David Mathers🔸 comments on The Case for Insect Consciousness

[David Mathers🔸]

What would be evidence for sentience in your view?

[Henry Howard🔸]

You could ask the same question about worms, mites or nematodes.

I think the reductio ad absurdum that if any of these things matter even slightly, then all human moral concerns become completely irrelevant, means we need a high bar for believing this

[Ben Stevenson]

I think it’s worthwhile distinguishing between the demandingness objection as an argument against insect/​worm/​mite/​nematodes’ interests mattering, and as an argument against them being sentient. I think you can make the first case but not the second.

[Henry Howard🔸]

There’s a distinction in theory but in practice the vague definition of “sentience” is so tied to moral relevance I don’t think you can argue for one without also arguing for the other.

The question “does a worm feel pain” isn’t really asking “does the worm have nociceptors and some degree of integration of those nociceptive signals that causes learning and behavioural changes”. It’s really asking, at the core, “does a worm ‘feel pain’ in a way that’s morally important”