Campaign coordinator for the World Day for the End of Fishing and Fish Farming, organizer of Sentience Paris 8 (animal ethics student group), enthusiastic donor.
Fairly knowledgeable about the history of animal advocacy and possible strategies in the movement. Very interested in how AI developments and future risks could affect non-human animals (both wild and farmed).
Thanks for questioning my imprecise definition! I was thinking (too?) broadly of vegans in general or casual activists. Even within this community, few prioritize animal suffering as evidenced by low participation in animal advocacy events and careers. While we could narrow our focus to āextremely dedicated animal advocates,ā this represents just thousands of individuals worldwide against billions of consumers and thousands of highly motivated industry stakeholders who likely match or exceed their commitment level.
This makes important points about strategy in a field where a lot is yet to be mapped and defined, and this is potentially useful in order to do that. I appreciate your concision, too.
The most important asymmetry for animal advocates seems to be the truth asymmetry, especially moral alignment to consumers. One of the only reasons I can find to feel hopeful about farmed animal advocacy is that animal advocates are likely to be much more aligned with the general preferences of individual consumers than those who wish to encourage factory farming. Optimistic scenarios of AGI development allowing for better decision-making could increase the chances that these consumer preferences can be leveraged (though Iām not sure how hopeful I am about this for now).
An asymmetry that seems more doubtful to me is the motivational asymmetry: I donāt get the impression that the majority of animal advocates are strongly motivated by reducing animal suffering, and there might be a sufficient number of stakeholders (in a broad sense) in animal agriculture who are likely to be as motivated as the minority of āhighly motivatedā animal advocates.
This will probably be helpful for my own strategic thinking on this question, so thank you for posting this!
I found this post excellent and original. SARP is an immense problem and still seems crucially neglected within EA animal advocacy, perhaps because itās still difficult to find good theories of change aimed at preventing it. This also might be the first piece I encounter that treats SARP as more than a short-termist concern.
While I superficially agree with the overall point, I do have a few cruxes. ā[...] advocacy towards considering the suffering of mammals farmed for their meat, seems to be contributing to the growth of the farming of smaller animalsā seems like a core claim, and yet thereās no link or footnote for tentative evidence[1]. Yes, vegan advocacy and SARP have both grown in the past ten years, but does correlation imply causation?
My second crux ends up being kind of the same as the first one. I find both Sentientia and Reversomelas implausible, because I find it unlikely that the values of a tiny minority of present-day humans (animal advocates) will have a strong effect on the values of society in the future.
Overall, while I found the post enriching, I find myself disagreeing with the premise somewhat. Your description of the present, as well as those of both futures, seem to give too much weight to moral adovcacy, compared to other factors. While I think that the size of animals that will be farmed in the future matters a lot, I think that the factors that will determine that are neither the way current vegans talk about animals, nor the choices we make in welfare campaigns during this decade.
Since veganism /ā antispeciesism opposes the farming of small animals, by contrast with environmentalists who are likelier to be favorable to insect farming for pet feed or honey production while being critical of the farming of large animals, there is a strong āsuperficialā case for thinking that the vegan /ā sentientist meme is likelier to attenuate SARP than to worsen it. Another point would be the (very minor) waves that shrimp welfare campaigns have made recently.
There are obvious counterpoints to my position though: cow-focused environmental /ā leaning vegan material like Cowspiracy has probably worsened SARP on the margin.
I thought of insect farming, but this is definitely one too!
To be precise, I didnāt say the post committed any norm violation (and Henry Stanley didnāt either), I made the vaguer claim that it doesnāt fit the standards of discussion that are often seen on the EA Forum (a āgenerousā approach, scout mindset).
I appreciate some of the concerns raised here, and share some of them myself (I think focusing on ārightsā, especially in the way Francione and Charlton usually frame them, has been unhelpful in animal ethics, especially when it comes to the disciplineās public image).
However, while I donāt want to be holding linkposts to unreasonable standards (and the post would probably have been more nuanced if it had been planned as an EA Forum linkpost), I did find the article quite uncharitable to the two things it critiques: the calling into attention of the harms that can come to domestic animals, and minimalist axiologies.
Regarding the former: in the comments, you mention second-order effects that could come from āhumane farmingā in the future, but in the post itself, you donāt link the strays whose lives you acknowledge to be bad to the breeding of pets themselves. Currently, domestic animals are often bred in operations with poor welfare standards, and many are mistreated and abandoned by their owners. I do think Francione and Charlton are not doing the cause a favor by pointing to ārightsā instead of the tangible, terrible experiences that millions of domestic animals face every year, but I donāt think it can be said that thereās āno trade-offā with anotherās interests here: if we focus on domestic animals that will live long, good lives, and think itās important that more exist and thus think that the pet industry should continue existing as it currently does, this will cause more strays (not to mention all the short and miserable lives that end at the puppy mills itself), and more domestic animals who might end up in homes where they are mistreated.
