Vasco Grilo🔸

• Vasco Grilo🔸 18 Mar 2026 18:42 UTC

  2 points

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  in reply to: Kestrel🔸’s comment on: Go­ing Big­ger: How We’re Scal­ing Effec­tive Giv­ing & Ca­reers in 2026

  The marginal multiplier should still decrease with spending if the organisation allocates funds to the most cost-effective activities 1st? I think so. If the marginal multiplier accounting for all effects, including longterm and low probability effects, of additional spending on core activities was lower than the marginal multiplier of additional spending on expansion activities, the organisation should move funds from core to expansion activities until their marginal multipliers were equal. Otherwise, they would be leaving impact on the table. The impact of core activities may not always be that visible. The impact of the organisation may not change much nearterm as a result of a temporary reduction in the spending on core activities. However, these are important for the longterm success of the organisation.

Con­scious­ness will slip through our fingers

• Vasco Grilo🔸 18 Mar 2026 17:29 UTC

  2 points

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  in reply to: Melanie Basnak🔸’s comment on: Go­ing Big­ger: How We’re Scal­ing Effec­tive Giv­ing & Ca­reers in 2026

  Hi Kestrel and Melanie. Thanks for the relevant discussion.

  Melanie, could you share your current bar in terms of the multiplier affecting the total expenses of grantees? You say this multiplier for 2025 was “~5–6x”, but your bar is lower because the cost-effectiveness of your grants has to be above the bar, and because you are expanding your funding?

  That said, if we’re funding an organization, even below its full budget, you can assume we believe they are above our bar at their full projected budget. We use their full projected expenses when estimating the giving multiplier, so a partial grant from us is not a signal that we think the marginal dollar is low-value.

  On the other hand, the marginal multiplier could in principle be 0 or negative even if the multiplier affecting the total expenses is high. For example, if the last 10 % of the total expenses have a multiplier of −1, the 2nd last 10 % have a multiplier of 0, and the 1st 80 % have a multiplier of 10, the multiplier affecting the overall expenses would be 7.9 (= 0.1*(-1) + 0.1*0 + 0.8*10), but the marginal multiplier would be at most −1 (at most because the multiplier could continue to decrease as expenses increase). I do not think a negative marginal multiplier is realistic, but I wonder whether it could be close to 1 when accounting for all effects, such as the benefits of a funding cap making grantees look for more counterfactual sources of funding, and the costs of CG scaling up the funding of effective giving initiatives too fast.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 18 Mar 2026 16:44 UTC

  4 points

  1 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Toby Tremlett🔹’s comment on: GHD dis­cus­sion here is slowly dying

  Hi Toby.

  I wonder what the trends look like for other cause areas.

  I thought about this too. It would be interesting to know the details, but I would be surprised if the number of comments per post decreased more in the overall population of posts than in GHD posts. According to Nick’s 1st graph, there were around 9 comments per GHD post in the 1st 3 months of 2021, and around 2 in the last few months, 22.2 % as many (= ²⁄₉), which means there was a reduction of 77.8 % (= 1 − 0.222). In contrast, as illustrated below, the number of engagement hours per day, and posts per month with at least 2 of karma are slightly higher today, which means the number of engagement hours per post has not changed much since early 2021. I guess the number of comments per post is not very far from proportional to the number of engagement hours per post. So I suspect the number of comments per post has not changed a lot in the overall population of posts.

  

  

• Vasco Grilo🔸 18 Mar 2026 12:00 UTC

  3 points

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  on: Poll: How con­vinced are you that whiteleg shrimps are sen­tient?

  Thanks for the post, Guillaume.

  I think hedonistic welfare per unit time should be represented as a practically continuous distribution. This implies a probability of practically 0 for the welfare per unit time being equal to any particular value, including 0, which results in a probability of sentience of practically 100 %. Here is a related article arguing for accepting that all animals are conscious, and focussing on how they are conscious.

  I believe increasing the welfare of shrimps can still have negligible benefits despite the above.

  You may be interested in my post Are you overestimating the importance of the probability of sentience?.

  Summary

  • If you trust there is as little variation in the probability of sentience as suggested by the values used by Ambitious Impact (AIM) and Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE), or presented in Bob Fischer’s book about comparing welfare across species, I believe there are other factors which may be more important for the probability of a small donation increasing animal welfare:

    • Donating to incremental instead of hits-based interventions.

    • Donating to smaller organisations.

    • Donating to organisations in lower income countries

  • I wonder to what extent people donate to interventions targeting animals which are more likely to be sentient to boost the probability of increasing welfare. People routinely take actions which are super unlikely to actually matter:

    • I calculate driving a car for 10 km in Great Britain without a seatbelt leads to 1 additional death with a probability of 1 in 73.0 M. AIM uses a probability of sentience of shrimps which is 34.2 M times as high.

