For Glo: I don’t fully know what means are available to show how much one has in the bank and in Treasuries. I guess the ideal would be some sort of continuous real-time verification, possibly by a network of the world’s largest banks in a custodial role? I am assuming you could prove how much Glo had been issued and how much you held (e.g., from redemptions); from that, it should be possible to show near-full capitalization (perhaps with some lag during heavy redemptions).
I also don’t know enough about running a cryptocurrency to express what I’d need to know Glo was secure (e.g., that someone could not steal the metaphorical printing press and start printing new Glo without asset backing, or hack into a wallet holding redeemed or not-yet-issued Glo). I think some of that would involve proving that there was a technological solution whereby several independent authorities (e.g., your auditors, a partner at a mega law firm, whoever) would need to provide authorization to generate more Glo or to move significant quantities out of cold storage.
For exchange risk: Ideally, there would be something like the SIPC (which insurers customers of broker/dealers from losses in the custody function—not from losses in the value of the underlying securities). I do not think that is particularly realistic—SIPC is actually funded by a levy on broker/dealers, but the exchange market is too concentrated for that to be a viable model to cover losses. It has a credit line with Treasury, but not full faith and credit.
I don’t see a universe with the FDIC/NCUA model for a while—we would need long proof that crypto exchange regulation was working well before I think putting the USG’s full faith and credit behind an exchange insurer would be viable.And to be frank, at least in the mid-term future, crypto exchanges just aren’t socially necessary in the way banks and securities dealers are, and so justifying taxpayer backing would be a tough sell.
So the question is whether something like Japanese regulations would be sufficient. I’m not yet convinced that would be sufficient for the standard you set, although they seem to have protected Japanese users at FTX Japan. Maybe I would change my mind after a few more years and more failures that affect other countries but not Japan.
For consumer-equipment risk: I don’t think you can get to essentially-insured-bank safety for consumer users without either Glo or the exchange eating fraud losses that a bank would have to eat. Consumers on average are just not savvy enough to keep that risk at a minimal level—and although you and I could probably do so, it would come at a steep cost for useability.
That’s a tough issue to figure out, because an entity like Glo isn’t really in a position to verify or cover those sorts of losses. And for me to be convinced of their safety, exchanges need to play it safe and largely stick to providing safe custody and exchange services . . . nothing that exposes the exchange to meaningful risk. Unfortunately, that approach also limits how much money exchanges can make and thus how much they could be expected to spend on fraud reimbursements.
Note that at least US law gives much less protection to business users—if your business computer gets a trojan and makes unauthorized transactions on your account, you’re often screwed. So if you could fix the exchange-risk problem, this might be an acceptable problem for business users.
Also, current US law does not generally protect customers who are fraudulently induced into losses—e.g., you get a fake text from the IRS saying to Zelle $5000 to this account or you’re going to jail, and you comply. Since these are risks borne by users in the banking system, they can be borne by Glo users as well.
All that is to say that I think truly safe crypto is a ways off. Of course, I am willing to accept a somewhat higher level of risk for people holding crypto to accrue benefits to themselves than for those who hold Glo for altruistic purposes.
For Glo: I don’t fully know what means are available to show how much one has in the bank and in Treasuries. I guess the ideal would be some sort of continuous real-time verification, possibly by a network of the world’s largest banks in a custodial role? I am assuming you could prove how much Glo had been issued and how much you held (e.g., from redemptions); from that, it should be possible to show near-full capitalization (perhaps with some lag during heavy redemptions).
I also don’t know enough about running a cryptocurrency to express what I’d need to know Glo was secure (e.g., that someone could not steal the metaphorical printing press and start printing new Glo without asset backing, or hack into a wallet holding redeemed or not-yet-issued Glo). I think some of that would involve proving that there was a technological solution whereby several independent authorities (e.g., your auditors, a partner at a mega law firm, whoever) would need to provide authorization to generate more Glo or to move significant quantities out of cold storage.
For exchange risk: Ideally, there would be something like the SIPC (which insurers customers of broker/dealers from losses in the custody function—not from losses in the value of the underlying securities). I do not think that is particularly realistic—SIPC is actually funded by a levy on broker/dealers, but the exchange market is too concentrated for that to be a viable model to cover losses. It has a credit line with Treasury, but not full faith and credit.
I don’t see a universe with the FDIC/NCUA model for a while—we would need long proof that crypto exchange regulation was working well before I think putting the USG’s full faith and credit behind an exchange insurer would be viable.And to be frank, at least in the mid-term future, crypto exchanges just aren’t socially necessary in the way banks and securities dealers are, and so justifying taxpayer backing would be a tough sell.
So the question is whether something like Japanese regulations would be sufficient. I’m not yet convinced that would be sufficient for the standard you set, although they seem to have protected Japanese users at FTX Japan. Maybe I would change my mind after a few more years and more failures that affect other countries but not Japan.
For consumer-equipment risk: I don’t think you can get to essentially-insured-bank safety for consumer users without either Glo or the exchange eating fraud losses that a bank would have to eat. Consumers on average are just not savvy enough to keep that risk at a minimal level—and although you and I could probably do so, it would come at a steep cost for useability.
That’s a tough issue to figure out, because an entity like Glo isn’t really in a position to verify or cover those sorts of losses. And for me to be convinced of their safety, exchanges need to play it safe and largely stick to providing safe custody and exchange services . . . nothing that exposes the exchange to meaningful risk. Unfortunately, that approach also limits how much money exchanges can make and thus how much they could be expected to spend on fraud reimbursements.
Note that at least US law gives much less protection to business users—if your business computer gets a trojan and makes unauthorized transactions on your account, you’re often screwed. So if you could fix the exchange-risk problem, this might be an acceptable problem for business users.
Also, current US law does not generally protect customers who are fraudulently induced into losses—e.g., you get a fake text from the IRS saying to Zelle $5000 to this account or you’re going to jail, and you comply. Since these are risks borne by users in the banking system, they can be borne by Glo users as well.
All that is to say that I think truly safe crypto is a ways off. Of course, I am willing to accept a somewhat higher level of risk for people holding crypto to accrue benefits to themselves than for those who hold Glo for altruistic purposes.