First, two rather technical notes: in your graphics you have areas represent both positive (assuming the future contribution might be positive) and negative figures, which is confusing IMO. If the second figure is to represent net contribution, maybe state that explicitly. Also, I don’t understand one of the formulae, namely
ΠBob=MBob−FundingBob−CrimesBob
I thought ΠBob=MBob+NBob and I don’t see why NBob=−FundingBob−CrimesBob or did I miss something?
Then, though I get your approach’s theoretical appeal, I don’t see why it should be be superior compared with other possible interventions. I don’t whether we can predict very well whether a former immate will commit new crimes after their release and how that probability can be reduced. Since private prisons won’t be able to operate very well without that knowledge base, why not prioritize research into those topics, before undertaking a difficult structural reform? This research and implementing its finding directly would also be much easier to sell to politicians, particularly on the left.
The graphs show what is encapsulated by what. The area to which a label corresponds is the smallest convex shape that encapsulates the label. For example, M is the whole lower-left quadrant, which also encapsulates the monetary effect of crimes (which is why the monetary effect of crimes is not explicitly included in the formulas). M doesn’t stand for all monetary factors. It stands for every monetary factor except Funding.
If the convict pays tax, that’s a good thing for society (all else being equal). Π should increase. And it does, since more tax means a higher M. If the convict has to use welfare, that’s bad.Π should decrease. And it does, since you get a lower M. If the convict’s incarceration requires more funding, that’s bad (all else being equal). Π should decrease. And it does, since funding is subtracted. And so on. There is part of the graph that is not included in Π: The nonmonetary effects that are not crimes. One of my simplifying assumptions was to ignore this section (“Let us ignore Bob’s other nonmonetary contributions for simplicity.”)
This system has an advantage over public prisons in that it provides a mechanism to choose which research should be pursed. Should we trial inmates wearing pink uniforms? Is that worth the cost of research or not? I don’t know. But there are people who are informed enough to be willing to make a bet on the matter. The people who believe strongly that they can get good outcomes will make those bets. If they’re wrong, they lose money and leave the market. If they’re right, they make money and gain a greater share of control.
One thing I want to note: I’m not saying “Implement the system as I’ve described by next month”. I think the system is something to carefully work towards.
But there are people who are informed enough to be willing to make a bet on the matter.
According to Peter’s comment, there already seem to be many informed people around working both inside and outside the prison system. Maybe it would be sufficient incentivize them better to make those bets, by introducing premiums for prisons that reduce the number of reconvictions of their previous inmates, taking into account some priors how likely they were to recidivate based on what their crime was and socio-economic background or so. One could also try to increase their agency if needed, I mean, letting public officials make decisions without having to worry too much about protocol or having to obtain permission from elected superiors who might want to take a tough stance against crime, letting researchers pursue any research they think is promising. Given the number of national and sub-national prison systems a lot of different insights would potentially result from that, which then could be shared and produce large benefits—especially if you pay the sharers.
Maybe the private system would still be more effective, but I am unsure by how much and in that case still my case holds up, I think, that you could make political progress much faster when you pursue a less radical idea—and the potential downsides would be lower.
There is a lot of research done in forensic psychology/psychiatry as to which offenders have which rates of reoffending (and how that rate can be reduced). There are instruments like the HCR20, the Psychopathy Checklist, the SVR20, etc.
In Germany there are nice statistics about which released groups do commit the same/different crimes with which rates of recidivism. I am pretty sure, other countries have comparable stats.
The rates are well below 50%, but we only have some 80 persons out of a hundred thousand behind bars, in the united states that number is nearly ten times higher, so people get faster into those (mostly private?/ profit orientated?) prisons.
My guess would be: get fewer people into prisons (than in the united states), get them therapy if needed (for example reasoning and rehabilitation aka r&r) and most important: give them good aftercare (possibilities).
Ah, I think we’ve both made the same mistake (believing recidivism rates were similar across countries). It appears recidivism has quite a large range.
First, two rather technical notes: in your graphics you have areas represent both positive (assuming the future contribution might be positive) and negative figures, which is confusing IMO. If the second figure is to represent net contribution, maybe state that explicitly. Also, I don’t understand one of the formulae, namely
I thought ΠBob=MBob+NBob and I don’t see why NBob=−FundingBob−CrimesBob or did I miss something?
