re: ābeing an actual causeā, is there an easy way to bracket the (otherwise decisive-seeming) vainglory objection that MacAskill raises in DGB of the person who pushes a paramedic aside so that he can instead be the actual (albeit less competent) cause of saving a life?
That is indeed a very difficult objection for the ābeing an actual cause is always valuableā view. We could amend that principle in various ways. One is agent-neutral: it is valuable that someone makes a difference (rather than the world just turning out well), but itās not valuable that I make a difference. One adds conditions to actual causation; you get credit only if you raise the probability of the outcome? Do not lower the probability of the outcome (in which case itās unclear whether youād be an actual cause at all).
Things get tricky here with the metaphysics of causation and how they interact with agency-based ethical principles. Thereās stuff here Iām aware I havenāt quite grasped!
re: ābeing an actual causeā, is there an easy way to bracket the (otherwise decisive-seeming) vainglory objection that MacAskill raises in DGB of the person who pushes a paramedic aside so that he can instead be the actual (albeit less competent) cause of saving a life?
Hi Richard,
That is indeed a very difficult objection for the ābeing an actual cause is always valuableā view. We could amend that principle in various ways. One is agent-neutral: it is valuable that someone makes a difference (rather than the world just turning out well), but itās not valuable that I make a difference. One adds conditions to actual causation; you get credit only if you raise the probability of the outcome? Do not lower the probability of the outcome (in which case itās unclear whether youād be an actual cause at all).
Things get tricky here with the metaphysics of causation and how they interact with agency-based ethical principles. Thereās stuff here Iām aware I havenāt quite grasped!