Here are some quick reactions (not really direct answers, and maybe not what Iād say if Iād researched this much more):
I donāt know of any sources addressing your specific question (though I imagine some might exist; I just havenāt looked), but a good starting point would be sources on the more general topic of the ex ante historical likelihood of nuclear weapons strikes, the likelihood of future nuclear weapons strikes, and the factors pushing those things up or down.
(Iām now working for the org that produced this post, and continuing this general research project, but I read this and thought it was useful a while before I got that job)
There are also some relevant questions on Metaculus, e.g. this one
One factor that might reduce how many times they wouldāve been used (compared to what a person would conclude if they ignored this factor) is that more proliferation might have reduced the overall number of wars/āconflicts
Though see also the āstability-instability paradoxā, a theory that āstates that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases.ā
I still expect more proliferation would have increased the expected number of aggressive nuclear weapons uses over the period since 1950
But maybe less than one would think if one just imagined that the same conflicts wouldāve occurred, but with more parties to those conflicts having nuclear weapons
(ETA: Iāve now seen that Jackson covered somewhat similar points, and I basically like that answer too.)
Great set of links, appreciate it. Was especially excited to see lukeprogās review and the authorās presentation of Atomic Obsession.
Iām inclined toward answers of the form āseems like they would have been used more or some civilizational factor would need to changeā (which is how I interpret Jacksonās answer on strong global policing). Which is why Iām currently most interested in understanding the Atomic Obsession-style skeptical take.
If anyone is interested, the following are some of the authorās claims which seem pertinent, at least as far as I can tell (from the authorās summary, a couple reviews, and a few chapters but not the whole book):
Nuclear weapons are not cost effective for practical military purposes or terrorists.
Many people have been alarmists about nuclear weapons, in describing their destructive powers and forecasting future developments.
Nuclear weapons have not played a major role as deterrents nor in shifting diplomatic dominance.
It seems like the first two are pretty straightforwardly true. (3) is most interesting, and I havenāt been able to make Muellerās argument crisp for myself on this point. My attempt at breaking down (3), with some of my own attempt at steelmanning:
a) Nuclear weapons are really expensive
b) Gaining nuclear weapons upsets your neighbors, which is an additional cost
c) There are cheaper ways of getting a more compelling deterrent, for example North Korea could invest in artillery to put more pressure on Seoul.
d) Countries didnāt really have any interest in going to war, anyway, so deterrents were not needed (I think he claims something about Stalin and other communist powers having no interest in war with western powers)
e) Nukes are technically complex and even if smaller actors, possibly including e.g. factions in a civil war, were to steal them, they would have a hard time using them
f) Nukes are easy to police because nuclear forensics are quite good at attributing events to their creators
g) People have to be really crazy to use nuclear weapons given they arenāt very effective on military targets and canāt actually help you win, only suicide
(It seems worth mentioning that in my actual cursory read of Muellerās arguments in the form mentioned above, I found some points Iāve omitted because they seem mutually inconsistent and make him seem dogmatic to me. For example at one point in his nuclear terrorism section he seems to use the fact that the CIA would probably have infiltrated a group as evidence for the overarching claim that investment in counter-proliferation is wasted. The contradiction is obviously that the CIA probably wouldnāt invest as much in infiltrating terrorist groups attempting to build nukes if that was less of a priority. )
If we take my hypothetical to mean ānuclear weapons are cheaper to buildā (sorry for the ambiguity there) then a, b, c and e seem basically null. I read d) as pretty far removed from the facts. Some good evidence for this in the comments of the lukeprog post especially Max Danielās.
Which leaves f- Nukes are easy to police, and g- people arenāt crazy enough to actually use them.
You link to the book Atomic Obsession. You (or other readers) might be interested in Luke Muehlhauserās notes on the book, and peopleās comments there.ā
In particular, I found Max Danielās comments interesting.
āInterested in assessing the impact of proliferation on risk from WMDs for a differential technology strategy project.ā You may be interested in some of the Forum posts related to differential progress, if you havenāt seen them already.
This seems like an interesting question!
