Thanks so much for this thoughtful post, Vasco! It is so heartening to see people taking arthropod welfare seriously.
While I agree that chicken welfare reforms could plausibly harm arthropods more than they help chickens, I donāt think that means we shouldnāt support chicken welfare reforms. For the same reason I reject the meat-eater problem, the logic of the larder, and the logic of the logger, I think that to get to a society that maximizes utility over the long term, we will probably need to take some steps that decrease utility in the short term.
That is, I donāt know exactly what global-scale arthropod welfare programs would look like, but I think weāre more likely to get there if more people live in material abundance, so I think economic development is worthwhile even if it increases factory farming in the short term. I think reforming, regulating, and banning factory farming are also very likely to be helpful (and possibly necessary) for human society to normalize and institutionalize concern for non-human animals, and to invest substantial resources in helping them.
I realize this is a suspiciously convenient conclusion to come to, and I canāt rule out the possibility that my position is driven by motivated reasoning. But I think itās a good sign that my claim (āChicken welfare reforms might be good overall, even if they hurt arthropods in the short termā) uses a similar logic to yours (āChicken welfare reforms might be bad overall, even if they help chickens directlyā). Both are examples of finding a different conclusion as a result of changing the scope of the analysis: Should our calculations include just chickens directly affected, or also arthropods indirectly affected, or also farmed and wild animals very-indirectly affected?
Of course one could agree with me that we should include the very-indirectly-affected animals, but disagree with my guesses about what would be best for them. One of the biggest weaknesses of my approach is that itās much harder to judge what kinds of are worthwhile, or to compare effectiveness across efforts. It also takes things further from ecology and more into social movement theory, which is annoying because I enjoy the former a lot more than the latter.
But that doesnāt mean we should abandon empiricism and settle for hand-waviness in everything. Analyses like yours can be very useful; I just think we should interpret their results in the context of explicit theories of change about long-term effects.
You make a great point about the parallel to the meat-eater problem, and I agree that, for similar reasons, itās probably still a good idea to advocate for chicken welfare reforms.
However, I donāt think reductio ad absurdum is a compelling argument in this case.
This postās argument seems absurd not because it leads to some kind of internal contradiction, but rather because it argues for something thatās way outside the things people normally think are good ideas. I donāt think āseems absurd to most peopleā is a reliable indicator of āis not ethically sound,ā because I think many people believe things and act in ways that are not morally sound (e.g., factory farming). What I love about EA is that itās a social space that encourages questioning of conventional ideas.