There is a case against the notion of moral progress: while the moral circle as a general rule expands with the general empowerment of Mankind, we also become more efficient at oppression. The XVII century Europeans created the Reform and the Glorious Revolution, and the same time their expanded capacities allowed for the Transatlantic Slave Trade.
In my view, the European expansion was net negative until around the end of the XIX century, and while currently human progress is undeniable, when you consider animals, probably we are worse than ever. I am not a radical animalist: I have doubts on the sentience of even birds, but the expansion of animal farming of large vertebrates perhaps has undo in “total” moral terms the undeniable (and massive) human progress.
Good! I think I mostly agree with this and I should probably flag it somewhere in the main post.
I do agree with you, and I think it also shows what is a central point of the later parts of my thesis, when I will talk about the empirical ideas rather than philosophical ideas: that technologies (from shipbuilding, to the industrial revolution, to factory farming, to future AI) are more of a factor in moral progress or regress than ideologies. So many moral philosophers might have the wrong focus.
(Although many of those things I would call “social” progress rather than “moral” strictly speaking, because it was triggered by external factors (economic and technological change) rather than moral reflection. It’s not that we became more cruel to animals in terms of our intentions, it’s that we gained more power over them.)
Well, I hope philosophers are aware of how much ideas are super-structure of the productive forces and the social relations! I am far from being a Marxist, but I suppose this is a commonplace on modern Western historiography...
Outside of Marxism and continental philosophy (particularly the Frankfurt School and some Foucault), I think this idea has lost a lot of grip! So it has actually become a minority view or even awareness among current academic philosophers, particularly in the anglosphere.
However, I think it’s a very useful idea that should make us look at our social arrangements (institutions, beliefs, morality...) with some level of initial suspicion. Luckily, some similar arguments (often called “debunking arguments” or “genealogical arguments”) are starting to gain traction within philosophy again.
There is a case against the notion of moral progress: while the moral circle as a general rule expands with the general empowerment of Mankind, we also become more efficient at oppression. The XVII century Europeans created the Reform and the Glorious Revolution, and the same time their expanded capacities allowed for the Transatlantic Slave Trade.
In my view, the European expansion was net negative until around the end of the XIX century, and while currently human progress is undeniable, when you consider animals, probably we are worse than ever. I am not a radical animalist: I have doubts on the sentience of even birds, but the expansion of animal farming of large vertebrates perhaps has undo in “total” moral terms the undeniable (and massive) human progress.
Good! I think I mostly agree with this and I should probably flag it somewhere in the main post.
I do agree with you, and I think it also shows what is a central point of the later parts of my thesis, when I will talk about the empirical ideas rather than philosophical ideas: that technologies (from shipbuilding, to the industrial revolution, to factory farming, to future AI) are more of a factor in moral progress or regress than ideologies. So many moral philosophers might have the wrong focus.
(Although many of those things I would call “social” progress rather than “moral” strictly speaking, because it was triggered by external factors (economic and technological change) rather than moral reflection. It’s not that we became more cruel to animals in terms of our intentions, it’s that we gained more power over them.)
Well, I hope philosophers are aware of how much ideas are super-structure of the productive forces and the social relations! I am far from being a Marxist, but I suppose this is a commonplace on modern Western historiography...
Outside of Marxism and continental philosophy (particularly the Frankfurt School and some Foucault), I think this idea has lost a lot of grip! So it has actually become a minority view or even awareness among current academic philosophers, particularly in the anglosphere.
However, I think it’s a very useful idea that should make us look at our social arrangements (institutions, beliefs, morality...) with some level of initial suspicion. Luckily, some similar arguments (often called “debunking arguments” or “genealogical arguments”) are starting to gain traction within philosophy again.