Buhl

• Buhl 3 Aug 2021 12:31 UTC

  7 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Gordon Seidoh Worley’s comment on: Towards a longter­mist frame­work for eval­u­at­ing democ­racy-re­lated interventions

  Thanks for raising these points! A few of my (personal) reactions:
  
  1. We definitely didn’t intend for the post to presuppose that democracy is good for the long term. It’s true that most of the potential effects we identity are positive-leaning – but none of these effects, nor the all-things-considered effect, is a settled case.
  
  2. I think the question of what conditions allowed EA to come into existence is interesting, although not sure if that’s the main positive impact of liberal democracy (especially given we don’t have super strong evidence that liberal democracy was necessary for EA to arise). As is sort-of mentioned in the post, (inclusive) liberalism might be the feature most directly important to the flourishing of EA. But of course it’s hard to tell and I think it’s plausible that a combination of features reinforcing each other is key.

• Buhl 21 Nov 2021 18:20 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  on: We need al­ter­na­tives to In­tro EA Fellowships

  Thanks for writing this post! I especially like the concrete alternatives with thoughtful upsides/​downsides. As some others have said, I’d guess some of the downsides to the alternatives are quite significant, but would still love to see trials and to chat to anyone who runs trials.
  

  A potentially useful alternative approach (especially for larger groups who can run multiple programs) is to have several alternative intro funnels at once. I.e. run the IF but also have a clear alternative for keen people with more background knowledge or who can quickly get background knowledge on their own, e.g. a retreat, a workshop or shorter version of the fellowship, mentorship, or something else. Organisers could scout for keen people both outside of the fellowship and in the first weeks. This might help preserve the benefits of the IF for those who need the accountability/​long-term commitment, while allowing people who find it frustrating to skip through. A key uncertainty is how easy it is to identify keen people. If it’s difficult, it might be worth just running the program that benefits keen people the most (though I’m unsure about that).

A col­lec­tion of re­sources for In­tro Fel­low­ship organisers

• Buhl 15 Jan 2022 12:02 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: michel’s comment on: A col­lec­tion of re­sources for In­tro Fel­low­ship organisers

  No worries!

  I don’t have strong opinions on a 4-week fellowship, no! I think my quick take would be that (a) it’s harder to teach the core EA ideas well in 4x1.5h sessions, (b) it’s harder to create a social community/​have people become friends in 4 weeks, and (c) the group of people who’d commit to a 4-week program but not an 8-week program is relatively small, at least in a university group context. But I’m not too sure about this. It also seems plausible to me that 4 weeks could be better in contexts like professional or city groups.

  I’d be excited to see a group running both and comparing the outcomes (e.g., in terms of retention, later engagement, number of friends made, whether participants say they’d like a shorter/​longer program).

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  [deleted]

• Buhl 30 Jun 2022 11:59 UTC

  10 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Com­mu­nity Builders Spend Too Much Time Com­mu­nity Building

  Thought-provoking post, thanks a lot for writing it!

  I broadly agree that it’s good for community builders to spend significant time on learning/​direct work, especially if their long-term plan is not to do community building, but I think I disagree with some of your specific reasons.

  I think the post sometimes conflates two senses of marketing. One is “pure” marketing, the other is marketing as you define it (i.e., marketing and ops), which includes things like organising content-heavy events and programs like fellowships. My instinct is that:

  A. Most of the negative effects of “too much marketing” that you identify are negative effects of “pure” marketing, rather than marketing-and-operations. I think this is especially true of claim 2 and 4: It doesn’t seem to me like organising a talk or fellowship creates bad epistemics or makes EA comes across as pushy or single-minded. It’s maybe not always the best thing organisers could be doing (e.g., because of claim 1 and 3), but doesn’t seem harmful otherwise.

  B. It’s not true that 60% of community builders spend 70-80% of their time on “pure” marketing.

  I’m curious if you disagree with either of these claims. (But even if not, I think the central argument could still be true, though for slightly different reasons, e.g., that organisers spend too much time on “pure” marketing, or that spending significant time on learning/​direct work makes you a better community builder.)

• Buhl 24 Aug 2022 11:17 UTC

  15 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Buhl’s Shortform

  Tl;dr: Most Turing Award winners and Decacorn company founders (i.e., exceptionally successful people) don’t attend US top universities, but there’s a fair amount of concentration.

  In response to the post Most Ivy-smart students aren’t at Ivy-tier schools and as a follow-up to Linch’s comment tallying the educational background of Field Medalists, I collected some data on the undergrad degrees of exceptionally successful people (using some of the (imperfect) ex post metrics suggested by Linch).

