Selected Cluelessness Critique Competition Entries

This sequence collects eligible entries[1] to the cluelessness critiques essay competition.

  1. ^

    Roughly, those that didn’t engage sufficiently with Anthony’s sequence, and offer a critique or solution. I’ll also refrain from publishing some of the more unreadable (because AI-generated) pieces, since they won’t be interesting to the Forum audience.

    If you notice that your entry is not in the list—this means that it didn’t make it to the second stage of judging. There are many reasons other than the quality of your essay that this may have happened—please do post your entry if you’d like it to be read and discussed.

Com­ments on the sum­mary of the un­aware­ness argument

Why Clue­less­ness Doesn’t En­tail Paralysis

Rea­sons Without Ag­gre­ga­tion: Why Coarse-Grained Un­der­stand­ing Does Not Pre­clude Best-Guess Comparison

One coun­terex­am­ple is enough

A Note Against the Max­i­mal­ity Rule

Start with Rea­sons, Not Global Welfare

Agency and the Jus­tifi­ca­tion of Altru­is­tic Preference

Im­par­tial Altru­is­tic Com­par­i­sons with­out Mo­dal Completeness

Max­i­mal­ity Is the Wrong De­ci­sion Rule for a Vague Representor

Me­tanor­ma­tive Brack­et­ing Needs a Rule for How We Slice Up Views. Add That Rule and the Neart­er­mism Ar­gu­ment Falls Apart

From Clue­less­ness to Ac­tion: Why Brack­et­ing Re­quires an Epistemic Audit

The Virtues of Cluelessness

A fishy anal­ogy for long term clue­less­ness.

A sim­ple im­pos­si­bil­ity re­sult about ra­tio­nal de­ci­sion­mak­ing un­der unawareness

Rea­sons to Act on Your Best Guess: A Re­ply to the Challenge of Unawareness

A case for ig­nor­ing unawareness

The Train to Arbitraryland

The Clue­less­ness Hori­zon Ar­gu­ment: Limited Ra­tion­al­ity from Im­par­tial Motivations

Clue­less­ness Cri­tiques: Re­quire­ments of Ra­tion­al­ity for Effec­tive Altruists

Cos­mic House-Always-Wins

Cross-Cat­e­gory Ir­rele­vance: A Re­sponse to Cluelessness

Every Un­known Comes Out the Same Shape

Unaware­ness as a com­pu­ta­tional constraint

Challeng­ing the un­aware­ness ar­gu­ment with third ac­tions and mixed actions

Two kinds of defer­ence and the nor­ma­tive premise

Lex­i­cal Fil­ter­ing: De­cid­ing un­der In­de­ter­mi­nacy with Lex­i­cally Ordered Values

Bot­tom-Up Brack­et­ing: A Per­son-Cen­tered Re­sponse to Clue­less­ness

De­fus­ing clue­less­ness with de­grees of justification