Another argument that points to âpleasure is goodâ is that people and many animals are drawn to things that gives them pleasure, and that generally people communicate about their own pleasurable states as good. Given a random person off the street, Iâm willing to bet that after introspection they will suggest that they value pleasure in the strong sense. So while this may not be universally accepted, I still think it could hold weight.
Also, a symmetric statement can be said regarding suffering, which I donât think youâd accept. People who say âsuffering is badâ claim that we can establish this by introspection about the nature of suffering.
From reading Tranquilism, I think that youâd respond to these as saying that people confuse âpleasure is goodâ with an internal preference or craving for pleasure, while suffering is actually intrinsically bad. But taking an epistemically modest approach would require quite a bit of evidence for that, especially as part of the argument is that introspection may be flawed.
Iâm curious as to how strongly you hold this position. (Personally, Iâm totally confused here but lean toward the strong sense of pleasure is good but think that overall pleasure holds little moral weight)
Another argument that points to âpleasure is goodâ is that people and many animals are drawn to things that gives them pleasure
Itâs worth pointing out that this association isnât perfect. See [1] and [2] for some discussion. Tranquilism allows that if someone is in some moment neither drawn to (craving) (more) pleasurable experiences nor experiencing pleasure (or as much as they could be), this isnât worse than if they were experiencing (more) pleasure. If more pleasure is always better, then contentment is never good enough, but to be content is to be satisfied, to feel that it is good enough or not feel that it isnât good enough. Of course, this is in the moment, and not necessarily a reflective judgement.
I also approach pleasure vs suffering in a kind of conditional way, like an asymmetric person-affecting view, or âpreference-affecting viewâ:
I would say that something only matters if it matters (or will matter) to someone, and an absence of pleasure doesnât necessarily matter to someone who isnât experiencing pleasure, and certainly doesnât matter to someone who does not and will not exist, and so we have no inherent reason to promote pleasure. On the other hand, thereâs no suffering unless someone is experiencing it, and according to some definitions of suffering, it necessarily matters to the sufferer. (A bit more on this argument here, but applied to good and bad lives.)
Another argument that points to âpleasure is goodâ is that people and many animals are drawn to things that gives them pleasure, and that generally people communicate about their own pleasurable states as good. Given a random person off the street, Iâm willing to bet that after introspection they will suggest that they value pleasure in the strong sense. So while this may not be universally accepted, I still think it could hold weight.
Also, a symmetric statement can be said regarding suffering, which I donât think youâd accept. People who say âsuffering is badâ claim that we can establish this by introspection about the nature of suffering.
From reading Tranquilism, I think that youâd respond to these as saying that people confuse âpleasure is goodâ with an internal preference or craving for pleasure, while suffering is actually intrinsically bad. But taking an epistemically modest approach would require quite a bit of evidence for that, especially as part of the argument is that introspection may be flawed.
Iâm curious as to how strongly you hold this position. (Personally, Iâm totally confused here but lean toward the strong sense of pleasure is good but think that overall pleasure holds little moral weight)
Itâs worth pointing out that this association isnât perfect. See [1] and [2] for some discussion. Tranquilism allows that if someone is in some moment neither drawn to (craving) (more) pleasurable experiences nor experiencing pleasure (or as much as they could be), this isnât worse than if they were experiencing (more) pleasure. If more pleasure is always better, then contentment is never good enough, but to be content is to be satisfied, to feel that it is good enough or not feel that it isnât good enough. Of course, this is in the moment, and not necessarily a reflective judgement.
I also approach pleasure vs suffering in a kind of conditional way, like an asymmetric person-affecting view, or âpreference-affecting viewâ:
I would say that something only matters if it matters (or will matter) to someone, and an absence of pleasure doesnât necessarily matter to someone who isnât experiencing pleasure, and certainly doesnât matter to someone who does not and will not exist, and so we have no inherent reason to promote pleasure. On the other hand, thereâs no suffering unless someone is experiencing it, and according to some definitions of suffering, it necessarily matters to the sufferer. (A bit more on this argument here, but applied to good and bad lives.)