LGS

• LGSMar 17, 2023, 9:30 PM

  1 point

  1 ∶ 3

  in reply to: Timothy Chan’s comment on: Re­mind­ing my­self just how awful pain can get (plus, an ex­per­i­ment on my­self)

  First of all, I doubt it. People don’t even commit suicide to avoid 1 hour pain (usually the suicide-due-to-pain people are those who don’t anticipate ever getting better).

  Second, even assuming you’re right, what happens in that world is that the emotional pain still trumps the actual pain. Like, if people prefer their own pain to their child’s death, then the death of a child is worse than the pain of a hermit (someone with no family). It’s not necessarily worse than the pain for a child… but only if that child has parents. Is that your model? It has important implications.

• LGSMar 17, 2023, 7:48 AM

  6 points

  3 ∶ 3

  on: Re­mind­ing my­self just how awful pain can get (plus, an ex­per­i­ment on my­self)

  Thanks for this post. However, I find myself disagreeing with the implicit hedonistic perspective here.

  If you could choose, which would you prefer?

  1. The excruciating, “maybe infinite” pain, for 1 hour (no long-term consequences)

  2. The death of your child (permanent)

  I’m not sure if there’s a single human alive that would choose (2) over (1). Even if you gave someone a 5-minute sample of the excruciating pain, they’d still choose the 1-hour version over the death of their child, guaranteed.

  But children die all the time! That’s the point of the AMF and similar charities. If you prioritize animals, you may want to consider whether they care about the deaths of their offspring.

• LGSFeb 16, 2023, 1:00 AM

  −2 points

  1 ∶ 3

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Re­think Pri­ori­ties’ Welfare Range Estimates

  Neuron counts are plausibly worse than all of the other proxies precisely because of how large the gaps in welfare range they imply are.

  If I’m reading this right, you are dismissing neuron counts because of your intuition. You correctly realize that intuitions trump all other considerations, and the game is just to pick proxies that agree with your intuitions and allow you to make them more systematic.

  I agree with this approach but strongly disagree with your intuitions. “14 bees = 1 human, after adjusting for probability of sentience” is so CLEARLY wrong that it is almost insulting. That’s my intuition speaking. I’m doing the same thing you’re doing when you dismiss neuron counts, just with a different starting intuition than you.

  I think it would be better if the OP was more upfront about this bias.

• LGSFeb 8, 2023, 11:11 AM

  3 points

  1 ∶ 1

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Re­think Pri­ori­ties’ Welfare Range Estimates

  Thanks for your reply. I agree with much of what you write. Below are some disagreements.

  I agree with all of this, although I think this bears primarily on whether they’re sentient at all, not really on their hedonic welfare range conditional on sentience. I don’t think bees are extremely unlikely to be sentient based on the evidence I have seen and my intuitions about consciousness.

  
  This seems to be framing consciousness as a binary, a yes/​no. That sounds wrong; many people view it as a sliding scale, and some of your links talk about “more valenced consciousness” etc.

  In any event, I understood the 14 bees = 1 human to be after accounting for the low chance of bee sentience. Did I misunderstand? The summary figure lists various disclaimers, but it notably does NOT say “conditioned on sentience”.

  I used to believe that hedonic welfare ranges should very probably scale (sublinearly) with neuron counts, but I’ve become pretty skeptical that they should scale with neuron counts at all based on RP’s work:

  1. Adam Shriver’s post on (mostly against) neuron counts.

  2. Our post on (mostly against) conscious subsystems.

  One could write equally convincing arguments against “do juveniles roll a ball” as a proxy. Neuron counts are bad and have many flaws; “do they roll a ball” is WORSE and has MORE flaws. That remains the case if you add 100 other subjective proxies, all wishy-washy things, all published by bee researchers eager to tell you bees are amazing.

  It remains the case that neuron counts are more objective than any of the other proxies. It also is the case that NOT using neuron counts is a guarantee of not getting tiny estimates: there’s no clear way to combine 100 yes/​no proxies and get an answer like “one-millionth of a human”. Only with neuron counts can you get this. I could tell you that even before looking at your results: your methodology eliminates a whole range of answers a priori.

