Currently looking for my next step in animal welfare. Reasonably clueless about what interventions are impartially good.
âWe have enormous opportunity to reduce suffering on behalf of sentient creatures [...], but even if we try our hardest, the future will still look very bleak.ââBrian Tomasik
Reading a (free) book by Magnus Vinding two years ago is what got me into effective altruism, and I now work full-time on (hopefully) improving the lives of others. Iâm very excited by this book, and have loved the chapter drafts that have been released early.
Fun fact: the draft chapter âhealthy habitsâ from this new book convinced me to go from a night owl to a regular bedtime person, which is the single most transformative lifestyle change Iâve ever made. Iâm awake for 2 hours more per day on average, and am less sleepy.
Really appreciate this sort of cluster thinking exercise, thanks for sharing! ~20% dying from parasites intuitively shocked me upon reading, even though it checks out, given the abundance of parasites in the wild.
âI donât think there is very much in the way of âthis forecasting happened, and now we have made demonstrably better decisions regarding this terminal goal that we care aboutâ.â
I assume some people disagree with this strong claim. One example Iâve heard was AGI timelines and their influence on AI safety field prioritiesâthough I guess one could answer that certain reports or expert opinions where disproportionately more useful than prediction markets.
On a different point, I appreciated Eli Liflandâs past comment on many intellectual activities (such as grantmaking) being forms of forecasting.
Agree with the post and the bottom line, though I donât think it justifies focusing on AI safety, because of a disanalogy.
In your analogy, we assume that when we give the money to the mugger, they either make the coin more likely to land heads, or do nothing.
Meanwhile, in AI safety, small chances of averting doom come with small chances of causing doomâand it seems most of those who work in the field consider that some respected interventions are actually increasing P(Doom). They just disagree on what those doom-increasing interventions are.
âEA isnât drawing the same talent as it used itâ
Iâm surprised by this claim: do you mean itâs getting fewer talented newcomers on a yearly basis than before, or that the newcoming talent is different? (different profiles /â skillsets)
I understood it at the former claim, but that would be surprising to me. Iâve heard a few orgs saying that theyâve been able to raise the bar for who to hire in the past years, because the EA-aligned talent pool has been getting bigger, with more senior professionals and exceptionally competent people. Also, generally, that EAs are less young on average than ten years ago, and that this has benefits for hiring.
I can actually think of one example in animal welfare: the EA Animal Welfare Fund forecasts grant outcomes.
I appreciate the initiative! AI Safety is rich with disagreements, and itâs nice to have an opportunity to easily map out the range of existing views. Thanks for sharing!
Fatebook has at once made me better at calibration, and provided an easy way to track what my initial beliefs were on topics before gaining more information. Iâd recommend using it for sure!
This probably had my favorite âhumor styleâ of this dayâs posts. Particularly liked the family planning mention.
A marginal $500,000 should go to:
The backfire effects of general alignment work early on in AI safety may have outweighed the benefits; I worry that the same could be true for animal-specific alignment.
If I really believe that, I should probably want to avoid money going into animal-specific alignment at this stage, while extra 500,000$ to general alignment, while not necessarily positive, is less likely to cause major backfire events?
Solving WAS intuitively seems too niche for people to deliberately change their mind on that, but I could be wrong. After all, the Bible says that the Lion will lie down with the lamb and eat straw like the ox, so it could be that human preferences tend to come back to the idea that animal suffering can be bad even when it doesnât depend on human actions.
I hesitated on how to frame the deep ecology thing, because I think itâs entirely possible that it ends up locked in. I think my thought was something like the following. If AGI gets the values of its builders and then never modifies it, in the current race, itâs unlikely that AGI would lock in deep ecology values: these donât seem massive in Chinese labs (could be wrong), and people in AI labs in the West are not hardcore ecologists, for the most part, because of political divisions.[1]
I do agree that AI systems could populate other worlds with animals for other reasons. Logically, we canât cover all of the reasons why systems that we donât know anything about would do something. The same applies to future humans.
(More broadly, I deliberately under-hedged all of the above. I donât think we have any action-guidance on AGIxAnimals)
Maybe itâs good that environmentalists hate AI so much, because it ensures that people in labs are less likely to be friendly to pro-ecology views?
Agree that these are important and unresolved crucial considerations.
I guess a âmetaâ consideration here is to what extent things that hold in our world hold in a âhuman-friendlyâ post-AGI world. Iâm pessimistic on resolving this, because given that there is absolutely no track record, we should be very uncertain on our answer to that question. Weâll have to wait and see (if we can see), or just have different factions taking different bets: there could be alt protein groups focusing on preventing further bans, and alt protein group building their ToC on the assumption that bans will not matter in a post-AGI world.
Fair pushback!
For P1, I assumed that AGI going well for humans was basically even ASI going well for humans (just: âit happens weâre in a good scenario for the fleshy humansâ). I donât know if ASI is much less likely to go right than AGIâsomething as capable as AGI could already very easily be misaligned and Iâm not sure that scales with increase in capabilities.
For P2, Iâm scared that we donât necessarily need the top of the distribution of ASI to do this. I could imagine non-AGI worlds where human-brain-driven technological progress gets us there, though it seems very complicated resource-wise at this stage.
I agree that these two arguments together could undermine my vague âone order of magnitude differenceâ claim, but Iâm not sure how much I believe them. I do come down to believing that most of my considerations will face counter-considerations which I am currently unaware of.
This is definitely a hard debate to disentangle, because I would personally reject the question of alignment as a crux. For now, I strongly believe that the total welfare of animals has been entirely uncorrelated with our moral intentions toward animals. Total welfare has mostly changed because of land use, due to human interests.
