Another argument that points to âpleasure is goodâ is that people and many animals are drawn to things that gives them pleasure
Itâs worth pointing out that this association isnât perfect. See [1] and [2] for some discussion. Tranquilism allows that if someone is in some moment neither drawn to (craving) (more) pleasurable experiences nor experiencing pleasure (or as much as they could be), this isnât worse than if they were experiencing (more) pleasure. If more pleasure is always better, then contentment is never good enough, but to be content is to be satisfied, to feel that it is good enough or not feel that it isnât good enough. Of course, this is in the moment, and not necessarily a reflective judgement.
I also approach pleasure vs suffering in a kind of conditional way, like an asymmetric person-affecting view, or âpreference-affecting viewâ:
I would say that something only matters if it matters (or will matter) to someone, and an absence of pleasure doesnât necessarily matter to someone who isnât experiencing pleasure, and certainly doesnât matter to someone who does not and will not exist, and so we have no inherent reason to promote pleasure. On the other hand, thereâs no suffering unless someone is experiencing it, and according to some definitions of suffering, it necessarily matters to the sufferer. (A bit more on this argument here, but applied to good and bad lives.)
Itâs worth pointing out that this association isnât perfect. See [1] and [2] for some discussion. Tranquilism allows that if someone is in some moment neither drawn to (craving) (more) pleasurable experiences nor experiencing pleasure (or as much as they could be), this isnât worse than if they were experiencing (more) pleasure. If more pleasure is always better, then contentment is never good enough, but to be content is to be satisfied, to feel that it is good enough or not feel that it isnât good enough. Of course, this is in the moment, and not necessarily a reflective judgement.
I also approach pleasure vs suffering in a kind of conditional way, like an asymmetric person-affecting view, or âpreference-affecting viewâ:
I would say that something only matters if it matters (or will matter) to someone, and an absence of pleasure doesnât necessarily matter to someone who isnât experiencing pleasure, and certainly doesnât matter to someone who does not and will not exist, and so we have no inherent reason to promote pleasure. On the other hand, thereâs no suffering unless someone is experiencing it, and according to some definitions of suffering, it necessarily matters to the sufferer. (A bit more on this argument here, but applied to good and bad lives.)