So i order to justify longtermism in particular, you have to point out proposed policies that are a lot less sensible seeming, and rely on a lot less certainty.
If you’re referring to the first point I would reword this to:
In order to justify longtermism in particular, you have to point out proposed policies that can’t be justified by drawing on the near future.
It is rather that longtermists have not provided any examples of moral decisions that would be different if we were to consider the far future versus the near future. All current focus areas, the authors argue, can be justified by appealing to the near future.
Hey everyone. Tristan here from Tasmania. I first heard about EA from a Peter Singer lecture at Melbourne in 2014 on his book TLYCS. Have since completed a Master of Public Health. I’ve been working as a bush walking guide for the last year but currently looking for EA related work. Applying for jobs on the 80,000 hours job board at organizations like GiveWell, GiveDirectly, and AMF.
Also looking to engage with people about EA and related topics in Tasmania, or online. Looking at potentially starting a university or other EA group in Tasmania.
Let me know if you have any advice re looking for EA work/ starting a EA group.
In the article the authors are somewhat ambiguous about the meaning of ‘near future’. They do at one point refer to the present and a few generations, as their potential time stamp. But your point raises an interesting question for the longtermists: How long does the future need to be in order for future people to have moral weight?
Although we might want to qualify it slightly in that the element of interest is not necessarily the number of years into the future but rather how many people (or beings) will be in the future. The question then becomes: How many people need to be alive in the future in order for their lives to have moral weight?
If we knew a black hole would swallow humanity in 200 years, on some estimates, there could still be ~15 billion human lives to come. If we knew that the future held only 15 more billion lives, would that justify not focusing on existential risks?