Do non-utilitarian moral theories have readily available solutions to infinite ethics either? Suggesting infinite ethics as an objection I think only makes sense if it’s a particular problem for utilitarianism, or at least a worse problem for utilitarianism than for anything else.
I’d also recommend the very repugnant conclusion as an important objection (at least to classical or symmetric utilitarianism).
Do non-utilitarian moral theories have readily available solutions to infinite ethics either?
I think it isn’t a problem in the first place for non-consequentialist theories, because the problem comes from trying to compare infinite sets of individuals with utilities when identities (including locations in spacetime) aren’t taken to matter at all, but you could let identities matter in certain ways and possibly get around it this way. I think it’s generally a problem for consequentialist theories, utilitarian or not.
I’d also recommend the very repugnant conclusion as an important objection (at least to classical or symmetric utilitarianism).
It’s worth considering that avoiding it (Weak Quality Addition) is one of several intuitive conditions in an important impossibility theorem (of which there are many similar ones, including the earlier one which is cited in the post you cite), which could be a response to the objection.
EDIT: Or maybe the impossibility theorems and paradoxes should be taken to be objections to consequentialism generally, because there’s no satisfactory way to compare outcomes generally, so we shouldn’t rely purely on comparing outcomes to guide actions.
the problem comes from trying to compare infinite sets of individuals with utilities when identities (including locations in spacetime) aren’t taken to matter at all
Ah, that’s fair—I think I was mistaking the technical usage of “infinite ethics” for a broader class of problems involving infinities in ethics in general. Deonotological theories sometimes imply “infinite” badness of actions, which can have counterintuitive implications as discussed by MacAskill in his interviews with 80k, which is why I was confused by your objection.
Do non-utilitarian moral theories have readily available solutions to infinite ethics either? Suggesting infinite ethics as an objection I think only makes sense if it’s a particular problem for utilitarianism, or at least a worse problem for utilitarianism than for anything else.
I’d also recommend the very repugnant conclusion as an important objection (at least to classical or symmetric utilitarianism).
I think it isn’t a problem in the first place for non-consequentialist theories, because the problem comes from trying to compare infinite sets of individuals with utilities when identities (including locations in spacetime) aren’t taken to matter at all, but you could let identities matter in certain ways and possibly get around it this way. I think it’s generally a problem for consequentialist theories, utilitarian or not.
It’s worth considering that avoiding it (Weak Quality Addition) is one of several intuitive conditions in an important impossibility theorem (of which there are many similar ones, including the earlier one which is cited in the post you cite), which could be a response to the objection.
EDIT: Or maybe the impossibility theorems and paradoxes should be taken to be objections to consequentialism generally, because there’s no satisfactory way to compare outcomes generally, so we shouldn’t rely purely on comparing outcomes to guide actions.
Ah, that’s fair—I think I was mistaking the technical usage of “infinite ethics” for a broader class of problems involving infinities in ethics in general. Deonotological theories sometimes imply “infinite” badness of actions, which can have counterintuitive implications as discussed by MacAskill in his interviews with 80k, which is why I was confused by your objection.