I think that saving lives in a catastrophe could have more flow-through effects, such as preventing collapse of civilization (from which we may not recover), reducing the likelihood of global totalitarianism, and reducing the trauma of the catastrophe, perhaps resulting in better values ending up in AGI.
Thanks for the comment, David! I agree all those effects could be relevant. Accordingly, I assume that saving a life in catastrophes (periods over which there is a large reduction in population) is more valuable than saving a life in normal times (periods over which there is a minor increase in population). However, it looks like the probability of large population losses is sufficiently low to offset this, such that saving lives in normal time is more valuable in expectation.
I think that saving lives in a catastrophe could have more flow-through effects, such as preventing collapse of civilization (from which we may not recover), reducing the likelihood of global totalitarianism, and reducing the trauma of the catastrophe, perhaps resulting in better values ending up in AGI.
Thanks for the comment, David! I agree all those effects could be relevant. Accordingly, I assume that saving a life in catastrophes (periods over which there is a large reduction in population) is more valuable than saving a life in normal times (periods over which there is a minor increase in population). However, it looks like the probability of large population losses is sufficiently low to offset this, such that saving lives in normal time is more valuable in expectation.