For reasons others have pointed out, the American revolution is weaker evidence, but I certainly agree it’s at least marginal evidence against my point—or at least, evidence that smaller revolutions are less likely to fail than bigger ones.
And as others explained in far more detail, the Americans smashed very little in terms of what made their system work, and invented very little—they just wanted to do things which had been done before, many of which they were already doing to some extent, independently.
Another example that comes to mind is Japan’s Meiji Restoration. I don’t think it fits neatly in any of the categories. It’s a combination of mutiny, steering and rowing. But just like the American revolution, I think it illustrates that very rapid and disruptive change in political and economic systems can be undertaken successfully.
The ability to maintain, or improve steering and/or rowing seem to be two important preconditions for a successful mutiny.
Also, the various revolutions that swept Eastern Europe and led to the end of the Soviet Union also seem to be successful mutinies. Of course, the reason these countries ended up under Soviet communism and needed to rise up was because of the Bolshevik mutiny, but still.
I feel like people in EA are mostly anti-mutiny because the only people advocating for it seem to be far left, anti-capitalist types who don’t seem to have a realistic plan for how to go about it, or a coherent plan for what could replace it. But I don’t think EA should be closed to the idea of mutiny in principle. It’s just that any mutiny proposal has to pass a really high bar.
I’ve claimed before that the critical enabler for eucatastrophe is having a clear and implementable vision of where you are heading—and that’s exactly what is missing is most mutinies.
To offer an analogy in the form of misquoting Russian literature, “all [functioning governments] are the same, but each [dysfunctional new attempt at government] is [dysfunctional] in its own way.
The very quick summary: Japan used to be closed off from the rest of the world, until 1853 when the US forced them to open up. This triggered major reforms. The Shogun was overthrown and replaced with the emperor, and in less than a century, Japan went from an essentially medieval economic and societal structure, to a modern industrial economy.
The very quick summary: Japan used to be closed off from the rest of the world, until 1853 when the US forced them to open up. This triggered major reforms. The Shogun was overthrown and replaced with the emperor, and in less than a century, Japan went from an essentially medieval economic and societal structure, to a modern industrial economy.
This is a good summary. I guess I have heard about this before, because I read a bit about the Qing dynasty and the Sino-Japanese wars.
(Note that I haven’t read these books and your comment updates me toward reading them.)
Acemoglu and Fukuyama are brilliant, but speaking in the abstract, I am skeptical of drawing too much from Big Idea sort of books. They tend to focus on and line up facts in their narrative. This doesn’t tend to lead to robust models and insights if we want to do something else with the underlying history.
Instead, it seems ideal to consume several books from several established scholars specialized on Japan and the Meiji restoration.
I will try to search Amazon/Goodreads and maybe report back.
For reasons others have pointed out, the American revolution is weaker evidence, but I certainly agree it’s at least marginal evidence against my point—or at least, evidence that smaller revolutions are less likely to fail than bigger ones.
And as others explained in far more detail, the Americans smashed very little in terms of what made their system work, and invented very little—they just wanted to do things which had been done before, many of which they were already doing to some extent, independently.
Another example that comes to mind is Japan’s Meiji Restoration. I don’t think it fits neatly in any of the categories. It’s a combination of mutiny, steering and rowing. But just like the American revolution, I think it illustrates that very rapid and disruptive change in political and economic systems can be undertaken successfully.
The ability to maintain, or improve steering and/or rowing seem to be two important preconditions for a successful mutiny.
Also, the various revolutions that swept Eastern Europe and led to the end of the Soviet Union also seem to be successful mutinies. Of course, the reason these countries ended up under Soviet communism and needed to rise up was because of the Bolshevik mutiny, but still.
I feel like people in EA are mostly anti-mutiny because the only people advocating for it seem to be far left, anti-capitalist types who don’t seem to have a realistic plan for how to go about it, or a coherent plan for what could replace it. But I don’t think EA should be closed to the idea of mutiny in principle. It’s just that any mutiny proposal has to pass a really high bar.
I’ve claimed before that the critical enabler for eucatastrophe is having a clear and implementable vision of where you are heading—and that’s exactly what is missing is most mutinies.
To offer an analogy in the form of misquoting Russian literature, “all [functioning governments] are the same, but each [dysfunctional new attempt at government] is [dysfunctional] in its own way.
This seems like an important and interesting example that advances your point.
I don’t know anything about it.
Do you (or anyone else) know a good book or author on the subject?
The very quick summary: Japan used to be closed off from the rest of the world, until 1853 when the US forced them to open up. This triggered major reforms. The Shogun was overthrown and replaced with the emperor, and in less than a century, Japan went from an essentially medieval economic and societal structure, to a modern industrial economy.
I don’t know of any books exclusively focused on it, but it’s analyzed in Why Nations Fail and Political Order and Political Decay.
This is a good summary. I guess I have heard about this before, because I read a bit about the Qing dynasty and the Sino-Japanese wars.
(Note that I haven’t read these books and your comment updates me toward reading them.)
Acemoglu and Fukuyama are brilliant, but speaking in the abstract, I am skeptical of drawing too much from Big Idea sort of books. They tend to focus on and line up facts in their narrative. This doesn’t tend to lead to robust models and insights if we want to do something else with the underlying history.
Instead, it seems ideal to consume several books from several established scholars specialized on Japan and the Meiji restoration.
I will try to search Amazon/Goodreads and maybe report back.