I agree with this in the abstract, but for the specifics of this particular case, do you in fact think that online mobs /â cancel culture /â groups who show up to protest your event without warning should be engaged with on a good faith assumption? I struggle to imagine any of these groups accepting anything other than full concession to their demands, such that youâre stuck with the BATNA regardless.
I think so.
In the abstract, ânegotiating via ultimatumâ (e.g. âyou must cancel the talk, or I will do thisâ) does not mean one is acting in bad faith. Alice may foresee there is no bargaining frontier, but is informing you what your BATNA looks like and gives you the opportunity to consider whether âgiving inâ is nonetheless better for you (this may not be very âniceâ, but it isnât âblackmailâ). A lot turns on whether her âor elseâ is plausibly recommended by the lights of her interests (e.g. she would do these things if we had already held the event/âshe believed our pre-commitment to do so) or she is threatening spiteful actions where their primary value is her hope they alter our behaviour (e.g. she would at least privately wish she didnât have to âfollow throughâ if we defied her).
The reason these are important to distinguish is âfolk game theoryâ gives a pro tanto reason to not give in the latter case, even if doing so is better than suffering the consequences (as you deter future attempts to coerce you). But not in the former one, as Aliceâs motivation to retaliate does not rely on the chance you may acquiesce to her threats, and so she will not âgo awayâ after youâve credibly demonstrated to her you will never do this.
On the particular case I think some of it was plausibly bad faith (i.e. if a major driver was âfleet in beingâ threat that people would antisocially disrupt the event) but a lot of it probably wasnât: âPeople badmouthing/âthinking less of us for doing thisâ or (as Habryka put it) the âvery explicit threatâ of an organisation removing their affiliation from EA Munich are all credibly/âprobably good faith warnings even if the only way to avoid them would have been complete concession. (There are lots of potential reasons I would threaten to stop associating with someone or something where the only way for me to relent is their complete surrender)
(I would be cautious about labelling things as mobs or cancel culture.)
[G]iven that sheâs taking actions that destroy value for Bob without generating value for Alice (except via their impact on Bobâs actions), I think it is fine to think of this as a threat. (I am less attached to the bully metaphorâI meant that as an example of a threat.)
Let me take a more in-group example readers will find sympathetic.
When the NYT suggested it will run an article using Scottâs legal name, may of his supporters responded by complaining to the editor, organising petitions, cancelling their subscriptions (and encouraging others to do likewise), trying to coordinate sources/âpublic figures to refuse access to NYT journalists, and so on. These are straightforwardly actions which âdestroy valueâ for the NYT, are substantially motivated to try and influence its behaviour, and was an ultimatum to boot (i.e. the only way the NYT can placate this âonline mobâ is to fully concede on not using Scottâs legal name).
Yet presumably this strategy was not predicated on âonly we are allowed to (or smart enough to) use game theory, so we can expect the NYT to irrationally give in to our threats when they should be ostentatiously doing exactly what we donât want them to do to demonstrate they wonât be bulliedâ. For although these actions are âthreatsâ, they are warnings/â good faith/â non-spiteful, as these responses are not just out of hope to coerce: these people would be minded to retaliate similarly if they only found out NYTâs intention after the article had been published.
Naturally the hope is that one can resolve conflict by a meeting of the minds: we might hope we can convince Alice to see things our way; and the NYT probably hopes the same. But if the disagreement prompting conflict remains, we should be cautious about how we use the word threat, especially in equivocating between commonsense use of the term (e.g. âI threaten to castigate Charlie publicly if she holds a conference on holocaust denialâ) and the subspecies where folk game theoryâand our own self-righteousnessâstrongly urges us to refute (e.g. âLife would be easier for us at the NYT if we acquiesced to those threatening to harm our reputation and livelihoods if we report things they donât want us to. But we will never surrender the integrity of our journalism to bullies and blackmailers.â)
Yeah, I think I agree with everything youâre saying. I think we were probably thinking of different aspects of the situationâIâm imagining the sorts of crusades that were given as examples in the OP (for which a good faith assumption seems straightforwardly wrong, and a bad faith assumption seems straightforwardly correct), whereas youâre imagining other situations like a university withdrawing affiliation (where it seems far more murky and hard to label as good or bad faith).