Here are some quick reactions (not really direct answers, and maybe not what Iād say if Iād researched this much more):
I donāt know of any sources addressing your specific question (though I imagine some might exist; I just havenāt looked), but a good starting point would be sources on the more general topic of the ex ante historical likelihood of nuclear weapons strikes, the likelihood of future nuclear weapons strikes, and the factors pushing those things up or down.
On this, one of my top recommendations would be GCRIās A Model For The Probability Of Nuclear War
Another of my top recommendations would be How likely is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia?
(Iām now working for the org that produced this post, and continuing this general research project, but I read this and thought it was useful a while before I got that job)
There are also some relevant questions on Metaculus, e.g. this one
One factor that might reduce how many times they wouldāve been used (compared to what a person would conclude if they ignored this factor) is that more proliferation might have reduced the overall number of wars/āconflicts
See the nuclear peace theory
Though see also the āstability-instability paradoxā, a theory that āstates that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases.ā
I still expect more proliferation would have increased the expected number of aggressive nuclear weapons uses over the period since 1950
But maybe less than one would think if one just imagined that the same conflicts wouldāve occurred, but with more parties to those conflicts having nuclear weapons
(ETA: Iāve now seen that Jackson covered somewhat similar points, and I basically like that answer too.)
Great set of links, appreciate it. Was especially excited to see lukeprogās review and the authorās presentation of Atomic Obsession.
Iām inclined toward answers of the form āseems like they would have been used more or some civilizational factor would need to changeā (which is how I interpret Jacksonās answer on strong global policing). Which is why Iām currently most interested in understanding the Atomic Obsession-style skeptical take.
If anyone is interested, the following are some of the authorās claims which seem pertinent, at least as far as I can tell (from the authorās summary, a couple reviews, and a few chapters but not the whole book):
Nuclear weapons are not cost effective for practical military purposes or terrorists.
Many people have been alarmists about nuclear weapons, in describing their destructive powers and forecasting future developments.
Nuclear weapons have not played a major role as deterrents nor in shifting diplomatic dominance.
It seems like the first two are pretty straightforwardly true. (3) is most interesting, and I havenāt been able to make Muellerās argument crisp for myself on this point. My attempt at breaking down (3), with some of my own attempt at steelmanning:
a) Nuclear weapons are really expensive b) Gaining nuclear weapons upsets your neighbors, which is an additional cost c) There are cheaper ways of getting a more compelling deterrent, for example North Korea could invest in artillery to put more pressure on Seoul. d) Countries didnāt really have any interest in going to war, anyway, so deterrents were not needed (I think he claims something about Stalin and other communist powers having no interest in war with western powers) e) Nukes are technically complex and even if smaller actors, possibly including e.g. factions in a civil war, were to steal them, they would have a hard time using them f) Nukes are easy to police because nuclear forensics are quite good at attributing events to their creators g) People have to be really crazy to use nuclear weapons given they arenāt very effective on military targets and canāt actually help you win, only suicide
(It seems worth mentioning that in my actual cursory read of Muellerās arguments in the form mentioned above, I found some points Iāve omitted because they seem mutually inconsistent and make him seem dogmatic to me. For example at one point in his nuclear terrorism section he seems to use the fact that the CIA would probably have infiltrated a group as evidence for the overarching claim that investment in counter-proliferation is wasted. The contradiction is obviously that the CIA probably wouldnāt invest as much in infiltrating terrorist groups attempting to build nukes if that was less of a priority. )
If we take my hypothetical to mean ānuclear weapons are cheaper to buildā (sorry for the ambiguity there) then a, b, c and e seem basically null. I read d) as pretty far removed from the facts. Some good evidence for this in the comments of the lukeprog post especially Max Danielās.
Which leaves f- Nukes are easy to police, and g- people arenāt crazy enough to actually use them.
Less important comments:
You link to the book Atomic Obsession. You (or other readers) might be interested in Luke Muehlhauserās notes on the book, and peopleās comments there.ā
In particular, I found Max Danielās comments interesting.
FWIW, I watched a 1-hour talk + Q&A the author did about the topic of the book, found parts of it interesting, but also thought much of the reasoning seemed poor to me.
I havenāt read the actual book.
āInterested in assessing the impact of proliferation on risk from WMDs for a differential technology strategy project.ā You may be interested in some of the Forum posts related to differential progress, if you havenāt seen them already.