In this case, AFAIK, no one in particular was making a threat yet. So, instead, not canceling the event is exposing yourself to a potential threat and the loss (whether you submit or not, or even retaliate) that would result. Avoiding the threat in the first place to avoid its costs is a reason to cancel the event.
Canceling is like hiring bodyguards for the president and transporting them in an armoured vehicle, instead of leaving them exposed to attacks and then retaliating afterwards if they are attacked.
(When I write “explicit threat(s)” below, I’m mostly thinking demands from outsiders to cancel the event and risks of EA Munich or its organizers being cancelled or explicit threats from outsiders to cancel EA Munich without necessarily following through.)
Abstractly, sure, the game theory is similar, since cancelling is also a cost, but I think the actual payoffs/costs can be very different, as you may be exposing yourself to more risk, and being explicitly threatened at all can incur additional (net) costs beyond the cost of cancellation. Also, if we were talking about not planning the event in the first place (that’s another way to avoid the action, although that’s not what happened here), it’ll go unnoticed, so you wouldn’t be known as someone who submits to threats to make yourself a target for more. A group won’t likely be known for not inviting certain controversial speakers in the first place. I think in this case, we can say the game theory is pretty different due to asymmetric information.
Cancelling early can also reduce the perception of submission to others who would make threats compared to cancelling after explicit threats, since explicit threats bring attention with them.
As I wrote, there are costs that come from being threatened that are additional to just (the costs of) cancelling the event that you can avoid if you’re never explicitly threatened in the first place. It’s easier to avoid negative perceptions (like being known as “the group that invited Peter Singer”, as Julia mentioned) if you didn’t plan the event in the first place or cancelled early before any threat was made (and even if no explicit threat was made at all). Once a threat is actually made, negative perceptions are more likely to result even if you submit, since threats bring negative perceptions with them. Cancelling after being threatened might seem like giving an apology after being caught, so might not appear genuine or the cancellation will just be less memorable than the threats and what lead to them (the association with particular figures).
I’m assuming you’re referring to my analogy with protecting the president, rather than my claim “Avoiding the threat in the first place to avoid its costs is a reason to cancel the event”, which seems obvious given the risk that they will follow through on the threat (although you may have stronger reasons in the opposite direction.)
Protecting the president has costs and is avoiding the action of letting the president go unprotected, which you would prefer if there were no threats or risks of threats. How does “Avoiding the action because you know you’ll be threatened until you change course is the same as submitting to the threat” apply to cancelling but not this? I guess you can look at bodyguards as both preventative and retaliatory (they’ll kill attackers), but armoured vehicles seem purely preventative.
EDIT: One possible difference from purely strategic threats is that the people threatening to cancel you (get you fired, ruin your reputation, etc., which you don’t have much control over) might actually value both making and following through on their threats to cancel as good things, rather than see following through as a necessary but unfortunate cost to make their future threats more persuasive. What do they want more, to cancel problematic people (to serve justice and/or signal virtue), or for there to be fewer problematic people? If the former, they may just be looking for appropriate targets to cancel and excuses to cancel them, so you’d mark yourself as a target by appearing problematic to them.
I’m not sure this is that different from protecting the president, though, since some also just value causing harm to the president and the country.
In this case, AFAIK, no one in particular was making a threat yet. So, instead, not canceling the event is exposing yourself to a potential threat and the loss (whether you submit or not, or even retaliate) that would result. Avoiding the threat in the first place to avoid its costs is a reason to cancel the event.
Canceling is like hiring bodyguards for the president and transporting them in an armoured vehicle, instead of leaving them exposed to attacks and then retaliating afterwards if they are attacked.
No it’s not! Avoiding the action because you know you’ll be threatened until you change course is the same as submitting to the threat.
(When I write “explicit threat(s)” below, I’m mostly thinking demands from outsiders to cancel the event and risks of EA Munich or its organizers being cancelled or explicit threats from outsiders to cancel EA Munich without necessarily following through.)
Abstractly, sure, the game theory is similar, since cancelling is also a cost, but I think the actual payoffs/costs can be very different, as you may be exposing yourself to more risk, and being explicitly threatened at all can incur additional (net) costs beyond the cost of cancellation. Also, if we were talking about not planning the event in the first place (that’s another way to avoid the action, although that’s not what happened here), it’ll go unnoticed, so you wouldn’t be known as someone who submits to threats to make yourself a target for more. A group won’t likely be known for not inviting certain controversial speakers in the first place. I think in this case, we can say the game theory is pretty different due to asymmetric information.
Cancelling early can also reduce the perception of submission to others who would make threats compared to cancelling after explicit threats, since explicit threats bring attention with them.
As I wrote, there are costs that come from being threatened that are additional to just (the costs of) cancelling the event that you can avoid if you’re never explicitly threatened in the first place. It’s easier to avoid negative perceptions (like being known as “the group that invited Peter Singer”, as Julia mentioned) if you didn’t plan the event in the first place or cancelled early before any threat was made (and even if no explicit threat was made at all). Once a threat is actually made, negative perceptions are more likely to result even if you submit, since threats bring negative perceptions with them. Cancelling after being threatened might seem like giving an apology after being caught, so might not appear genuine or the cancellation will just be less memorable than the threats and what lead to them (the association with particular figures).
I’m assuming you’re referring to my analogy with protecting the president, rather than my claim “Avoiding the threat in the first place to avoid its costs is a reason to cancel the event”, which seems obvious given the risk that they will follow through on the threat (although you may have stronger reasons in the opposite direction.)
Protecting the president has costs and is avoiding the action of letting the president go unprotected, which you would prefer if there were no threats or risks of threats. How does “Avoiding the action because you know you’ll be threatened until you change course is the same as submitting to the threat” apply to cancelling but not this? I guess you can look at bodyguards as both preventative and retaliatory (they’ll kill attackers), but armoured vehicles seem purely preventative.
EDIT: One possible difference from purely strategic threats is that the people threatening to cancel you (get you fired, ruin your reputation, etc., which you don’t have much control over) might actually value both making and following through on their threats to cancel as good things, rather than see following through as a necessary but unfortunate cost to make their future threats more persuasive. What do they want more, to cancel problematic people (to serve justice and/or signal virtue), or for there to be fewer problematic people? If the former, they may just be looking for appropriate targets to cancel and excuses to cancel them, so you’d mark yourself as a target by appearing problematic to them.
I’m not sure this is that different from protecting the president, though, since some also just value causing harm to the president and the country.