But the example assumes the person actually wants to build the monument more strongly than they want to eat. If we admit that some desires matter more than others, even if they are weaker, we seem to be giving up preference utilitarianism.
I’m not saying their preference to build the monument matters less than their preference to eat, just that it would have been better for them if they didn’t have that preference in the first place. I’m thinking in antifrustrationist and “preference-affecting” terms. Having conflicting preferences seems bad.
Then why is it better, according to preference utilitarianism, not to have a preference for monuments than not to have a preference for eating properly? (Not having one of them resolves the conflict after all.)
Either would be better, but it’s hard to imagine someone not being worse off by their own lights in any way from not eating properly (felt unpleasantness, weakness making it harder to do things, risk of death, etc.). If that were not true about eating properly, then people might not prioritize it in the first place. If we could make it so that people didn’t need to eat to avoid being worse off in important ways, all else equal, that would be better.
They should be, under preference-affecting preference utilitarianism or negative preference utilitarianism (which is antifrustrationist), or possibly for more indirect or contingent reasons, any form of preference utilitarianism.
But the example assumes the person actually wants to build the monument more strongly than they want to eat. If we admit that some desires matter more than others, even if they are weaker, we seem to be giving up preference utilitarianism.
I’m not saying their preference to build the monument matters less than their preference to eat, just that it would have been better for them if they didn’t have that preference in the first place. I’m thinking in antifrustrationist and “preference-affecting” terms. Having conflicting preferences seems bad.
Then why is it better, according to preference utilitarianism, not to have a preference for monuments than not to have a preference for eating properly? (Not having one of them resolves the conflict after all.)
Either would be better, but it’s hard to imagine someone not being worse off by their own lights in any way from not eating properly (felt unpleasantness, weakness making it harder to do things, risk of death, etc.). If that were not true about eating properly, then people might not prioritize it in the first place. If we could make it so that people didn’t need to eat to avoid being worse off in important ways, all else equal, that would be better.
Yeah. The question is whether these intuitions are still covered by something we may call: preference utilitarianism.
They should be, under preference-affecting preference utilitarianism or negative preference utilitarianism (which is antifrustrationist), or possibly for more indirect or contingent reasons, any form of preference utilitarianism.
Can this also be classified along these criteria by Kaj Sotala?