  Of the 32 Turing Award winners in the last 20 years, 6 attended a top 10 US university, 16 attended another US university, 3 attended Oxbridge, and 7 attended other non-US universities. (full data)

  Of the 97 Decacorn company founders I could find education data for, 19 attended a top 10 US university, 32 attended another US university, and 46 attended non-US universities (no Oxbridge). (full data)

  So it seems like people who are successful on these metrics are pretty spread out across both US/​elsewhere and elite/​non-elite unis, but concentrated enough that having considerable focus on top US universities makes sense (assuming a key aim is to target people with the potential to be extremely successful).

  The concentration gets a bit higher for PhDs for the Turing Award winners (28% at top 10 US universities). It’s also higher for younger Decacorn company founders (e.g., 50% of under-35s in the US at MIT or Stanford) – so that gives some (relatively weak) evidence that concentration at top US universities has increased in the last few decades.

  There’s a doc with more details here for anyone interested.

  [Also for full disclosure: I collected this data as part of my job, not just as a fun after hours project.]

  What links here?

  • Buhl's comment on Most Ivy-smart stu­dents aren’t at Ivy-tier schools by Aaron Bergman (24 Aug 2022 11:19 UTC; 22 points)

• Buhl 24 Aug 2022 11:19 UTC

  22 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Linch’s comment on: Most Ivy-smart stu­dents aren’t at Ivy-tier schools

  [Shortform version of this comment here.]

  Update: I helped Linch collect data on the undergrad degrees of exceptionally successful people (using some of the ex post metrics Linch mentioned).

  Of the 32 Turing Award winners in the last 20 years, 6 attended a top 10 US university, 16 attended another US university, 3 attended Oxbridge, and 7 attended other non-US universities. (full data)

  Of the 97 Decacorn company founders I could find education data for, 19 attended a top 10 US university, 32 attended another US university, and 46 attended non-US universities (no Oxbridge). (full data)

  So it seems like people who are successful on these metrics are pretty spread out across both US/​elsewhere and elite/​non-elite unis, but concentrated enough that having considerable focus on top US universities makes sense (assuming a key aim is to target people with the potential to be extremely successful).

  The concentration gets a bit higher for PhDs for the Turing Award winners (28% at top 10 US universities). It’s also higher for younger Decacorn company founders (e.g., 50% of under-35s in the US at MIT or Stanford) – so that gives some (relatively weak) evidence that concentration at top US universities has increased in the last few decades.

  There’s a doc with more details here for anyone interested.

• Buhl 13 Oct 2022 0:01 UTC

  5 points

  1 ∶ 0

  on: We can do bet­ter than argmax

  Curious what people think of the argument that, given that people in the EA community have different rankings of the top causes, a close-to-optimal community outcome could be reached if individuals argmax using their own ranking?

  (At least assuming that the number of people who rank a certain cause as the top one is proportional to how likely it is to be the top one.)

• Buhl 27 Oct 2022 7:34 UTC

  4 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Ways in which EA could fail

  Another failure mode I couldn’t easily fit into the taxonomy that might warrant a new category:

  Competency failures—EAs are just ineffective at achieving things in the world due to lack of skills (eg comms, politics, org running) or bad judgement. Maybe this could be classed as a resource failure (for failing to attract people with certain skills) or a rigor failure (for failing to develop them/​learn from others). Will try to think of a title beginning with R…

  Minor points:

  • I was also considering something like value failures (EAs have the wrong moral theories/​values), but that could probably be classified as a failure of rigor.

  • +1 to separating internal strife and reputation risks.

• Buhl 31 Oct 2022 11:30 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Morgan R’s comment on: Civ­i­liza­tion Re­cov­ery Kits

  Curious what you’re referring to here and if there’s any publicly available information about it? Couldn’t find anything in ALLFEDs 2020 and 2021 updates. (I’m trying to estimate the cost-effectiveness of this kind of project as part of my work at Rethink Priorities)

• Buhl 2 Dec 2022 15:30 UTC

  14 points

  0 ∶ 1

  on: Why Neu­ron Counts Shouldn’t Be Used as Prox­ies for Mo­ral Weight

  Thank you for the important post!
  

  “we might question how well neuron counts predict overall information-processing capacity”

  My naive prediction would be that many other factors predicting information-processing capacity (e.g., number of connections, conduction velocity, and refractory period) are positively correlated with neuron count, such that neuron count is pretty strongly correlated with information processing even if it only plays a minor part in causing more information processing to happen.

