I am lower on use in Ukraine the next month (~4%) and much lower in the next year (6%).
I guess I sense it’s just still a big norm we need reasons to push us away from this. What’s more, even if Putin does want to launch a nuke, which I guess I think is unlikely (10?%) it still needs to happen soon and the chain of command need to agree with him. And his lieutenants need to think that this is a situation that gains them something rather than thinking that NATO will support Ukraine with conventional weapons.
What I find more compelling is that they might launch/detonate a low-megaton nuke on the battlefield where they are losing. But again, that has to go off without a hitch, via some chain of command, it has to happen in the next month. And again, what does Russia gain from this, other than showing that their bluff wasn’t a bluff.
I am lower on use in Ukraine the next month (~4%) and much lower in the next year (6%).
I guess I sense it’s just still a big norm we need reasons to push us away from this. What’s more, even if Putin does want to launch a nuke, which I guess I think is unlikely (10?%) it still needs to happen soon and the chain of command need to agree with him. And his lieutenants need to think that this is a situation that gains them something rather than thinking that NATO will support Ukraine with conventional weapons.
What I find more compelling is that they might launch/detonate a low-megaton nuke on the battlefield where they are losing. But again, that has to go off without a hitch, via some chain of command, it has to happen in the next month. And again, what does Russia gain from this, other than showing that their bluff wasn’t a bluff.
I am happy to bet here.
I’m not sure whether this is included in your 4%?
It is. I guess I just sense this is still really quite unlikely.