Admittedly that is a good argument against the idea that moral realism actually matters too much, albeit I would say that the EV of your actions can be very different depending on your perspective (if moral realism is false).
Also, this is a case where non-consequentialist moralities fail badly at probability, because it’s asking for an infinite amount of evidence in order to update one’s view away from the ordering, which is equivalent to asking for mathematical proof that you’re wrong.
Admittedly that is a good argument against the idea that moral realism actually matters too much, albeit I would say that the EV of your actions can be very different depending on your perspective (if moral realism is false).
Also, this is a case where non-consequentialist moralities fail badly at probability, because it’s asking for an infinite amount of evidence in order to update one’s view away from the ordering, which is equivalent to asking for mathematical proof that you’re wrong.