Since the discussion on this thread, Iâve had the view that the meat-eater problem is dwarfed by the cause prioritisation problem, in the sense that if you give money to a global health and development charity, overwhelmingly the biggest harm to animals is that you didnât give that money to animal welfare charities: the actual negative effect of your donation is likely very small by comparison.
(Thereâs obviously an act-omission difference here, but I donât personally find that an important difference.)
I think describing donations to global health and development interventions as net negative because animal welfare interventions are more cost-effective is misleading:
The default counterfactual for this sort of comparisons is simply not donating anything, i.e. keeping more money for personal consumption.
I believe cost-effective global health and development interventions, such as those of GiveWellâs top charities, are more cost-effective than the marginal personal consumption of donors.
Just to be clear, I also see value in Benâs point. As I had answered below:
Nice question, Sammy! I worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distraction. If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans, and does not think Rethink Prioritiesâ welfare ranges are wildly off, the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best interventions to save human lives. I estimatedcorporate campaigns for chicken welfare, such as the ones supported by The Humane League (THL), are 1.51 k times as cost-effective as GiveWellâs top charities.
Sorry I meant compared to doing nothing. Iâm mainly concerned about specifically the consequence of increased meat consumption and also factory farming from GH&D.
Being net negative or positive and how much just depends on the values of whoever does this assessment. So I donât think such statements are useful. These EAs may be net negative given your values. Probably much less so given their values.
I donât think it is useful or helpful to speak in general terms about how positive/ânegative the (expected) value of something is. There is no universal way to value stuff.
Since the discussion on this thread, Iâve had the view that the meat-eater problem is dwarfed by the cause prioritisation problem, in the sense that if you give money to a global health and development charity, overwhelmingly the biggest harm to animals is that you didnât give that money to animal welfare charities: the actual negative effect of your donation is likely very small by comparison.
(Thereâs obviously an act-omission difference here, but I donât personally find that an important difference.)
Im worried that the chunk of EA that is concerned with effective human nearterm charities are all at risk of being net negative
Hi Sammy,
I think describing donations to global health and development interventions as net negative because animal welfare interventions are more cost-effective is misleading:
The default counterfactual for this sort of comparisons is simply not donating anything, i.e. keeping more money for personal consumption.
I believe cost-effective global health and development interventions, such as those of GiveWellâs top charities, are more cost-effective than the marginal personal consumption of donors.
Just to be clear, I also see value in Benâs point. As I had answered below:
Sorry I meant compared to doing nothing. Iâm mainly concerned about specifically the consequence of increased meat consumption and also factory farming from GH&D.
Ah, sorry for misinterpreting too. I thought your ânet negativeâ was connected to Benâs point.
Being net negative or positive and how much just depends on the values of whoever does this assessment. So I donât think such statements are useful. These EAs may be net negative given your values. Probably much less so given their values.
I donât think it is useful or helpful to speak in general terms about how positive/ânegative the (expected) value of something is. There is no universal way to value stuff.