So to me, this example isnāt a spotless application of the idea you wish to defend: but Iām also not sure there are any good applications of this idea that can be as broad as āthe existence of petsā, as there are generally significant trade-offs with otherās interests when creating good lives, as our resources could be allocated elsewhere (as has been pointed out by Magnus Vinding).
Regarding the latter: calling a philosophical position āa pathologyā with no further justification is not the sort of thing I usually expect to find on the forum, though itās still common when it comes to minimalist axiologies and related views.
I realize I didnāt choose a clear position on this in my description, and Iām actually not sure. Iād call a complete, seemingly irreversible collapse of civilization, even with humans remaining on earth (what the outcome of a nuclear war could be, for example), an X-risk even if itās not full-on extinction, but when it comes to lock-in and disempowerment, since humans (and presumably other animals) remain numerous and living, it doesnāt feel like it should be part of the same question. Iād say my question is about X-risks involving death and destruction (or even mass sterilization), rather than a change in who controls the outcome.
I read this on the morning of a sunny national holiday that I spent indoors, typing away as usual, and I came back to it three times, it really resonates. I might even translate it in French, crediting you (if thatās alright) and share it with acquaintances (or simply paraphrase it) next time they seem confused or worried by me choosing to make work my main focus in life. I really like the last sentence in particular.
We should promote AI safety ideas more than other EA ideas
AI Safety work is likely to be extremely important, but āother EA ideasā is too broad for me to agree. It would mean, for example, that itās more important than the āthree radical ideasā and I have trouble agreeing with that.
We should focus more on building particular fields (AI safety, effective global health, etc.) than building EA
I donāt have very specific arguments. EA community-building seems valuable, but I do think that work on specific causes can be interesting and scalable (for example, Hive, AI for Animals, of the Estivales de la question animale in France, all concretely seems like good ways to draw new individuals into the EA/āEA-adjacent community).
Most AI safety outreach should be done without presenting EA ideas or assuming EA frameworks
Agree āon principleā, clueless (and concerned) on consequences.
From my superficial understanding of the current psychological research on EA (by Caviola and Althaus), a lot of core EA ideas are unlikely to really resonate with the majority of individuals, while the case for building safer AI seems to have broader appeal. Nonetheless, I do worry that AI Safety with a lack of EA ideas involved is more likely to favor an ethics of survival rather than a welfarist ethic, is unlikely to take S-risks /ā digital sentience into account, so it also seems possible that scaling in that way could have very negative outcomes.
We should be trying to accelerate the EA community and brandās current trajectory (i.e., ārowingā) versus trying to course-correct the current trajectory (i.e., āsteeringā)
Not a very developed objection, but āsteeringā seems to lack tractability to me, so Iād rather see the EA community scale to an extent, even though it could be perfected. Things like GWWC aiming to increase the number of pledge takers, or CEA organizing more medium-scale summits, seems more tractable to me, and potentially quite good.
The case for doing EA community building hinges on having significant probability on ālongā (>2040) AI timelines
Not sure itās okay to say this, but I simply agree with Michael Dickens on this. If we expect to have have AGI by 2038, or even say, 2033 (8 years from now!) it seems like EA community building could be very important. I know people who went full-time into AI safety /ā governance work less than one year after discovering the issue through EA.
There exists a cause which ought to receive >20% of the EA communityās resources but currently receives little attention
Agree depending on what counts as ālittle attentionā. Wild animal welfare, perhaps S-risks, but neither of those are completely neglected.
Iād also be tempted to say ālimiting the development of insect farmingā as it seems likely to be very cost-effective, but I donāt think the field could currently absorb that much funding.
Ducks (and geese) are actually a common focus of animal advocacy in France (and now in the USA, with large-scale pressure campaigns), due to the massive production of foie gras in France, made by force-feeding ducks and geese three times a day until their liver grows ten times in size. It started being a central topic in the french movement in the 90s (though itās less addressed now, it seems to have stuck in peopleās mind, though consumption has kept increasing since them). To my knowledge, itās now a big focus in the USA, through grassroots pressure campaigns. This doesnāt really answer the question though, as itās likely that less than 1% of ducks worldwide are slaughtered for foie gras. Julia Wiseās answer is probably more to the point.
I think itās unlikely that limiting insect farming increases fish farming or factory farming very significantly, since itās mostly meant to be feed for animals in these situations. Iād be more worried if insect meal marketed itself as a substitute for human-consumed animals or fishes. And even in the case of pet food, since itās much more expensive for now than other pet food ingredients (to my understanding), itās not clear that letting insect farming spread would significantly reduce the number of factory farmed animals.
