Volunteer spread over multiple animal welfare orgs, freelance translator, and enthusiastic donor. Reasonably clueless about what interventions are impartially good. Past experiences include launching an animal ethics university group, coordinating small campaigns in animal advocacy, and designing automated workflows in that context.
āWe have enormous opportunity to reduce suffering on behalf of sentient creatures [...], but even if we try our hardest, the future will still look very bleak.āāBrian Tomasik
Thank you so much for pushing back on my simplistic comment! I agree that my framing was misleading (I commented without even re-reading had said). Thanks for highlighting crucial considerations on counterintuitive conclusions in NU and CU.
Your comment makes me realize that an objection based on utopian situations makes sense (and Iāve found it reasonable in the past as a crux against NU). I guess my frustration with the use of the World Destruction Argument against NU, in the ways EAs often bring it up, is that it criticizes the fact that NU recommends extinction in our world (which contains suffering), even though CU has a decent chance of recommending extinction in our world (as soon as we determine whether wild invertebrates are living net-negative lives or not!).[1]
Though again, if there are higher chances of astronomically good than astronomically bad futures, animal suffering is easily outweighed in CU, but not in NU (but CUs could change their mind on the empirical aspect and recommend extinction). But my impression is that this isnāt what people (among non-philosophers, which includes me) are objecting to? They mostly seem to find deliberate extinction repugnant (which is something I think many views can agree upon).