I think it does challenge the point but could have done so more clearly.
The post isn’t broadly discussing “preventing bad things and causing good things”, but more narrowly discussing preventing a person from existing or bringing someone into existence, who could have a good life or a bad life.
“Why should we not think that it’s good to bring into existence a flourishing life?”
Assuming flourishing means “net positive” and not “devoid of suffering”, for the individual with a flourishing life who we are considering bringing into existence:
The potential “the presence of suffering” in their life, if we did bring them into existence, would be “bad and morally worth preventing”
while
The potential “absence of pleasure”, if we don’t being them into existence, “is not bad and not a problem”.
The potential “absence of pleasure”, if we don’t being them into existence, “is not bad and not a problem”.
This seems to be begging the question. Someone could flat out disagree, holding the position that it is a problem not to create wellbeing/pleasure when one can do so, just as it is a problem not to avoid suffering / pain when one can do so. It still doesn’t seem to me that you have given any independent justification for the claim I’ve quoted.
In Magnus’s post, Will MacAskill makes the claim that:
“If we think it’s bad to bring into existence a life of suffering, why should we not think that it’s good to bring into existence a flourishing life? I think any argument for the first claim would also be a good argument for the second.”
Magnus presents the asymmetry as an example of a view that offers an argument for the first claim but not for the second claim.
I agree that someone can just say they disagree with the asymmetry and many people do—it think of it as a terminal belief that doesn’t have “underlying” justification, similar to views like “suffering is bad”.
(Is there a proper philosophy term for what I’m calling a “terminal belief”?)
I think it does challenge the point but could have done so more clearly.
The post isn’t broadly discussing “preventing bad things and causing good things”, but more narrowly discussing preventing a person from existing or bringing someone into existence, who could have a good life or a bad life.
“Why should we not think that it’s good to bring into existence a flourishing life?”
Assuming flourishing means “net positive” and not “devoid of suffering”, for the individual with a flourishing life who we are considering bringing into existence:
The potential “the presence of suffering” in their life, if we did bring them into existence, would be “bad and morally worth preventing”
while
The potential “absence of pleasure”, if we don’t being them into existence, “is not bad and not a problem”.
This seems to be begging the question. Someone could flat out disagree, holding the position that it is a problem not to create wellbeing/pleasure when one can do so, just as it is a problem not to avoid suffering / pain when one can do so. It still doesn’t seem to me that you have given any independent justification for the claim I’ve quoted.
In Magnus’s post, Will MacAskill makes the claim that:
“If we think it’s bad to bring into existence a life of suffering, why should we not think that it’s good to bring into existence a flourishing life? I think any argument for the first claim would also be a good argument for the second.”
Magnus presents the asymmetry as an example of a view that offers an argument for the first claim but not for the second claim.
I agree that someone can just say they disagree with the asymmetry and many people do—it think of it as a terminal belief that doesn’t have “underlying” justification, similar to views like “suffering is bad”.
(Is there a proper philosophy term for what I’m calling a “terminal belief”?)
What is the reasoning that the asymmetry uses to argue for the first claim? This isn’t currently clear to me.
I suspect whatever the reasoning is that it can also be used to argue for the second claim.
See my comment here.