    • Andrew Gelman found the probability of a voter in a small US state polling around ⁵⁰⁄₅₀ in a close election nationally changing the outcome of the national election could get as high as 1 in 3 million. AIM uses a probability of sentience of shrimps which is 1.40 M times as high.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 18 Mar 2026 10:28 UTC

  3 points

  1 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelDickens’s comment on: Poll: How con­vinced are you that whiteleg shrimps are sen­tient?

  Hi Michael. I agree. On the other hand, I also think the Shrimp Welfare Project’s (SWP’s) Humane Slaughter Initiative (HSI), which leads to more farmed shrimps being electrically stunned, may have a very low cost-effectiveness even if their target shrimps are sentient with a probability of 100 %. Their subjective experiences can have a super low intensity. For individual welfare per fully-healthy-animal-year proportional to “individual number of neurons”^“exponent”, and “exponent” from 0 to 2, which covers my reasonable best guesses, the individual welfare per fully-healthy-shrimp-year is 10^-12 (= (10^-6)^2) to 1 times that of humans, as shrimps have 10^-6 times as many neurons as humans. In that case, I estimate that HSI has increased the welfare of farmed shrimps 2.26*10^-4 (= 2.06*10^-8/​(9.13*10^-5)) to 1.49 k (= 20.6*10^3/​13.8) times as cost-effectively as cage-free corporate campaigns increase the welfare of chickens.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 17 Mar 2026 18:18 UTC

  3 points

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  in reply to: Hannah Tookey’s comment on: Re­think Pri­ori­ties: 2025 Re­sults, 2026 Plans and Fund­ing Needs

  Hi Hannah. Are you still planning to email me?

• Vasco Grilo🔸 13 Mar 2026 17:47 UTC

  2 points

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  in reply to: Vasco Grilo🔸’s comment on: Cost-effec­tive­ness of An­ima In­ter­na­tional Poland

  I would estimate the number of layer-years improved in expectation in year Y from “expected population of layers in year Y”*(“expected population of layers in cages in year Y without the intervention as a fraction of all of them in year Y”—“expected population of layers in cages in year Y with the intervention as a fraction of all of them in year Y”) = P(Y)*(f_control(Y) - f_intervention(Y)), which is correct by definition.

  Here is a post illustrating this.

  Summary

  • Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEAs) of interventions accelerating animal welfare reforms usually estimate the increase in the welfare of the target animals (for example, hens in cages) based on the acceleration in years of the full implementation of the reform. This makes sense if each level of implementation of the reform is accelerated as much as its full implementation.

  • However, there are many cases where the acceleration of the full implementation of the reform is not enough to determine the number of animals helped, or animal-years improved. I discuss some below.

Es­ti­ma­tion of the benefits of ac­cel­er­at­ing welfare reforms

• Vasco Grilo🔸 12 Mar 2026 19:58 UTC

  2 points

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  on: Hard-to-re­verse de­ci­sions de­stroy op­tion value

  Thanks for the great post, Stefan.

  Risk aversion. Risk aversion is normally a reason not to make a hard-to-reverse decision. Since reversibility gives you the option to switch course if your strategy underperforms, it normally reduces the risk of a truly bad outcome. Note, though, that the standard view within the effective altruism movement seems to be that altruists should not be risk-averse.

  It could similarly be argued that reversibility gives one the option to switch course despite their strategy performing well, this increasing the risk of missing a truly great outcome? The takeaway is that one should make certainly bad options less available, and certainly good options more unavoidable?

• Vasco Grilo🔸 12 Mar 2026 18:02 UTC

  2 points

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  on: I un­der­es­ti­mated AI ca­pa­bil­ities (again)

  Hi Ajeya.

  But for the first time, I don’t see any solid trend we can extrapolate to say it won’t happen soon.^[11] AI R&D really could be automated this year.

  What are your predictions for the unemployment rate of software engineers? What do you think about these reasons for potentially overestimating the pace of automation based on AI benchmarks?

  But there’s a big problem here – if AIs are actually able to perform most tasks on 1-hour task horizons, why don’t we see more real-world task automation? For example, most emails take less than an hour to write, but crafting emails remains an important part of the lives of billions of people every day.

  Some of this could be due to people underusing AI systems,^[2] but in this post I want to focus on reasons that are more fundamental to the capabilities of AI systems. In particular, I think there are three such reasons that are the most important:

  1. Time-horizon estimates are very domain-specific

  2. Task reliability strongly influences task horizons

  3. Tasks are very bundled together and hard to separate out.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 12 Mar 2026 15:20 UTC

  5 points

  2 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Max Klijnstra 🔶’s comment on: GWWC’s 2026 strat­egy: strength­en­ing foun­da­tions & ac­cel­er­at­ing growth

  Welcome to the EA Forum, Max. Thanks for the clarification, and additional context. I am rooting for your (GWWC’s) success.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 12 Mar 2026 11:48 UTC

  11 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Which An­i­mal Char­i­ties Should ACE Be Eval­u­at­ing?