  (Also, the argument that bees are amazing is used in Shriver’s post, which makes this discussion circular: he doesn’t want to use neuron counts because it underestimates bees (according to intuition, I guess).)

  Humans don’t seem to have many times more synapses per neuron than bees (1,000 to 7,000 in human brains vs ~1,000 in honeybee brains, based on data in [1] and [2]), so the number of direct connections between neurons is close-ish to proportional with neuron counts between humans and bees. We could have many times more indirect connections per neuron through paths of connections, but the influence from one neuron on another it’s only indirectly connected to should decrease with the lengths of paths from the first to the second, because the signal has to make it farther and compete with more signals. This doesn’t rule out superlinear scaling, but can limit it.

  Compare: if each server on the internet is connected to only 10 other servers on average, does it hold that each user of the internet can only reach a constant number of websites?

  No: the graph is an expander, and if there are n nodes, the distance between any two nodes may be as little as O(log n), even if the degree of each node is constant. Hence, via a few hops on the graph, a node may talk to many other nodes (potentially even all of them).

  Neural networks (whether artificial or natural) can certainly cause interaction between far away neurons, and the O(log n) distance does not necessarily mean the signal dies. This is similar to how my words reach you despite the packets passing through many servers along the way.

  I don’t know for sure that this is how the brain works. However, I find it plausible. I also note that the human brain achieves an incredible amount of intelligence, so certain impressive interactions between neurons are definitely taking place.

• LGSFeb 8, 2023, 12:07 AM

  −2 points

  0 ∶ 4

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Re­think Pri­ori­ties’ Welfare Range Estimates

  I would definitely be interested in hearing which proxies you’d include, how you’d weigh them and why. A model might be useful, although I think the reasoning would be the most useful part.

  Personally, when I think of the intensity of suffering and pleasure, the kinds of (largely vague) accounts I have in mind depend on attention and prioritization or can use those as proxies scaling roughly monotonically with intensity (similar to Welfare Footprint Project’s definitions for levels of pain, annoying, hurtful, disabling and excruciating), and humans don’t seem particularly special here for excruciating pain and extreme fear (e.g. torture), i.e. I expect mammals and birds to respond with attention and prioritization similar to humans.

  Well, first of all, we should be very uncertain that species sufficiently far from us are even capable of suffering at all. I take it as self-evident that suffering is in the brain, a property of neurons; however, I also think that small machine learning models clearly don’t experience suffering, so “having something that’s kinda maybe like neurons” is not sufficient.

  Bees have fewer than a million neurons and likely fewer “parameters” than even small LLMs like BERT-base. Moreover, a lot of those neurons are likely used for controlling the wings and for implementing hardcoded algorithms like “build a hex-tiled beehive”.

  I don’t believe a single neuron, by itself, can experience pain. It’s an emergent phenomenon. But the fact that it’s emergent suggests it might even scale super-linearly with the number of neurons (e.g. perhaps quadratically, for the number of possible interactions between neurons, though that’s far from certain). I find the assumption of sub-linear scaling (or no scaling at all) to be particularly weird.

  Apart from the neuron count, there’s the issue that bees are so evolutionarily far away that they basically developed their intelligence independently of us. Our common ancestor with them was an early bilateral -- a primitive worm with few organs. The split likely happened soon after the development of memory, which itself was soon-ish after the evolution of the brain. The worms in question were so primitive that one line started crawling backwards, eating out of its anus and pooping out of its mouth—this flip actually defines the duterostomes vs protostomes (we’re deuterostomes, bees are protostomes). It’s not clear that “has subjective feelings” dates back to such early brain designs. If it arose later, then bees are either not conscious or have independently-evolved consciousness, which would be nearly impossible to reason about.

