One thing I don’t understand is whether this approach is immune to fanaticism/takeover from moral theories that place very little (but nonzero) value in hedonism. Naively a theory that (e.g.) values virtue at 10,000x that of hedonism will just be able to swamp out hedonism-centric views in this approach, unless you additionally normalize in a different way.
If some theories see reasons where others do not, they will be given more weight in a maximize-expected-choiceworthiness framework. That seems right to me and not something to be embarrassed about. Insofar as you don’t want to accept the prioritization implications, I think the best way to avoid them is with an alternative approach to making decisions under normative uncertainty.
One thing I don’t understand is whether this approach is immune to fanaticism/takeover from moral theories that place very little (but nonzero) value in hedonism. Naively a theory that (e.g.) values virtue at 10,000x that of hedonism will just be able to swamp out hedonism-centric views in this approach, unless you additionally normalize in a different way.
If some theories see reasons where others do not, they will be given more weight in a maximize-expected-choiceworthiness framework. That seems right to me and not something to be embarrassed about. Insofar as you don’t want to accept the prioritization implications, I think the best way to avoid them is with an alternative approach to making decisions under normative uncertainty.