My views have shifted over time (in 2018 I would have scoffed at the idea of THL and AMF being even in the same welfare range), and will probably continue to shift.
Are you saying that you are more likely than not to update towards animal welfare, or that you expect to update towards animal welfare? The former is fine. If the latter, it makes sense for you to update all the way now (one should not expect future beliefs to differ from past beliefs).
I donât actually think moral weights are premises.
Nice to know.
Is my risk aversion just a guise for my preference that GHD should get lots of money? I comfortably admit that my choice to personally work on GHD is a function of my background and skillset.
One could work in a certain area, but support moving marginal donations from that area to animal welfare[1], as you just illustrated:
I do think we should reallocate funding from GHD to AW on the margin.
Thanks for being transparent about this! I think it would be good for more people like you, who do not think spending on animal welfare should increase a lot, to clarify what they believe is more cost-effective at the margin (as this is what matters in practice).
But risk aversion is a universal preference descriptively â it shouldnât be a high bar to believe that Iâm actually just a risk averse person.
Right, but risk aversion with respect to resources makes sense because welfare increases sublinearly with resources. I assume people are less risk averse with respect to welfare. Even if people are significantly risk averse with respect to welfare, I do not think we should elevate this to being normative. People also discount the welfare of their future selves and foreigners. People in and governments of high income countries could argue they are already doing something pretty close to optimal with respect to supporting people in extreme poverty given their decriptive preferences. This may be right, but I would say such preferences are misguided, and that they should be much more impartial with respect to nationality.
At the end of the day, I hold the normie belief that good things are good. Children not dying of malaria is good. Chickens not living in cages is good. Philosophical gotchas and fragile calculations can supplement that belief but not replace it.
I think the vast majority of people arguing that animal welfare should receive way more funding would agree with the above. I certainly do. I just do not think the calculations are fragile to the extent that the current porfolio can be considered anywhere close to optimal. I Fermi estimated buying organic eggs is 2.11 times as cost-effective as donating to GiveWellâs top charities[2], and I think that is far from the most cost-effective interventions in the space. which is what you suggest based on your guess that corporate campaigns for chicken welfare are 0.5 to 1.5 times as cost-effective as GiveWellâs top charities.
I support increasing donations to animal welfare, but I have not been paid for my work in the area. Personal fit plays much less of a role in deciding donations than in deciding jobs. It still plays some role because one could be better suited to assess donation opportunities in some areas.
My estimate relies on Rethink Prioritiesâ median welfare range for chicken, but it does not make any use of Sauliusâ estimates, which are one of your 2 major sources of scepticism.
Thanks for clarifying.
Are you saying that you are more likely than not to update towards animal welfare, or that you expect to update towards animal welfare? The former is fine. If the latter, it makes sense for you to update all the way now (one should not expect future beliefs to differ from past beliefs).
Nice to know.
One could work in a certain area, but support moving marginal donations from that area to animal welfare[1], as you just illustrated:
Thanks for being transparent about this! I think it would be good for more people like you, who do not think spending on animal welfare should increase a lot, to clarify what they believe is more cost-effective at the margin (as this is what matters in practice).
Right, but risk aversion with respect to resources makes sense because welfare increases sublinearly with resources. I assume people are less risk averse with respect to welfare. Even if people are significantly risk averse with respect to welfare, I do not think we should elevate this to being normative. People also discount the welfare of their future selves and foreigners. People in and governments of high income countries could argue they are already doing something pretty close to optimal with respect to supporting people in extreme poverty given their decriptive preferences. This may be right, but I would say such preferences are misguided, and that they should be much more impartial with respect to nationality.
I think the vast majority of people arguing that animal welfare should receive way more funding would agree with the above. I certainly do. I just do not think the calculations are fragile to the extent that the current porfolio can be considered anywhere close to optimal. I Fermi estimated buying organic eggs is 2.11 times as cost-effective as donating to GiveWellâs top charities[2], and I think that is far from the most cost-effective interventions in the space. which is what you suggest based on your guess that corporate campaigns for chicken welfare are 0.5 to 1.5 times as cost-effective as GiveWellâs top charities.
I support increasing donations to animal welfare, but I have not been paid for my work in the area. Personal fit plays much less of a role in deciding donations than in deciding jobs. It still plays some role because one could be better suited to assess donation opportunities in some areas.
My estimate relies on Rethink Prioritiesâ median welfare range for chicken, but it does not make any use of Sauliusâ estimates, which are one of your 2 major sources of scepticism.