  You cite one paper (Chitka 2009) that provides some evidence against my prediction (based on skimming the abstract, this seemed to be roughly by arguing that insect brains are not necessarily worse at information processing than vertebrate brains). Curious if you think this is the general trend of the literature on this topic?

Scal­able longter­mist pro­jects: Speedrun se­ries – In­tro­duc­tion

Speedrun: Develop an af­ford­able su­per PPE

Speedrun: De­mon­strate the abil­ity to rapidly scale food pro­duc­tion in the case of nu­clear winter

• Buhl 23 Mar 2023 14:16 UTC

  4 points

  1 ∶ 1

  in reply to: RobBensinger’s comment on: Where I’m at with AI risk: con­vinced of dan­ger but not (yet) of doom

  (I’m in a similar position to Amber: Limited background (technical or otherwise) in AI safety and just trying to make sense of things by discussing them.)
  
  Re: “I think you need to say more about what the system is being trained for (and how we train it for that). Just saying “facts about humans are in the data” doesn’t provide a causal mechanism by which the AI acts in human-like ways, any more than “facts about clouds are in the data” provides a mechanism by which the AI role-plays being a cloud.”
  
  The (main) training process for LLMs is exactly to predict human text, which seems like it could reasonably be described as being trained to impersonate humans. If so, it seems natural to me to think that LLMs will by default acquire goals that are similar to human goals. (So it’s not just that “facts about humans are in the data”, but rather that state-of-the-art models are (in some sense) being trained to act like humans.)
  
  I can see some ways this could go wrong – e.g., maybe “predicting what a human would do” is importantly different from “acting like a human would” in terms of the goals internalised; maybe fine-tuning changes the picture; or maybe we’ll soon move to a different training paradigm where this doesn’t apply. And of course, even if there’s some chance this doesn’t happen (even if it isn’t the default), it warrants concern. But, naively, this argument still feels pretty compelling to me.

[Question] What longter­mist pro­jects would you like to see im­ple­mented?

20 con­crete pro­jects for re­duc­ing ex­is­ten­tial risk

• Buhl 26 Jul 2023 15:26 UTC

  9 points

  2 ∶ 2

  in reply to: Vasco Grilo’s comment on: 20 con­crete pro­jects for re­duc­ing ex­is­ten­tial risk

  The quick explanation is that I don’t want people to over-anchor on it, given that the inputs are extremely uncertain, and that I think that a ranked list produced by a relatively well-respected research organisation is the kind of thing people could very easily over-anchor on, even if you caveat it heavily

• Buhl 27 Sep 2023 10:10 UTC

  4 points

  1 ∶ 0

  in reply to: weeatquince’s comment on: 20 con­crete pro­jects for re­duc­ing ex­is­ten­tial risk

  Thanks, appreciate your comment and the compliment!
  
  On your questions:

  2. The research process does consider cost-effectiveness as a key factor – e.g., the weighted factor model we used included both an “impact potential” and a “cost” item, so projects were favoured if they had high estimated impact potential and/​or a low estimated cost. “Impact potential” here means “impact with really successful (~90th percentile) execution” – we’re focusing on the extreme rather than the average case because we expect most of our expected impact to come from tail outcomes (but have a separate item in the model to account for downside risk). The “cost” score was usually based on a rough proxy, but the “impact potential” score was basically just a guess – so it’s quite different from how CE (presumably) uses cost-effectiveness, in that we don’t make an explicit cost-effectiveness estimate and in that we don’t consult evidence from empirical studies (which typically don’t exist for the kinds of projects we consider).

  Re: “For each of the ideas do you feel like you have a sense of why this thing has not happened already?” – we didn’t consider this explicitly in the process (though it somewhat indirectly featured as part of considering tractability and impact potential). I feel like I have a rough sense for each of the projects listed – and we wouldn’t include projects where we didn’t think it was plausible that the project would be feasible, that there’d be a good founder out there etc. – but I could easily be missing important reasons. Definitely an important question – would be curious to hear how CE takes it into account.

  3. Appreciate the input! The idea here wouldn’t be to just shove people into government jobs, but also making sure that they have the right context, knowledge, skills and opportunities to have a positive impact once there. I agree that policy is an ecosystem and that people are needed in many kinds of roles. I think it could make sense for an individual project to focus just/​primarily on one or a few types of role (analogously to how the Horizon Institute focuses primarily on technocratic staffer and executive branch roles + think tank roles), but am generally in favour of high-quality projects in multiple policy-related areas (including advocacy/​lobbying and developing think tank pipelines).