Question 13 seems under-specified to me, specifically this part: âTheir members are equally happy.â Does this mean their level of welfare is the same, but it could be at any level for the purposes of this question? Does the use of âhappyâ in particular mean the question assumes this constant level of welfare is net positive? Could the magnitudes of happiness and suffering differ between people as long as the ânet welfareâ is positive, assuming itâs possible to make that aggregation?
I think these questions matter because they influence your interpretation of the answers as either a result of population ethical factors, or other things like the respondentsâ beliefs about the moral weight of happiness vs suffering. Someone could coherently accept totalism yet consider the smaller world better if, for instance, they think the higher number of cases of the extreme tails of suffering in the larger population (just because there are more people that things could go very wrong for) makes it worse.
A priori I expect suffering focused intuitions to be in the minority, but in any case itâs not obvious that the answers to #13 reveal non-totalist or irrational population ethics among the respondents.
(I think âif the contributive axiological value of people is negative, then preferring smaller populations is consistent withâindeed, implied byâtotalism in population ethicsâ is a valid point, and obviously so. It is also mentioned by Spears in the paper I cite above. I therefore find it quite irritating that the parent comment was apparently strongly downvoted. Curious if Iâm missing a reason for this?
NB I also think the point is trivial and has an implausible premise, but IMO it is the hallmark of good philosophy that each individual statement seems trivialâe.g., Reasons and Persons features an ample amount of such claims that might strike some readers as trivial or pedantic.)
The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it.
Thanks, this is a good point. From looking at the qualitative answers that people provided in response to this question, it doesnât appear to have been much of an issue in practice, however.
Question 13 seems under-specified to me, specifically this part: âTheir members are equally happy.â Does this mean their level of welfare is the same, but it could be at any level for the purposes of this question? Does the use of âhappyâ in particular mean the question assumes this constant level of welfare is net positive? Could the magnitudes of happiness and suffering differ between people as long as the ânet welfareâ is positive, assuming itâs possible to make that aggregation?
I think these questions matter because they influence your interpretation of the answers as either a result of population ethical factors, or other things like the respondentsâ beliefs about the moral weight of happiness vs suffering. Someone could coherently accept totalism yet consider the smaller world better if, for instance, they think the higher number of cases of the extreme tails of suffering in the larger population (just because there are more people that things could go very wrong for) makes it worse.
A priori I expect suffering focused intuitions to be in the minority, but in any case itâs not obvious that the answers to #13 reveal non-totalist or irrational population ethics among the respondents.
(I think âif the contributive axiological value of people is negative, then preferring smaller populations is consistent withâindeed, implied byâtotalism in population ethicsâ is a valid point, and obviously so. It is also mentioned by Spears in the paper I cite above. I therefore find it quite irritating that the parent comment was apparently strongly downvoted. Curious if Iâm missing a reason for this?
NB I also think the point is trivial and has an implausible premise, but IMO it is the hallmark of good philosophy that each individual statement seems trivialâe.g., Reasons and Persons features an ample amount of such claims that might strike some readers as trivial or pedantic.)
Cf. Russell:
âTrivial, but in a Derek Parfit wayâ is honestly the highest compliment I could ever receive.
Thanks, this is a good point. From looking at the qualitative answers that people provided in response to this question, it doesnât appear to have been much of an issue in practice, however.
I see, thank youâwasnât sure what might have been hidden in âOther.â :)