One quick clarification: If someone is later alive, then they have not previously been ākilledā, as I use the term (i.e. to mean the permanent cessation of life; not just temporary loss of life or whatever). I agree that stopping someoneās heartbeat and then starting it again, if no harm is done, is harmless to that individual. What Iām interested in here is whether permanently ending someoneās life, and replacing them with an entirely new (psychologically disconnected) life, is something we should regard negatively or with indifference, all else equal.
Ah, sorry, that makes sense. I can also try to give one example where someone dies permanently. For all else to be equal, we can consider 2 situations where only one person is alive at any given time (such that there are no effects on other persons):
Word A contains 1 person who lives for 100 years with mean annual utility of 10.
World B contains:
1 person X who lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10, and then instantly dies.
1 person Y who is instantly created when person X instantly dies, and then lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10.
Both worlds have utility of 1 k, and feel equally valuable to me.
One quick clarification: If someone is later alive, then they have not previously been ākilledā, as I use the term (i.e. to mean the permanent cessation of life; not just temporary loss of life or whatever). I agree that stopping someoneās heartbeat and then starting it again, if no harm is done, is harmless to that individual. What Iām interested in here is whether permanently ending someoneās life, and replacing them with an entirely new (psychologically disconnected) life, is something we should regard negatively or with indifference, all else equal.
Ah, sorry, that makes sense. I can also try to give one example where someone dies permanently. For all else to be equal, we can consider 2 situations where only one person is alive at any given time (such that there are no effects on other persons):
Word A contains 1 person who lives for 100 years with mean annual utility of 10.
World B contains:
1 person X who lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10, and then instantly dies.
1 person Y who is instantly created when person X instantly dies, and then lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10.
Both worlds have utility of 1 k, and feel equally valuable to me.