The graphs show what is encapsulated by what. The area to which a label corresponds is the smallest convex shape that encapsulates the label. For example, M is the whole lower-left quadrant, which also encapsulates the monetary effect of crimes (which is why the monetary effect of crimes is not explicitly included in the formulas). M doesn’t stand for all monetary factors. It stands for every monetary factor except Funding.
If the convict pays tax, that’s a good thing for society (all else being equal). Π should increase. And it does, since more tax means a higher M. If the convict has to use welfare, that’s bad.Π should decrease. And it does, since you get a lower M. If the convict’s incarceration requires more funding, that’s bad (all else being equal). Π should decrease. And it does, since funding is subtracted. And so on. There is part of the graph that is not included in Π: The nonmonetary effects that are not crimes. One of my simplifying assumptions was to ignore this section (“Let us ignore Bob’s other nonmonetary contributions for simplicity.”)
This system has an advantage over public prisons in that it provides a mechanism to choose which research should be pursed. Should we trial inmates wearing pink uniforms? Is that worth the cost of research or not? I don’t know. But there are people who are informed enough to be willing to make a bet on the matter. The people who believe strongly that they can get good outcomes will make those bets. If they’re wrong, they lose money and leave the market. If they’re right, they make money and gain a greater share of control.
One thing I want to note: I’m not saying “Implement the system as I’ve described by next month”. I think the system is something to carefully work towards.
But there are people who are informed enough to be willing to make a bet on the matter.
According to Peter’s comment, there already seem to be many informed people around working both inside and outside the prison system. Maybe it would be sufficient incentivize them better to make those bets, by introducing premiums for prisons that reduce the number of reconvictions of their previous inmates, taking into account some priors how likely they were to recidivate based on what their crime was and socio-economic background or so. One could also try to increase their agency if needed, I mean, letting public officials make decisions without having to worry too much about protocol or having to obtain permission from elected superiors who might want to take a tough stance against crime, letting researchers pursue any research they think is promising. Given the number of national and sub-national prison systems a lot of different insights would potentially result from that, which then could be shared and produce large benefits—especially if you pay the sharers.
Maybe the private system would still be more effective, but I am unsure by how much and in that case still my case holds up, I think, that you could make political progress much faster when you pursue a less radical idea—and the potential downsides would be lower.
The graphs show what is encapsulated by what. The area to which a label corresponds is the smallest convex shape that encapsulates the label. For example, M is the whole lower-left quadrant, which also encapsulates the monetary effect of crimes (which is why the monetary effect of crimes is not explicitly included in the formulas). M doesn’t stand for all monetary factors. It stands for every monetary factor except Funding.
If the convict pays tax, that’s a good thing for society (all else being equal). Π should increase. And it does, since more tax means a higher M. If the convict has to use welfare, that’s bad.Π should decrease. And it does, since you get a lower M. If the convict’s incarceration requires more funding, that’s bad (all else being equal). Π should decrease. And it does, since funding is subtracted. And so on. There is part of the graph that is not included in Π: The nonmonetary effects that are not crimes. One of my simplifying assumptions was to ignore this section (“Let us ignore Bob’s other nonmonetary contributions for simplicity.”)
This system has an advantage over public prisons in that it provides a mechanism to choose which research should be pursed. Should we trial inmates wearing pink uniforms? Is that worth the cost of research or not? I don’t know. But there are people who are informed enough to be willing to make a bet on the matter. The people who believe strongly that they can get good outcomes will make those bets. If they’re wrong, they lose money and leave the market. If they’re right, they make money and gain a greater share of control.
One thing I want to note: I’m not saying “Implement the system as I’ve described by next month”. I think the system is something to carefully work towards.
Thank you for the clarifications.
According to Peter’s comment, there already seem to be many informed people around working both inside and outside the prison system. Maybe it would be sufficient incentivize them better to make those bets, by introducing premiums for prisons that reduce the number of reconvictions of their previous inmates, taking into account some priors how likely they were to recidivate based on what their crime was and socio-economic background or so. One could also try to increase their agency if needed, I mean, letting public officials make decisions without having to worry too much about protocol or having to obtain permission from elected superiors who might want to take a tough stance against crime, letting researchers pursue any research they think is promising. Given the number of national and sub-national prison systems a lot of different insights would potentially result from that, which then could be shared and produce large benefits—especially if you pay the sharers.
Maybe the private system would still be more effective, but I am unsure by how much and in that case still my case holds up, I think, that you could make political progress much faster when you pursue a less radical idea—and the potential downsides would be lower.