  I don’t see why “juvenile bees sometimes roll a ball” (which gets translated into “bees play”) should weigh so significantly into our considerations, here. It’s kind of ridiculous. Either you think bees should be weighted highly, or you think they should be given little weight, but why is “juveniles roll a ball!” such strong evidence of the amount of pain or pleasure they feel?

  Yet “roll a ball” (and a few similar proxies) is the only thing the OP is going by. There’s nothing else in the model!

• LGSFeb 7, 2023, 11:57 AM

  −6 points

  0 ∶ 5

  in reply to: Bob Fischer’s comment on: Re­think Pri­ori­ties’ Welfare Range Estimates

  I just don’t think that our intuitions tell us anything important about how much other animals can suffer or the heights of their pleasures.

  But what you think does tell us about how much other animals can suffer or the height of their pleasures is… listing out ~100 traits like “bees play” and “bees don’t express love”, plugging them into a complex model, and getting “14 bees is around 1 human” as the answer.

  That’s not any better! You’re merely hiding your intuitions behind a complex model. But the inputs to your model are no better than the inputs to mine! Your inputs are things like “bees play”, which I’m already inputting into my intuition (along with many other facts your model cannot take into account). You’re weighing all proxies equally; my intuition uses a very skewed weighted average of the proxies. But the uniform distribution is not special! It’s just as arbitrary!

  Would it help if I coded up a simple model which took in “bees play but don’t express love” and the rest of the list, and outputted 0.00000001? We surely both agree that I can do it. What makes you confident your model is more justified, if not your own intuitions?

  If I save humans over beehives, it isn’t because I think bees don’t feel anything—or barely feel anything compared to humans. Instead, it’s because I don’t think small harms always aggregate to outweigh large ones, or because I give some weight to partiality, or because I think death is much worse for humans than for bees, or whatever. There are just so many other places to push back.

  This sounds perilously close to “our numbers shouldn’t be used for anything”. Is there any decision you’d be comfortable making based on your numbers (the 14 bees is 1 human thing)?

• LGSFeb 7, 2023, 10:26 AM

  0 points

  0 ∶ 7

  on: Re­think Pri­ori­ties’ Welfare Range Estimates

  This project seems interesting, but I think you’re importantly wrong when you say that we shouldn’t dismiss your results based on our intuitions.

  Our intuitions are our ONLY guide to the possible internal mental states of other animals. You are right to try to systematize—to find scientific, measurable criteria that match our intuitions on easier cases and help shape them on harder ones. However, whatever criteria you find NECESSARILY relies on intuitions, for example in your decision of what to include or not include as a proxy. Also, the only way we could judge your theory even in principle is by our intuitions.

  If someone tells you “after reviewing all the behavioral and cognitive abilities of chickens (and after deeply understanding the proxies you’ve listed), I reject your estimates of their welfare range,” there’s nothing you can say to that person. Therefore, saying things like

  No. First, the empirical evidence is our only objective guide to animals’ abilities—avoiding the twin mistakes of anthropomorphism (attributing human characteristics to nonhumans) and what Franz de Waal calls “anthropodenial”—i.e., “the a priori rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals.” So, we’re inclined to defer to it. [emphasis in original]

  Is just exaggerating the objectivity of your evidence. It’s not objective, it’s more like, objectively subjective. You remind me of the Integrated Information Theory people, who, when confronted with “your theory implies a CD drive is more conscious than a human”, answer back with “yes, CD drives are more conscious, don’t rely on your intuitions to dismiss empirical measurements of consciousness”. You’re making a fundamental error! Intuitions are SUPERIOR to fancy theories that say CD drives are more conscious than humans, no matter how fancy those theories are.

  Now, happily, your theory does not say CD drives are more conscious than humans. But it does say that one single beehive is worth more than 10 humans, even after adjusting for lifespan. Literally you are claiming that improving the lives of the bees in a suffering beehive (only until they die naturally a month later!) is more important than permanently healing a paraplegic—by an order of magnitude. You are claiming that, though the suffering a human can experience in an hour may be vast, it is not quite as vast as the suffering-per-hour which can be experienced by (checks notes) 15 bees.

