Agreed—I wasn’t expecting Ukraine’s military to hold out so well. In the longer run I suspect Putin still has the upper hand, but this isn’t what he wanted. That said I still think the most likely outcome for Ukraine is still very bad, and note that my option would have (hopefully) avoided the loss/suffering/economic collapse that has already happened. Lastly, I could be ex ante right even if this week’s events change our ex post calculations.
I wouldn’t say overwhelming, but I have been impressed with European unity and surprised by Sweden, Switzerland and Germany reversing longstanding policies. I agree that this will make future action for Russia technically harder, though it also backs Putin into a corner which is a bit of a dangerous place for him to be.
I also agree that ‘realist’ perspectives often risk losing track with reality—realism as an approach/philosophy in IR is often based more on pessimism about human behaviour than about how things turn out. But it’s too early to judge.
I’m talking to a range of people. Not everyone agrees. But there are a good number of ‘realists’ including in the EA community who are focused on reducing the chances of nuclear war, and believe that these would have been lower if Russia had been offered some concessions last week, but all of us recognise why this was politically unattainable.
I think that there’s good evidence, including US intelligence claims, that Russia decided on the invasion many weeks ago. This is another point, to the others above, that are contra to the premise of your post.
I’m also skeptical that Putin is backed into a corner or that it’s worth any time reacting to related posturing, as others seem to have.
I think your post is more virtuous and thoughtful than it appears.
The truth is that the Ukraine resistance and efforts on the back of the Ukrainian people, provide enormous value for western and US interests. It’s not clear the Ukrainians are really being “compensated” for this.
(I’m not sure where this fits in with a “realist” worldview but) I see your post as pushing through this to look at the human toll. The truth is probably that human suffering will be a lot higher with the effective Ukraine resistance we are seeing than the collapse that Russia expected.
It’s risky to point this out, in front of many Ukrainians and others close to the events, including those in Poland who have suffered a terrible history of de facto betrayal and perfidy.
Another reason why I’m interested in asking questions is that deep models are rare and it’s good to poke and try to learn more about them.
I think you’re right and I’m wrong about what will happen in the military situation, and this seems important for suffering.
I said:
It even seems like Russia’s offensive with its current deployed forces could fail.
You said:
I suspect Putin still has the upper hand, but this isn’t what he wanted. That said I still think the most likely outcome for Ukraine is still very bad, and note that my option would have (hopefully) avoided the loss/suffering/economic collapse that has already happened.
Unfortunately, I think you are right that the Russians will win. Also your perspective and post is right and much more virtuous than it seemed.
A perspective of the military situation is given here in this thread:
Basically, the Russian military looks bad right now. But this is because they relied on a light quick attack. However, the Russians are really good at brutal artillery attacks, which they will probably resort to. This may take time but they will use these and other heavy weapons in the following weeks or months.
If this happens, the Russians might level the cities of Ukraine, which are still filled with hundreds of thousands of people and the historical and cultural value of Ukraine.
I’m not really sure but it seems like there is an intervention here that is sort of weird in an EA way.
The idea of this intervention is not that we focus on stopping the war immediately. The “negotiations” that are going on seem ineffective.
Instead, we acknowledge the outcome, the surrender of Ukraine, and we focus on doing things that might result in a ceasefire earlier than it would otherwise occur, and at lower levels of destruction from heavy weapons.
For example, maybe US and NATO concessions can be dangled, or acts of antagonism are discouraged so that it doesn’t entrench the conflict, but I don’t really know what to do.
Another subthread is that the US policy establishment might have a mindset focused on Ukraine’s instrumental value in undermining Russia. Maybe this means that peace and concessions to Russia could be relatively neglected. It seems possible that someone could convince the US that enough has been done by the Ukrainian people.
Again, this intervention is weird because it says that the west will be horrified at some point and move for peace, especially if deaths rise to the horror of tens of thousands. The idea of this intervention is to try to move this point earlier, saving the thousands of lives because of the earlier cease fire.
This is important, since deaths during use of heavy weapons might be extreme.
This seems neglected, since it assumes the dominance of Russian heavy weapons and promotes the surrender of Ukraine.
The US and EU are very sophisticated and active in diplomacy, so this might be (extremely) intractable, or this whole thread superseded in some way.