  Thanks for asking, Vince. Here are some suggestions listed alphabetically which are not in your sheet, and have not yet been mentioned in other answers to your post:

  • Arthropoda Foundation.

  • Innovate Animal Ag.

  • Rethink Priorities’ (RP’s) animal welfare department.

  • Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI).

• Vasco Grilo🔸 9 Mar 2026 9:24 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Gra­da­tions of moral weight

  Thanks for the post, Michael.

  However, any specific function or set of coefficients would (to me) require justification, and it’s unclear that there can be any good justification.

  I also worry about the arbitrariness of the weights (coefficients) of the models. In Bob Fischer’s book about comparing welfare across species, there seems to be only 1 line about the weights used to aggregate the tentative estimates for the welfare range, the difference between the maximum and minimum hedonistic welfare per unit time. “We assigned 30 percent credence to the neurophysiological model, 10 percent to the equality model, and 60 percent to the simple additive model”. People usually give weights that are at least 0.1/​”number of models”, which is at least 3.33 % (= 0.1/​3) for 3 models, when it is quite hard to estimate the weights. However, giving weights which are not much smaller than the uniform weight of 1/​”number of models” could easily lead to huge mistakes. As a silly example, if I asked random people with age 7 about whether the gravitational force between 2 objects is proportional to “distance”^-2 (correct answer), “distance”^-20, or “distance”^-200, I imagine I would get a significant fraction picking the exponents of −20 and −200. Assuming 60 % picked −2, 20 % picked −20, and 20 % picked −200, one may naively conclude the mean exponent of −45.2 (= 0.6*(-2) + 0.2*(-20) + 0.2*(-200)) is reasonable. Yet, there is lots of empirical evidence against this which the respondants are not aware of. The right conclusion would be that the respondants have no idea about the right exponent because they would not be able to adequately justify their picks. I think we are in a similar situation with respect to comparing hedonistic welfare across species.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 9 Mar 2026 8:54 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: In­creas­ingly vague in­ter­per­sonal welfare comparisons

  Thanks for the post, Michael.

  The more or larger such changes are necessary to get from one brain to another, the less tight the bounds on the comparisons could become, the further they may go both negative and positive overall,^[2] and the less reasonable it seems to make such comparisons at all.

  I agree comparisons become increasingly uncertain as the difference between the states of the organisms increases. However, I do not think there is a point where comparisons go from possible, but extremely difficult to not possible at all. I would say there is just a progressive widening of the distribution representing the hedonistic welfare per unit time of a given state of an organism as it moves away from typical human states. As an example, I could say my hedonistic welfare right now is 0.5 to 1.5 times that of random human who is awake, whereas that of a random nematode might be 10^-17 to 1 times that of a random human who is awake. I estimate the ratio between the individual number of neurons of nematodes and humans is 2.79*10^-9, whose square is 7.78*10^-18, roughly 10^-17.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 8 Mar 2026 13:52 UTC

  2 points

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Dig­ging In Your Heels

• Vasco Grilo🔸 8 Mar 2026 9:42 UTC

  2 points

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  in reply to: Anthony DiGiovanni 🔸’s comment on: 1. The challenge of un­aware­ness for im­par­tial al­tru­ist ac­tion guidance: Introduction

  • What makes two actions incomparable, under the imprecise EV model, is that the interval of EV differences crosses zero.

  Imagine 2 states of the world which are exactly the same, and have an imprecice expected welfare of −1 to 1. The difference between their imprecise expected welfare is −2 (= −1 − 1) to 2 (1 - (-1)), which crosses 0. So their expected welfare would be incomparable under your framework? I would say their expected welfare would be comparable, and exactly the same.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 8 Mar 2026 9:17 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Mo Putera’s comment on: Are We Un­der­es­ti­mat­ing Lo­cal Giv­ing in LMICs?

  I did not have a particular structure in mind for how the people in LMICs would regrant the funds. Thanks for giving examples, Mo.

• Vasco Grilo🔸 7 Mar 2026 14:25 UTC

  2 points

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  in reply to: Evan LaForge’s comment on: Your Tools Aren’t Perfect: Method­olog­i­cal Bias Ex­plored Through Weighted Fac­tor Models

  My claim is that people should take time to understand their tools and account for their weaknesses. Accounting for weaknesses should happen not just within the tool, but outside of it when making the final decision.

  I think GiveWell is a good example of this. If CEAs made up 100% of their decision making process, their decisions would be heavily influenced by the weaknesses of CEAs as a method. However, GiveWell acknowledges these weaknesses and uses CEAs as a primary deciding factor, while also incorporating other factors as well.

  Agreed.