Cheers, and thanks for all the links! I read the binding problem section of your post- itâs really interesting and something Iâve thought about before, but without a nice phrase to bind to it. From an initial read, Iâm pretty sceptical that the binding problem is something we can talk about/â experiment on/â introspect on. I.e it feels kind of impossible for me to answer to what extent my various experiences at this moment are bound together, and what would be different if they werenât bound, but they were integrated into the information Iâm acting on in some other way. Is there a reason to think a âbinding mechanismâ is an easier thing to investigate than âconsciousnessâ? A valid answer to that question is: please read my post in full, lol.
I get what you mean! Here are a few very quick thoughtsâhope they make sense!
Maybe one challenge around introspecting on binding is that one typically has to be in altered or ill states of consciousness to experience what itâs like for binding to break down. For instance, under some psychedelics, the color of an object can âbleed outâ of its boundaries.
In normal waking consciousness, we just take binding for granted. We have no problem recognizing that the eyes, nose, mouth, etc. of the person in front of us are âgluedâ together into a unified gestalt that we can make sense of (and e.g. recognize as our friend). Some people with integrative agnosia canât do that.
As David Pearce says, no binding = no mind. Without binding, there would only be âqualia dustâ floating around. It makes sense that evolution would recruit bound experiences to make sense of the external world. Ethically, we should care about bound experiences.
Binding is also the reason why you canât do your taxes on a high dose of LSD (though maybe altered states of consciousness can be used for other types of computation).
Happy to chat about this more in person one of these days! I just moved to London and plan to visit Oxford every now and then. âșïž
Cheers, and thanks for all the links!
I read the binding problem section of your post- itâs really interesting and something Iâve thought about before, but without a nice phrase to bind to it.
From an initial read, Iâm pretty sceptical that the binding problem is something we can talk about/â experiment on/â introspect on. I.e it feels kind of impossible for me to answer to what extent my various experiences at this moment are bound together, and what would be different if they werenât bound, but they were integrated into the information Iâm acting on in some other way. Is there a reason to think a âbinding mechanismâ is an easier thing to investigate than âconsciousnessâ? A valid answer to that question is: please read my post in full, lol.
I get what you mean! Here are a few very quick thoughtsâhope they make sense!
Maybe one challenge around introspecting on binding is that one typically has to be in altered or ill states of consciousness to experience what itâs like for binding to break down. For instance, under some psychedelics, the color of an object can âbleed outâ of its boundaries.
In normal waking consciousness, we just take binding for granted. We have no problem recognizing that the eyes, nose, mouth, etc. of the person in front of us are âgluedâ together into a unified gestalt that we can make sense of (and e.g. recognize as our friend). Some people with integrative agnosia canât do that.
As David Pearce says, no binding = no mind. Without binding, there would only be âqualia dustâ floating around. It makes sense that evolution would recruit bound experiences to make sense of the external world. Ethically, we should care about bound experiences.
Binding is also the reason why you canât do your taxes on a high dose of LSD (though maybe altered states of consciousness can be used for other types of computation).
Happy to chat about this more in person one of these days! I just moved to London and plan to visit Oxford every now and then. âșïž
Awesome, Iâd love to chat when youâre around in Oxford!