Isn’t there a difference between creating entirely new frameworks, and just adopting frameworks to different species in parallel?
For instance, it seems that adopting frameworks to different species in parallel often ends up happening over time (as we’ve seen people gradually adopt cognitive ethology from chimpanzees and captive dolphins into wild dolphins, elephants, african grey parrots, kea [where academic labs do exist to study them], capuchin monkeys, and new Caledonian Crows). It seems that some species of animals are intensively studied, and the vast majority of others not so much (like, WHERE are the Irene Pepperbergs on storks and pelicans or Andean Condors or deer?).
One thing I’ve often noticed is how little attention is spent on studying individual orders of protists and very small animals (especially nematodes that aren’t C. elegans or most species of invertebrates), which should presumably have even more genetic diversity than what we see in charismatic megafauna.I know there is a conference specifically for tardigrades, but it hasn’t gotten much attention..
As for cognitive ethology—people like Louis Herman, Joyce Poole (of elephants), Andrea Marshall (of manta rays) all seemed to get funding through independent research institutes. It seems that sometimes they get support from sources that overlap with sources that support zoos?
John Marzluff def gets a lot of academic support for studying crows (and before that, prairie dogs)
Hi, yes there is a difference between creating new frameworks, and just adopting frameworks to different species in parallel. You probably have in mind the establishment of welfare biology as a new field. What happens in that case is that the study of the circumstances affecting the welfare of wild animals requires learning many things about their environment, due to which cross-disciplinary work intersecting animal welfare science and ecology is needed, which is not the case with domesticated animals.
You’re probably right with regards to sources of funding for cognitive ethology, and that’s also the case for animal welfare science. What you say about little attention being paid to invertebrates is also true.
Isn’t there a difference between creating entirely new frameworks, and just adopting frameworks to different species in parallel?
For instance, it seems that adopting frameworks to different species in parallel often ends up happening over time (as we’ve seen people gradually adopt cognitive ethology from chimpanzees and captive dolphins into wild dolphins, elephants, african grey parrots, kea [where academic labs do exist to study them], capuchin monkeys, and new Caledonian Crows). It seems that some species of animals are intensively studied, and the vast majority of others not so much (like, WHERE are the Irene Pepperbergs on storks and pelicans or Andean Condors or deer?).
One thing I’ve often noticed is how little attention is spent on studying individual orders of protists and very small animals (especially nematodes that aren’t C. elegans or most species of invertebrates), which should presumably have even more genetic diversity than what we see in charismatic megafauna.I know there is a conference specifically for tardigrades, but it hasn’t gotten much attention..
As for cognitive ethology—people like Louis Herman, Joyce Poole (of elephants), Andrea Marshall (of manta rays) all seemed to get funding through independent research institutes. It seems that sometimes they get support from sources that overlap with sources that support zoos?
John Marzluff def gets a lot of academic support for studying crows (and before that, prairie dogs)
Hi, yes there is a difference between creating new frameworks, and just adopting frameworks to different species in parallel. You probably have in mind the establishment of welfare biology as a new field. What happens in that case is that the study of the circumstances affecting the welfare of wild animals requires learning many things about their environment, due to which cross-disciplinary work intersecting animal welfare science and ecology is needed, which is not the case with domesticated animals.
You’re probably right with regards to sources of funding for cognitive ethology, and that’s also the case for animal welfare science.
What you say about little attention being paid to invertebrates is also true.
Thanks for your comment!