Also, I realize this wasnât clear before, but I emphatically donât think that making threats is necessarily immoral or even bad; it depends on the context (as youâve been elucidating).
I think so.
In the abstract, ânegotiating via ultimatumâ (e.g. âyou must cancel the talk, or I will do thisâ) does not mean one is acting in bad faith. Alice may foresee there is no bargaining frontier, but is informing you what your BATNA looks like and gives you the opportunity to consider whether âgiving inâ is nonetheless better for you (this may not be very âniceâ, but it isnât âblackmailâ). A lot turns on whether her âor elseâ is plausibly recommended by the lights of her interests (e.g. she would do these things if we had already held the event/âshe believed our pre-commitment to do so) or she is threatening spiteful actions where their primary value is her hope they alter our behaviour (e.g. she would at least privately wish she didnât have to âfollow throughâ if we defied her).
The reason these are important to distinguish is âfolk game theoryâ gives a pro tanto reason to not give in the latter case, even if doing so is better than suffering the consequences (as you deter future attempts to coerce you). But not in the former one, as Aliceâs motivation to retaliate does not rely on the chance you may acquiesce to her threats, and so she will not âgo awayâ after youâve credibly demonstrated to her you will never do this.
On the particular case I think some of it was plausibly bad faith (i.e. if a major driver was âfleet in beingâ threat that people would antisocially disrupt the event) but a lot of it probably wasnât: âPeople badmouthing/âthinking less of us for doing thisâ or (as Habryka put it) the âvery explicit threatâ of an organisation removing their affiliation from EA Munich are all credibly/âprobably good faith warnings even if the only way to avoid them would have been complete concession. (There are lots of potential reasons I would threaten to stop associating with someone or something where the only way for me to relent is their complete surrender)
(I would be cautious about labelling things as mobs or cancel culture.)
Let me take a more in-group example readers will find sympathetic.
When the NYT suggested it will run an article using Scottâs legal name, may of his supporters responded by complaining to the editor, organising petitions, cancelling their subscriptions (and encouraging others to do likewise), trying to coordinate sources/âpublic figures to refuse access to NYT journalists, and so on. These are straightforwardly actions which âdestroy valueâ for the NYT, are substantially motivated to try and influence its behaviour, and was an ultimatum to boot (i.e. the only way the NYT can placate this âonline mobâ is to fully concede on not using Scottâs legal name).
Yet presumably this strategy was not predicated on âonly we are allowed to (or smart enough to) use game theory, so we can expect the NYT to irrationally give in to our threats when they should be ostentatiously doing exactly what we donât want them to do to demonstrate they wonât be bulliedâ. For although these actions are âthreatsâ, they are warnings/â good faith/â non-spiteful, as these responses are not just out of hope to coerce: these people would be minded to retaliate similarly if they only found out NYTâs intention after the article had been published.
Naturally the hope is that one can resolve conflict by a meeting of the minds: we might hope we can convince Alice to see things our way; and the NYT probably hopes the same. But if the disagreement prompting conflict remains, we should be cautious about how we use the word threat, especially in equivocating between commonsense use of the term (e.g. âI threaten to castigate Charlie publicly if she holds a conference on holocaust denialâ) and the subspecies where folk game theoryâand our own self-righteousnessâstrongly urges us to refute (e.g. âLife would be easier for us at the NYT if we acquiesced to those threatening to harm our reputation and livelihoods if we report things they donât want us to. But we will never surrender the integrity of our journalism to bullies and blackmailers.â)
Yeah, I think I agree with everything youâre saying. I think we were probably thinking of different aspects of the situationâIâm imagining the sorts of crusades that were given as examples in the OP (for which a good faith assumption seems straightforwardly wrong, and a bad faith assumption seems straightforwardly correct), whereas youâre imagining other situations like a university withdrawing affiliation (where it seems far more murky and hard to label as good or bad faith).
Also, I realize this wasnât clear before, but I emphatically donât think that making threats is necessarily immoral or even bad; it depends on the context (as youâve been elucidating).