Then, though I get your approach’s theoretical appeal, I don’t see why it should be be superior compared with other possible interventions. I don’t whether we can predict very well whether a former immate will commit new crimes after their release and how that probability can be reduced. Since private prisons won’t be able to operate very well without that knowledge base, why not prioritize research into those topics, before undertaking a difficult structural reform? This research and implementing its finding directly would also be much easier to sell to politicians, particularly on the left.
The graphs show what is encapsulated by what. The area to which a label corresponds is the smallest convex shape that encapsulates the label. For example, M is the whole lower-left quadrant, which also encapsulates the monetary effect of crimes (which is why the monetary effect of crimes is not explicitly included in the formulas). M doesn’t stand for all monetary factors. It stands for every monetary factor except Funding.
If the convict pays tax, that’s a good thing for society (all else being equal). Π should increase. And it does, since more tax means a higher M. If the convict has to use welfare, that’s bad.Π should decrease. And it does, since you get a lower M. If the convict’s incarceration requires more funding, that’s bad (all else being equal). Π should decrease. And it does, since funding is subtracted. And so on. There is part of the graph that is not included in Π: The nonmonetary effects that are not crimes. One of my simplifying assumptions was to ignore this section (“Let us ignore Bob’s other nonmonetary contributions for simplicity.”)
This system has an advantage over public prisons in that it provides a mechanism to choose which research should be pursed. Should we trial inmates wearing pink uniforms? Is that worth the cost of research or not? I don’t know. But there are people who are informed enough to be willing to make a bet on the matter. The people who believe strongly that they can get good outcomes will make those bets. If they’re wrong, they lose money and leave the market. If they’re right, they make money and gain a greater share of control.
One thing I want to note: I’m not saying “Implement the system as I’ve described by next month”. I think the system is something to carefully work towards.
Thank you for the clarifications.
According to Peter’s comment, there already seem to be many informed people around working both inside and outside the prison system. Maybe it would be sufficient incentivize them better to make those bets, by introducing premiums for prisons that reduce the number of reconvictions of their previous inmates, taking into account some priors how likely they were to recidivate based on what their crime was and socio-economic background or so. One could also try to increase their agency if needed, I mean, letting public officials make decisions without having to worry too much about protocol or having to obtain permission from elected superiors who might want to take a tough stance against crime, letting researchers pursue any research they think is promising. Given the number of national and sub-national prison systems a lot of different insights would potentially result from that, which then could be shared and produce large benefits—especially if you pay the sharers.
Maybe the private system would still be more effective, but I am unsure by how much and in that case still my case holds up, I think, that you could make political progress much faster when you pursue a less radical idea—and the potential downsides would be lower.
There is a lot of research done in forensic psychology/psychiatry as to which offenders have which rates of reoffending (and how that rate can be reduced). There are instruments like the HCR20, the Psychopathy Checklist, the SVR20, etc. In Germany there are nice statistics about which released groups do commit the same/different crimes with which rates of recidivism. I am pretty sure, other countries have comparable stats. The rates are well below 50%, but we only have some 80 persons out of a hundred thousand behind bars, in the united states that number is nearly ten times higher, so people get faster into those (mostly private?/ profit orientated?) prisons. My guess would be: get fewer people into prisons (than in the united states), get them therapy if needed (for example reasoning and rehabilitation aka r&r) and most important: give them good aftercare (possibilities).
Ah, I think we’ve both made the same mistake (believing recidivism rates were similar across countries). It appears recidivism has quite a large range.
“For all reported outcomes, a 2-year follow-up period was the most commonly used. The 2-year rearrest rates ranged from 26% (Singapore) to 60% (USA), two-year reconviction rates ranged from 20% (Norway) to 63% (Denmark), and two-year reimprisonment rates ranged from 14% (USA – Oregon) to 43% (Canada – Quebec, New Zealand) (see Table 3 for 2-year rates from included countries).”
In any case, my argument doesn’t hinge on what the true statistics are.