Whatever happened was life and death and happened two days ago.
I’d say the thing that was life and death for them wasn’t so much the price of the token (that was only a trigger) but the bank run that came after the token situation hit the news. Even if the token had stayed at the same price temporarily, no one could seriously expect their stake to be worth “number of coins times price at the time” (or 50% of that, which one source reported they had “conservatively” marked it down to) given the low liquidity / low historical sales volume of the token, the fact that they had so so much of the supply, and the logic of the token dynamics where the token does well when FTX/Alameda do well, but not when they’re forced to liquidate because they’re already looking like they’re under water.
So basically, I think it sets up a misleading narrative if we think of this as “if only the price of the token hadn’t tanked due to unforeseen events (pressure by Binance).” In reality, the token wasn’t worth as much as it showed on their balance sheet, and that was obvious, so it was bad for them that the balance sheet leaked, which doesn’t sound good and makes you think “why and how did they get into that situation in the first place if they’re supposed to take care of customer assets safely?”
50% is crazy if true. Even 10% would be generous. Conservative would be 1%, or not counting FTT at all! It’s like they didn’t countenance the possibility of a bank run, even after giving their arch nemesis a ton of FTT :( (Or maybe they did, and just hoped it would all come good via enough profits or something before it blew up).
Yes, as you say, the FTT token wasn’t worth anything even before the crash, the FTX/Alameda money to prop it up is what was operative, and is gone now.
We haven’t discussed anything that would contradict the overwhelming evidence that FTX has a gap of $4B or more.
Low information threads seem undesirable if there are people who are less informed and had very high/trust in SBF, partially due to EA associations.
I’d say the thing that was life and death for them wasn’t so much the price of the token (that was only a trigger) but the bank run that came after the token situation hit the news. Even if the token had stayed at the same price temporarily, no one could seriously expect their stake to be worth “number of coins times price at the time” (or 50% of that, which one source reported they had “conservatively” marked it down to) given the low liquidity / low historical sales volume of the token, the fact that they had so so much of the supply, and the logic of the token dynamics where the token does well when FTX/Alameda do well, but not when they’re forced to liquidate because they’re already looking like they’re under water.
So basically, I think it sets up a misleading narrative if we think of this as “if only the price of the token hadn’t tanked due to unforeseen events (pressure by Binance).” In reality, the token wasn’t worth as much as it showed on their balance sheet, and that was obvious, so it was bad for them that the balance sheet leaked, which doesn’t sound good and makes you think “why and how did they get into that situation in the first place if they’re supposed to take care of customer assets safely?”
50% is crazy if true. Even 10% would be generous. Conservative would be 1%, or not counting FTT at all! It’s like they didn’t countenance the possibility of a bank run, even after giving their arch nemesis a ton of FTT :( (Or maybe they did, and just hoped it would all come good via enough profits or something before it blew up).
Yes, as you say, the FTT token wasn’t worth anything even before the crash, the FTX/Alameda money to prop it up is what was operative, and is gone now.
We haven’t discussed anything that would contradict the overwhelming evidence that FTX has a gap of $4B or more.
Low information threads seem undesirable if there are people who are less informed and had very high/trust in SBF, partially due to EA associations.