  I appreciate the work you put into this, and I think there’s much to learn from it (I’ve already learned from your reports, despite not reading everything). But you are wrong about your placeholder range estimates—importantly, obviously wrong, orders-of-magnitude wrong, these-numbers-should-not-be-used-for-anything wrong.

  I don’t want to over-criticize because I think being wrong is much better than doing nothing! But I’m afraid of people citing these estimates without realizing how off they are from what normal people value (or what normal people would value even if perfectly informed).

• LGSJan 25, 2023, 10:46 PM

  10 points

  3 ∶ 0

  in reply to: ChanaMessinger’s comment on: FLI FAQ on the re­jected grant pro­posal controversy

  Let me register a strong prediction that normal granting agencies to not say they “approved a grant” and “because we are a non-profit organization under US law, we are only allowed to make grants to non-profit organizations; we hereby declare our intent to transfer the grant amount promptly once [name] has been registered” if these are, in fact, false statements and there’s another due diligence phase.

  If I’m wrong and this is how normal letters of intent work, then—to be 100% clear—normal letters of intent are lies that mislead the public and can be used by neo-Nazis to convince people they mainstream. That is, after all, why SND asked for the letter.

  Is it true, or is it not true, that the reason FLI did not already issue the grant was “because we [...] are only allowed to make grants to non-profit organizations”? The letter is very clear about this: the letter says if SND was registered as non-profit, they would already have the money. I see no other reading.

• LGSJan 24, 2023, 12:02 AM

  2 points

  3 ∶ 1

  in reply to: Aleksi Maunu’s comment on: FLI FAQ on the re­jected grant pro­posal controversy

  I agree this seems likely. I think it’s bad to use misleading language to help neo-Nazi organizations pass bureaucratic checks, though, and I’m concerned that FLI showed no remorse for this.

  My guess is that what happened here is related to Tegmark’s brother—the brother wanted SND to be registered and had the organization ask FLI for a letter. I’m not sure, though, and I think the information we’ve received so far from FLI is insufficient and likely deceptive.

• LGSJan 22, 2023, 4:54 AM

  −1 points

  1 ∶ 3

  in reply to: Tsunayoshi’s comment on: FLI FAQ on the re­jected grant pro­posal controversy

  Please post the letter your local EA group received, then.

  I agree that if the norm is “everyone lies in grant commitment letters, that’s normal”, then it makes the story better. I do not actually believe there is such a norm (and of course, if there is one, it’s a bad one).

  And if what you say is true, then the commitment letter is a lie, to be clear—the letter specifically says the grant will be paid out promptly, as soon as SND registers as a non-profit. It clearly says this registration status is the only barrier left.

  When I was hired for a job, there was indeed a point at which I got an offer pending on a background check. But the offer letter was clear that this offer was conditional; this FLI letter is not like that.

• LGSJan 21, 2023, 11:03 PM

  20 points

  6 ∶ 5

  in reply to: Erich_Grunewald 🔸’s comment on: FLI FAQ on the re­jected grant pro­posal controversy

  I will try to be kinder. Apologies, I am new here.

  According to the letter FLI sent, the only reason they did not issue the grant already is the lack of registration. Assuming they did not lie, this means, hypothetically, if SND was registered, FLI would have granted them $100,000 instead of writing this letter.

  Do you see the issue with FLI granting $100,000 to neo-Nazis? I understand that they didn’t end up granting it, but according to the FLI letter that was a fluke. If SND happened to be registered, the grant would have been paid out. Or at least, that what the letter says. (They say clearly the grant has been approved, and the problem with paying it out is the registration.)

  Maybe they are lying in the letter! But if not, FLI was going to give $100,000 to neo-Nazis and lucked out due to the fact they weren’t registered.

  My problem now is that FLI does not express contrition for this. At no point do they go “oh no, we almost sent out $100,000 to neo-Nazis!” and at no point do they go “oh no, the letter we sent to SND said the grant has been approved when it wasn’t, so that misleads people, we are so sorry for misleading people”.