In response to your two points:
Agreed—I wasn’t expecting Ukraine’s military to hold out so well. In the longer run I suspect Putin still has the upper hand, but this isn’t what he wanted. That said I still think the most likely outcome for Ukraine is still very bad, and note that my option would have (hopefully) avoided the loss/suffering/economic collapse that has already happened. Lastly, I could be ex ante right even if this week’s events change our ex post calculations.
I wouldn’t say overwhelming, but I have been impressed with European unity and surprised by Sweden, Switzerland and Germany reversing longstanding policies. I agree that this will make future action for Russia technically harder, though it also backs Putin into a corner which is a bit of a dangerous place for him to be.
I also agree that ‘realist’ perspectives often risk losing track with reality—realism as an approach/philosophy in IR is often based more on pessimism about human behaviour than about how things turn out. But it’s too early to judge.
I’m talking to a range of people. Not everyone agrees. But there are a good number of ‘realists’ including in the EA community who are focused on reducing the chances of nuclear war, and believe that these would have been lower if Russia had been offered some concessions last week, but all of us recognise why this was politically unattainable.
I think that there’s good evidence, including US intelligence claims, that Russia decided on the invasion many weeks ago. This is another point, to the others above, that are contra to the premise of your post.
I’m also skeptical that Putin is backed into a corner or that it’s worth any time reacting to related posturing, as others seem to have.
Russian decisions, starting from weeks ago, through to today are easily rationalizable (if grossly incompetent and murderous). Putin can make his performative actions, but he spends a lot of effort/money on say, his $100M yacht which he carefully evacuated before the conflict or his (probable) billion dollar (!) palace in the Mediterranean climate on the Black Sea.
I think your post is more virtuous and thoughtful than it appears.
The truth is that the Ukraine resistance and efforts on the back of the Ukrainian people, provide enormous value for western and US interests. It’s not clear the Ukrainians are really being “compensated” for this.
(I’m not sure where this fits in with a “realist” worldview but) I see your post as pushing through this to look at the human toll. The truth is probably that human suffering will be a lot higher with the effective Ukraine resistance we are seeing than the collapse that Russia expected.
It’s risky to point this out, in front of many Ukrainians and others close to the events, including those in Poland who have suffered a terrible history of de facto betrayal and perfidy.
Another reason why I’m interested in asking questions is that deep models are rare and it’s good to poke and try to learn more about them.
I think you’re right and I’m wrong about what will happen in the military situation, and this seems important for suffering.
I said:
You said:
Unfortunately, I think you are right that the Russians will win. Also your perspective and post is right and much more virtuous than it seemed.
A perspective of the military situation is given here in this thread:
https://mobile.twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498381975022940167
Basically, the Russian military looks bad right now. But this is because they relied on a light quick attack. However, the Russians are really good at brutal artillery attacks, which they will probably resort to. This may take time but they will use these and other heavy weapons in the following weeks or months.
If this happens, the Russians might level the cities of Ukraine, which are still filled with hundreds of thousands of people and the historical and cultural value of Ukraine.
I’m not really sure but it seems like there is an intervention here that is sort of weird in an EA way.
The idea of this intervention is not that we focus on stopping the war immediately. The “negotiations” that are going on seem ineffective.
Instead, we acknowledge the outcome, the surrender of Ukraine, and we focus on doing things that might result in a ceasefire earlier than it would otherwise occur, and at lower levels of destruction from heavy weapons.
For example, maybe US and NATO concessions can be dangled, or acts of antagonism are discouraged so that it doesn’t entrench the conflict, but I don’t really know what to do.
Another subthread is that the US policy establishment might have a mindset focused on Ukraine’s instrumental value in undermining Russia. Maybe this means that peace and concessions to Russia could be relatively neglected. It seems possible that someone could convince the US that enough has been done by the Ukrainian people.
Again, this intervention is weird because it says that the west will be horrified at some point and move for peace, especially if deaths rise to the horror of tens of thousands. The idea of this intervention is to try to move this point earlier, saving the thousands of lives because of the earlier cease fire.
This is important, since deaths during use of heavy weapons might be extreme.
This seems neglected, since it assumes the dominance of Russian heavy weapons and promotes the surrender of Ukraine.
The US and EU are very sophisticated and active in diplomacy, so this might be (extremely) intractable, or this whole thread superseded in some way.