numbers they do use are also just guesses. They go further than basically anyone else, but is it far enough? How much less cost-effective could they be?
For individuals doing altruistic work, if they didnât do it (e.g. they didnât take the job), what would others have done differently, and with what value? (âReplaceabilityâ.)
There are other effects on things we donât or canât measure. Does the charity undermine governance and do harm in the long run as a result? What about the effects on nonhuman animals, farmed and wild? What about the potential impacts much further into the future, through economic growth, climate change or space colonization? This gets into cluelessness and the McNamara fallacy.
Yes all fair, and Iâd say it goes beyond counterfactuals. Iâm not sure people fully realize how sensitive many conclusions are to all sorts of assumptions, which are often implicit in standard models. I am on record disagreeing strongly with John Halstead about the likely cost-effectiveness of advocating for economic growth, and I feel similarly about much of the longtermist agenda, so this isnât specific to animals. My personal sense is that if you can save an existing human life for a few thousand dollars (for which the evidence is very clear, although point taken that the marginal impact isnât definitively pinned downâhowever Iâd guess within a factor of two,), thatâs an extremely high bar to overcome.