I agree that in AGI-transformed futures that go well for humans, human desires may start playing a larger role. However, I expect that whether we mean well for animals (or donât care much about them) will not be cleanly correlated with outcomes for them.
There are worlds where we mean well for a large part of animals, stop intentionally killing them, and help certain wild animals. But that world could very well end up having a large population of animals living bad lives.
On the other hand, out of apathy and even negative feeling toward wild animals, we may decide to limit their spread and use resources in a way that optimizes for human flourishing, over animal abundance. That world could end up being much better for animal welfare.
Maybe some extreme scenarios tip the scales, for example if we bred incredibly happy genetically modified animals due to positive feelings toward them. But Iâm not confident on putting any weight on such utilitarian-leaning scenarios when assessing post-AGI futures. Because part of the reason human moral intentions are not correlated with total animal welfare is that humans are not scope-sensitive utilitarians.
(Copied from my Symposium position statement)
If I accept conventional assumptions in EA Animal welfare[1], AGI will be negative for animals in expectation. On the other hand, AGI being good for humans makes it worse for animals in expectation. However, both rogue AGI and human-friendly AGI seem positive for animals in most scenarios: it just happens that the âbadâ scenarios seem much worse than the âgoodâ scenario.
Why is that? AGI, whether rogue or human-aligned, may not decide to keep other planets free of biological animals (though it seems like a bigger risk for human-aligned AGI). And EA Animal Welfare advocates generally believe that the likelihood that wild animal welfare is negative makes such spreading of biological animals too risky.
A small chance of this decision being made outweighs the positives. This seems very unlikely with rogue AGI (0.1%, perhaps much less), but it could still dominate the scales in my view. An AGI that is more human-friendly seems at least one order of magnitude more likely to terraform other planets.[2]
That said, this doesnât flip the sign of AI safety work. This judgment is lightly held; digital minds (human-like or animal-like) are a larger portion of welfare patients in expectation; and I have no idea of what the counterfactuals are. Thus, I donât treat this as an action-guiding beliefs.
To caveat, I think terraforming is still relatively unlikely in human-friendly scenarios because biodiversity becomes less instrumentally valuable post-AGI, so memes that would favor the existence of wild animal populations would lose in popularity. Even in human lock-in scenarios, the values that control AGI wonât favor deep ecology.
How about farmed animals? Even in precision Livestock Farmingâs best and worst cases, suffering in factory farms shifts by a few orders of magnitude at most.[3] AGI makes the end of factory farming through developing alternatives more likely, though Iâm more convinced by âbiological food systems become unnecessary or unrecognizableâ than âclean meat winsâ. In the vast majority of scenarios, wild animals would be the most numerous moral patients.[4]
However, again, alien counterfactuals probably messes all of this up. If biological beings from other planets can colonize planets in our sphere of influence, then I have to put myself at 0%.
Farmed animal welfare is negative, wild animal welfare is negative, âgoodâ and âbadâ relate to expected total welfare
Though what that looks like is still underdefined.
However, precision livestock farming offers massive near-term risks and opportunities for farmed animals, and interest in this area appears justified.
Human-friendly AGI could decide to only keep animals under human control, but that would probably not lead to massive animal populations.
My position statement (20% disagree with the statement âIf AGI goes well for humans, itâll go well for animalsâ)[1]
If I accept conventional assumptions in EA Animal welfare[2], AGI will be negative for animals in expectation. On the other hand, AGI being good for humans makes it worse for animals in expectation. However, both rogue AGI and human-friendly AGI seem positive for animals in most scenarios: it just happens that the âbadâ scenarios seem much worse than the âgoodâ scenario.
Why is that? AGI, whether rogue or human-aligned, may not decide to keep other planets free of biological animals (though it seems like a bigger risk for human-aligned AGI). And EA Animal Welfare advocates generally believe that the likelihood that wild animal welfare is negative makes such spreading of biological animals too risky.
A small chance of this decision being made outweighs the positives. This seems very unlikely with rogue AGI (0.1%, perhaps much less), but it could still dominate the scales in my view. An AGI that is more human-friendly seems at least one order of magnitude more likely to terraform other planets.[3]
That said, this doesnât flip the sign of AI safety work. This judgment is lightly held; digital minds (human-like or animal-like) are a larger portion of welfare patients in expectation; and I have no idea of what the counterfactuals are. Thus, I donât treat this as an action-guiding beliefs.
To caveat, I think terraforming is still relatively unlikely in human-friendly scenarios because biodiversity becomes less instrumentally valuable post-AGI, so memes that would favor the existence of wild animal populations would lose in popularity. Even in human lock-in scenarios, the values that control AGI wonât favor deep ecology.
How about farmed animals? Even in precision Livestock Farmingâs best and worst cases, suffering in factory farms shifts by a few orders of magnitude at most.[4] AGI makes the end of factory farming through developing alternatives more likely, though Iâm more convinced by âbiological food systems become unnecessary or unrecognizableâ than âclean meat winsâ. In the vast majority of scenarios, wild animals would be the most numerous moral patients.[5]
Probably 0% on reflection because aliens could count as animals, but itâs less indicative
Farmed animal welfare is negative, wild animal welfare is negative, âgoodâ and âbadâ relate to expected total welfare
Though what that looks like is still underdefined.
However, precision livestock farming offers massive near-term risks and opportunities for farmed animals, and interest in this area appears justified.
Human-friendly AGI could decide to only keep animals under human control, but that would probably not lead to massive animal populations.
Far from a shovel-ready proposal, but you may appreciate this post from three years ago: Corporate campaigns work: a key learning for AI Safety
âWhat exactly do you mean by moving goalposts?â
Quick answer: itâs a reference to this paragraph.