Negative utilitarianism (NU) isn’t mentioned anywhere on the website, AFAIS. This ethical view has quite a few supporters among thinkers, and unlike classical utilitarianism (CU) NU appears satiable (“maximize happiness” vs “minimize misery”). There are subtypes like weak NU (lexical NU and lexical threshold NU), consent-based NU, and perhaps OPIS’ “xNU+”.
I’d be more excited about seeing some coverage of suffering-focused ethics in general, rather than NU specifically. I think NU is a fairly extreme position, but the idea that suffering is the dominant component of the expected utility of the future is both consistent with standard utilitarian positions, and also captures the key point that most EA NU thinkers are making.
the idea that suffering is the dominant component of the expected utility of the future is both consistent with standard utilitarian positions, and also captures the key point that most EA NU thinkers are making.
I don’t think it quite captures the key point. The key point is working to prevent suffering, which “symmetric” utilitarians often do. It’s possible the future is positive in expectation, but it’s best for a symmetric utilitarian to work on suffering, and it’s possible that the future is negative in expectation, but it’s best for them to work on pleasure or some other good.
Symmetric utilitarians might sometimes try to improve a situation by creating lots of happy individuals rather than addressing any of the suffering, and someone with suffering-focused views (including NU) might find this pointless and lacking in compassion for those who suffer.
Even classical utilitarianism can belong to the umbrella term of suffering-focused ethics if its supporters agree that we should still focus on reducing suffering in practice (for its neglectedness, relative easiness of prevention, as a common ground with other ethical views, etc).
I’m surprised by the downvotes. There’s a page on types of utilitarianism, and NU is not mentioned, but “variable value theories, critical level theories and person-affecting views” are at least named, and NU seems better known than variable value and critical level theories. Average utilitarianism also isn’t mentioned.
My impression of variable value theories and critical level theories is that these are mostly academic theories, constructed as responses to the repugnant conclusion and other impossibility results, and pretty ad hoc for this purpose, with little independent motivation and little justification for their exact forms. Exactly where should be the critical level? Exactly what should the variable value function look like? They don’t seem to be brought up much in the literature except in papers actually developing different versions of them or in comparing different theories. Maybe my impression is wrong.
Negative utilitarianism (NU) isn’t mentioned anywhere on the website, AFAIS. This ethical view has quite a few supporters among thinkers, and unlike classical utilitarianism (CU) NU appears satiable (“maximize happiness” vs “minimize misery”). There are subtypes like weak NU (lexical NU and lexical threshold NU), consent-based NU, and perhaps OPIS’ “xNU+”.
Are there reasons for the omission?
I’d be more excited about seeing some coverage of suffering-focused ethics in general, rather than NU specifically. I think NU is a fairly extreme position, but the idea that suffering is the dominant component of the expected utility of the future is both consistent with standard utilitarian positions, and also captures the key point that most EA NU thinkers are making.
I also agree and would like to see discussion of hedonistic/preference NU and SFE more generally.
I don’t think it quite captures the key point. The key point is working to prevent suffering, which “symmetric” utilitarians often do. It’s possible the future is positive in expectation, but it’s best for a symmetric utilitarian to work on suffering, and it’s possible that the future is negative in expectation, but it’s best for them to work on pleasure or some other good.
Symmetric utilitarians might sometimes try to improve a situation by creating lots of happy individuals rather than addressing any of the suffering, and someone with suffering-focused views (including NU) might find this pointless and lacking in compassion for those who suffer.
Good point. Thank you.
Even classical utilitarianism can belong to the umbrella term of suffering-focused ethics if its supporters agree that we should still focus on reducing suffering in practice (for its neglectedness, relative easiness of prevention, as a common ground with other ethical views, etc).
I’m surprised by the downvotes. There’s a page on types of utilitarianism, and NU is not mentioned, but “variable value theories, critical level theories and person-affecting views” are at least named, and NU seems better known than variable value and critical level theories. Average utilitarianism also isn’t mentioned.
My impression of variable value theories and critical level theories is that these are mostly academic theories, constructed as responses to the repugnant conclusion and other impossibility results, and pretty ad hoc for this purpose, with little independent motivation and little justification for their exact forms. Exactly where should be the critical level? Exactly what should the variable value function look like? They don’t seem to be brought up much in the literature except in papers actually developing different versions of them or in comparing different theories. Maybe my impression is wrong.