Do non-utilitarian moral theories have readily available solutions to infinite ethics either?
I think it isnāt a problem in the first place for non-consequentialist theories, because the problem comes from trying to compare infinite sets of individuals with utilities when identities (including locations in spacetime) arenāt taken to matter at all, but you could let identities matter in certain ways and possibly get around it this way. I think itās generally a problem for consequentialist theories, utilitarian or not.
Iād also recommend the very repugnant conclusion as an important objection (at least to classical or symmetric utilitarianism).
Itās worth considering that avoiding it (Weak Quality Addition) is one of several intuitive conditions in an important impossibility theorem (of which there are many similar ones, including the earlier one which is cited in the post you cite), which could be a response to the objection.
EDIT: Or maybe the impossibility theorems and paradoxes should be taken to be objections to consequentialism generally, because thereās no satisfactory way to compare outcomes generally, so we shouldnāt rely purely on comparing outcomes to guide actions.
the problem comes from trying to compare infinite sets of individuals with utilities when identities (including locations in spacetime) arenāt taken to matter at all
Ah, thatās fairāI think I was mistaking the technical usage of āinfinite ethicsā for a broader class of problems involving infinities in ethics in general. Deonotological theories sometimes imply āinfiniteā badness of actions, which can have counterintuitive implications as discussed by MacAskill in his interviews with 80k, which is why I was confused by your objection.
I think it isnāt a problem in the first place for non-consequentialist theories, because the problem comes from trying to compare infinite sets of individuals with utilities when identities (including locations in spacetime) arenāt taken to matter at all, but you could let identities matter in certain ways and possibly get around it this way. I think itās generally a problem for consequentialist theories, utilitarian or not.
Itās worth considering that avoiding it (Weak Quality Addition) is one of several intuitive conditions in an important impossibility theorem (of which there are many similar ones, including the earlier one which is cited in the post you cite), which could be a response to the objection.
EDIT: Or maybe the impossibility theorems and paradoxes should be taken to be objections to consequentialism generally, because thereās no satisfactory way to compare outcomes generally, so we shouldnāt rely purely on comparing outcomes to guide actions.
Ah, thatās fairāI think I was mistaking the technical usage of āinfinite ethicsā for a broader class of problems involving infinities in ethics in general. Deonotological theories sometimes imply āinfiniteā badness of actions, which can have counterintuitive implications as discussed by MacAskill in his interviews with 80k, which is why I was confused by your objection.