  FLI says neither of these things. They pretend, instead, that they never sent out a letter approving the grant and intending to pay it out ASAP. They pretend they merely provisionally approved it subject to another vetting stage. But either that’s false or else they lied in their letter.

• LGSJan 21, 2023, 9:20 PM

  16 points

  7 ∶ 4

  in reply to: Sanjay’s comment on: FLI FAQ on the re­jected grant pro­posal controversy

  What’s clear and reassuring about it?

  It remains the case that either FLI lied in their letter to NDF or else they are lying now. It really bothers me that people here are ignoring this fact!

  Here is what FLI said to SND:

  This letter is to confirm that the Future of Life Institute (FLI) has approved a grant in the amount of $100,000 to the Swedish foundation”Stiftelsen Nya Dagbladet” that is currently under registration. Because we are a non-profit organization under US law, we are only allowed to make grants to non-profit organizations; we hereby declare our intent to transfer the grant amount promptly once “Stiftelsen Nya Dagbladet” has been registered. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at [redacted].

  [emphasis added]

  
  So, was the “intent to transfer the grant amount promptly” a lie, or are they lying now? Because right now they are saying that there was always going to be another due diligence phase.

  I also have other gripes (I think FLI is dodging questions about the connections to Tegmark’s brother, and Max Tegmark’s original response a few days ago angrily denied that NDF is far-right or neo-Nazi and made no apologies for associating with them), but the above lie is the clearest-cut among them. In their FAQ, FLI expressed no contrition for lying to NDF. They seem to think that writing a letter that says they “approved a grant” and will “transfer the grant promptly” after registration is consistent with saying they merely considered and declined a grant. Look at what they say!

  The way we see it, we rejected a grant proposal that deserved to be rejected, and challenging, reasonable questions have been asked as to why we initially considered it and didn’t reject it earlier. We deeply regret that we may have inadvertently compromised the confidence of our community and constituents.

  Is that really the way you see an “intent to transfer the grant amount promptly”? Sanjay, tell me with a straight face that there is no attempt to mislead here.

• LGSJan 21, 2023, 6:10 AM

  2 points

  2 ∶ 5

  in reply to: MathiasKB🔸’s comment on: FLI FAQ on the re­jected grant pro­posal controversy

  Sorry, I’m new here, and maybe I’m misunderstanding something, but...

  it seems pretty clear that FLI is lying in this statement? Like, here’s the published evidence:

  https://​​expo.se/​​sites/​​default/​​files/​​ed-faksimil-loi.jpg

  This letter is to confirm that the Future of Life Institute (FLI) has approved a grant in the amount of $100,000 to the Swedish foundation”Stiftelsen Nya Dagbladet” that is currently under registration. Because we are a non-profit organization under US law, we are only allowed to make grants to non-profit organizations; we hereby declare our intent to transfer the grant amount promptly once “Stiftelsen Nya Dagbladet” has been registered. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at [redacted].

  [emphasis added]

  And here is what they say at the end of the current FAQ:

  This was just covered by vice.com. Note that their article is inconsistent about whether we issued a grant agreement or not, first saying “the grant agreement was immediately revoked” and then saying “would not be moving forward with a grant agreement”. As clarified in (4) above, our process made it to the intent stage but never proceeded it to the stage of issuing a grant agreement, which is what we mean by “offering a grant”.

  Do you not feel lied to? There’s something wrong here. There’s more to this story.

  Tegmark’s brother published in this place. Expo says, reasonably: “Whether this connection is significant with regards to the promise of funding from Max Tegmark and the Future of Life Institute to Nya Dagbladet is one of the questions we have been trying to put to them, but neither Max Tegmark nor his brother Per Shapiro have commented.”

  Yet this does not make it to the FAQ, somehow? Like, FLI just refuses to address the suspicious connection here, except to say that Max Tegmark wouldn’t have been paid.

  You can apologize if you want, but I personally still feel lied to.