Do you feel that “ordinary” (non-attractor state) longtermist interventions are commonly put forward in the longtermist community? [...] The only intervention in Greaves and MacAskill’s paper that doesn’t rely on an attractor state is “speeding up progress”
As mentioned in another comment, my impression is that, in line with this, the most commonly proposed longtermist priority other than changing the likelihood of various attractor states is speeding up progress. Last year, I drafted a post that touched on this and related issues, and I really really plan to finally publish it soon (it’s sat around un-edited for a long time), but here’s the most relevant section in the meantime, in case it’s of interest to people:
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Beckstead writes that our actions might, instead of or in addition to “slightly or significantly alter[ing] the world’s development trajectory”, speed up development:
In many cases, ripple effects from good ordinary actions speed up development. For example, saving some child’s life might cause his country’s economy to develop very slightly more quickly, or make certain technological or cultural innovations arrive more quickly.
Technically, I think that increases in the pace of development are trajectory changes. At the least, they would change the steepness of one part of the curve. We can illustrate this with the following graph, where actions aimed at speeding up development would be intended to increase the likelihood of the green trajectory relative to the navy one:
This seems to be the sort of picture Benjamin Todd has in mind when he writes:
One way to help the future we don’t think is a contender is speeding it up. Some people who want to help the future focus on bringing about technological progress, like developing new vaccines, and it’s true that these create long-term benefits. However, we think what most matters from a long-term perspective is where we end up, rather than how fast we get there. Discovering a new vaccine probably means we get it earlier, rather than making it happen at all.
However, I think speeding up development could also affect “where we end up”, for two reasons.
Firstly, if it makes us spread to the stars earlier and faster, this may increase the amount of resources we can ultimately use. We can illustrate this with the following graph, where again actions aimed at speeding up development would be intended to increase the likelihood of the green trajectory relative to the navy one:
Secondly, more generally, speeding up development could affect which trajectory we’re likely to take. For example, faster economic growth might decrease existential risk by reducing international tensions, or increase it by allowing us less time to prepare for and adjust to each new risky technology. Arguably, this might be best thought of as a way in which speeding up development could, as a side effect, affect other types of trajectory change.
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(The draft post was meant to be just “A typology of strategies for influencing the future”, rather than an argument for one strategy over another, so I just tried to clarify possibilities and lay out possible arguments. If I was instead explaining my own views, I’d give more space to arguments along the lines of Benjamin Todd’s.)
Thanks for this Michael, I’d be very interested to read this post when you publish it. Especially as my career has taken a (potentially temporary) turn in the general direction of speeding up progress, rather than towards safety. I still feel that Ben Todd and co are probably right, but I want to read more.
Also, relevant part from Greaves and MacAskill’s paper:
Just how much of an improvement [speeding up progress] amounts to depends, however, on the shape of the progress curve. In a discrete-time model, the benefit of advancing progress by one time period (assuming that at the end of history, one thereby gets one additional time period spent in the “end state”) is equal to the duration of that period multiplied by the difference between the amounts of value that are contained in the first and last periods. Therefore, if value per unit time is set to plateau off at a relatively modest level, then the gains from advancing progress are correspondingly modest. Similarly, if value per unit time eventually rises to a level enormously higher than that of today, then the gains from advancing progress are correspondingly enormous.
As mentioned in another comment, my impression is that, in line with this, the most commonly proposed longtermist priority other than changing the likelihood of various attractor states is speeding up progress. Last year, I drafted a post that touched on this and related issues, and I really really plan to finally publish it soon (it’s sat around un-edited for a long time), but here’s the most relevant section in the meantime, in case it’s of interest to people:
---
Beckstead writes that our actions might, instead of or in addition to “slightly or significantly alter[ing] the world’s development trajectory”, speed up development:
Technically, I think that increases in the pace of development are trajectory changes. At the least, they would change the steepness of one part of the curve. We can illustrate this with the following graph, where actions aimed at speeding up development would be intended to increase the likelihood of the green trajectory relative to the navy one:
This seems to be the sort of picture Benjamin Todd has in mind when he writes:
However, I think speeding up development could also affect “where we end up”, for two reasons.
Firstly, if it makes us spread to the stars earlier and faster, this may increase the amount of resources we can ultimately use. We can illustrate this with the following graph, where again actions aimed at speeding up development would be intended to increase the likelihood of the green trajectory relative to the navy one:
Secondly, more generally, speeding up development could affect which trajectory we’re likely to take. For example, faster economic growth might decrease existential risk by reducing international tensions, or increase it by allowing us less time to prepare for and adjust to each new risky technology. Arguably, this might be best thought of as a way in which speeding up development could, as a side effect, affect other types of trajectory change.
---
(The draft post was meant to be just “A typology of strategies for influencing the future”, rather than an argument for one strategy over another, so I just tried to clarify possibilities and lay out possible arguments. If I was instead explaining my own views, I’d give more space to arguments along the lines of Benjamin Todd’s.)
Thanks for this Michael, I’d be very interested to read this post when you publish it. Especially as my career has taken a (potentially temporary) turn in the general direction of speeding up progress, rather than towards safety. I still feel that Ben Todd and co are probably right, but I want to read more.
Also, relevant part from Greaves and MacAskill’s paper: