You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ºC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ºC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
Still thinking about it.
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
Okay, let’s change it then. What would be bad enough, a mild headache? Let’s go with that. Would you prefer infinite lifetimes with a mild headache for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The disutility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Actually, even if you replace those 10 minutes with 10^10000000000 years of uninterrupted extreme torture, the disutility of the former is still infinitely greater. Which one would you choose in that case?
Or lets’say you have to choose between these two worlds:
World A: a Rayo’s number of people experience extreme suffering but also an infinite number of people live barely above neutral (defined as 1/Rayo’s number above neutral) World B: a world where a Rayo’s number of people experience extreme hedonia without any suffering whatsoever.
The utility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Which one would you go for?
I would go with world A. I think world B is worse than, for example, a world with 1 M times as many people as B, and welfare per person just 0.0001 % lower. Repeating a similar comparison sufficiently many times, I conclude that world B is worse than a world C with way way more people than B, and welfare per person just above 0. I also believe world C is worse than a world D with 10 billion more people than C, all of whom experiencing super high welfare except for 1 person with welfare just below 0 (for example, −10^-100 times the welfare of a random human). So I conclude world B is worse than a world D with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, 10^10 − 1 people with super high welfare w, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. I think 10^10 − 1 people with welfare w is worse than 10^11 people with welfare 0.0001 % lower than w. Repeating this, I determine that 10^10 − 1 people with welfare w is worse than lots and lots of people with barely positive welfare. So I conclude that world B is worse than a world E with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. Based on a similar reasoning, world B is worse than a world F with lots and lots of people with welfare just above 0, and lots of people with welfare just below 0. For the reasons I have mentioned in the thread, I think sufficiently many people with welfare just below 0 is worse than a given number of people with very negative welfare. So I conclude world B is worse than world A with infinitely many people with welfare just above 0, and a large number of people with very negative welfare.
My conclusion that A is better than B may seem counterintuitive. However, I strongly endorse all the steps that lead me to conclude A is better than B. So I also endorse this conclusion. It is also counterintuitive that the mass of sufficiently many grains of sand could be larger than the mass of a mountain. However, I strongly endorse that grains of sand have mass, and therefore I am forced to endorse the conclusion that sufficiently many grains could have a greater mass than a mountain.
Still thinking about it.
Okay, let’s change it then. What would be bad enough, a mild headache? Let’s go with that. Would you prefer infinite lifetimes with a mild headache for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The disutility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Actually, even if you replace those 10 minutes with 10^10000000000 years of uninterrupted extreme torture, the disutility of the former is still infinitely greater. Which one would you choose in that case?
Or lets’say you have to choose between these two worlds:
World A: a Rayo’s number of people experience extreme suffering but also an infinite number of people live barely above neutral (defined as 1/Rayo’s number above neutral)
World B: a world where a Rayo’s number of people experience extreme hedonia without any suffering whatsoever.
The utility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Which one would you go for?
I would go with world A. I think world B is worse than, for example, a world with 1 M times as many people as B, and welfare per person just 0.0001 % lower. Repeating a similar comparison sufficiently many times, I conclude that world B is worse than a world C with way way more people than B, and welfare per person just above 0. I also believe world C is worse than a world D with 10 billion more people than C, all of whom experiencing super high welfare except for 1 person with welfare just below 0 (for example, −10^-100 times the welfare of a random human). So I conclude world B is worse than a world D with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, 10^10 − 1 people with super high welfare w, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. I think 10^10 − 1 people with welfare w is worse than 10^11 people with welfare 0.0001 % lower than w. Repeating this, I determine that 10^10 − 1 people with welfare w is worse than lots and lots of people with barely positive welfare. So I conclude that world B is worse than a world E with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. Based on a similar reasoning, world B is worse than a world F with lots and lots of people with welfare just above 0, and lots of people with welfare just below 0. For the reasons I have mentioned in the thread, I think sufficiently many people with welfare just below 0 is worse than a given number of people with very negative welfare. So I conclude world B is worse than world A with infinitely many people with welfare just above 0, and a large number of people with very negative welfare.
My conclusion that A is better than B may seem counterintuitive. However, I strongly endorse all the steps that lead me to conclude A is better than B. So I also endorse this conclusion. It is also counterintuitive that the mass of sufficiently many grains of sand could be larger than the mass of a mountain. However, I strongly endorse that grains of sand have mass, and therefore I am forced to endorse the conclusion that sufficiently many grains could have a greater mass than a mountain.