I graduated from Georgetown University in December, 2021 with degrees in economics, mathematics and a philosophy minor. There, I founded and helped to lead Georgetown Effective Altruism. Over the last few years recent years, I’ve interned at the Department of the Interior, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Nonlinear.
Blog: aaronbergman.net
Assuming we’re not radically mistaken about our own subjective experience, it really seems like pleasure is good for the being experiencing it (aside from any function or causal effects it may have).
In fact, pleasure without goodness in some sense seems like an incoherent concept. If a person was to insist that they felt pleasure but in no sense was this a good thing, I would say that they are mistaken about something, whether it be the nature of their own experience or the usual meaning of words.
Some people, I think, concede the above but want to object that lower-case goodness in the sense described is distinct from some capital-G objective Goodness out there in the world.
But sentient beings are a perfectly valid element of the world/universe, and so goodness for a given being simply implies goodness at large (all else equal of course). There’s no spooky metaphysical sense in which it’s written into the stars; it is simply directly implied by the facts about what some things are like to some sentient beings.
I’d add that the above logic holds fine, and with even more rhetorical and ethical force, in the case of suffering.
Now if you accept the above, here’s a simple thought experiment: consider two states of the world, identical in every way except in world A you’re experiencing a terrible stomach ache and in world B you’re not.
The previous argument implies that there is simply more badness in world A, full stop.
Much more to be said ofc but I’ll leave it there :)