You could update the wording in the post if you like, though if you find it time-consuming, you donāt have to spend time on that. Most readers probably find the distinction as you frame it quite intuitive.
As someone involved both in EA and less-EA animal advocacy, I really appreciate this post because it goes into a subject that is sometimes treated in a bit of a handwavey way with nuance and humility. And through pointing out all the caveats and assumptions in your argument in sufficient detail, it allows laypeople like me to learn more about the key issues surrounding cultivated meat.
Potential reputational spillover
I found this point to be one of the most important things here, and Iām curious to know if there had been reports, or simply articles, written on the impact that anti-cultivated-meat measures and sentiment could has had on alt proteins and even animal advocacy in general. It seems limited for now but these negative reactions could continue into the future.
A point I would also love to read more about is expectations of how the plant-based meat market could grow in the decades to come. I personally donāt know what the standard predictions in that space are. Itās especially disorienting given that when I talk to non-EA vegans, many seem to believe that plant-based meat is a fast-growing market, while EAs sometimes wave off the whole endeavor as a complete flop.
One action /ā sub-cause area I tend to conceive as more robustly good than many others is preventing the continued development of insect farming (Insect Institute, Observatoire National de lāElevage dāInsectes). Since farmed insects are so small (and that the implications of insect farming on the rest of the world donāt seem outsized), it seems intuitively unlikely that harms from preventing it could lead to more suffering than the counterfactual (as opposed to farming of bigger animals, where āenvironmentalā effects may dominate the welfare impact). Meanwhile, I have difficulty seeing how the amount of insect farms in the world could significantly impact other aspects of the long-term future (in the way, say, getting rid of animal farming altogether might), which reduces my worries about long-term cluelessness, increasing S-risks, etc.
Nonetheless, even this carries significant risk of being net-negative, the crux-being how significant insect suffering is. If it turns out mealworms arenāt sentient, for example, less mealworm farming would probably mean more fish suffering (for fishmeal), and perhaps more factory farming of land vertebrates for pet food. Not to mention, obviously, the opportunity cost associated with āhelpingā non-sentient animals.
Like you, I do also think that the Shrimp Welfare Project is an example of a very robust cause: in fact, this is the non-insect-farming org to which I currently donate the most.
Also, small nitpick: an āineffectiveā intervention will generally have a negative EV (see Tomasik), though of course, not necessarily an āextremely negativeā EV as I think was you concern in the post.
(my answer is kind of messy as I probably misunderstood some of your points while first writing it, and then edited in a disorderly fashion)
What will shape the future is always unclear. Naively predictable factors that seem much larger than animal advocacy to me are:
Caring about the environment /ā sustainability: itās likely that if these factors remain important in society, some forms of farming could be severely restricted (cow farming, but also perhaps some forms of fish farming?)
Cultural /ā commercial contingencies: stuff like the popularity of sushi in the west, successful ad campaigns by red lobster, seem to have significantly influenced the demand for small animals
Technological development: current developments may make cow farming more sustainable (good for small animals), but productivity developments will probably be more significant for small animal farming, which is much less efficient currently and has more room for improvement.
Sure, animal advocates could strategically try to influence these factors in one direction or the other, but Iād see at possible marginal impact over force currently beyond their control. Regarding second-order effects of the moral advocacy /ā cultural influence aspect of animal advocacy, I canāt remember ever encountering any indication of the fact that people in the west were eating more chickens[1], crustaceans and fishes because of culturally-encouraged empathy for large animals. Maybe there are non-consumer cases where a link can be drawn, such as ethical criticisms of meat from large animals being leveraged by the insect farming industry, but this is more of an imaginary example as Iām not sure this has been the case.
As for whether animal advocates are still likely to influence SARP: yes, but plausibly only marginally, unless they act with a strategic mindset in some key field (eg through getting a ban on the use of Precision Livestock Farming for large animals but not for small animals). I agree that it should be taken more seriously. However, I think whether current animal advocacy efforts increase or decrease SARP is very unclear to me. There are definitely strategic questions to be asked here, such as whether welfare reforms that drive up the prices of products from large animals will increase the consumption of small animals, or whether the movement should try to be aligned with the environmental movement (who seems to have a larger effect on SARP), and reminding advocates that SARP actually matters a lot is a good step in that direction. I wonder to what extent the big animal welfare orgs are currently thinking about this (it seems to be on L214ā²s mind from what Iāve heard floating around, but itās unclear whether their current efforts are going in the right direction).
Matt Ball is definitely an interesting case, itās surprising that the person whoās probably been the most outspoken about SARP is also the one anti-invertebrate sentience advocate in the movement.