Good question, Eli. I think a lot here depends on keeping the relevant alternatives in view. The question is not whether it’s permissible to coordinate climate change mitigation efforts (or what have you). Instead, the question is whether we owe it to anyone to address climate change relative to the alternatives. And when you compare the needs of starving children or those suffering from serious preventable diseases, etc., to those who might be negatively affected by climate change, it becomes a lot more plausible that we don’t owe to anyone to address those things over more pressing needs (assuming we have a good chance of doing something about those needs / moving the needle significantly / etc.).
I think “don’t work on climate change[1] if it would trade off against helping one currently identifiable person with a strong need” is a really bizarre/undesirable conclusion for a moral theory to come to, since if widely adopted it seems like this would lead to no one being left to work on climate change. The prospective climate change scientists would instead earn-to-give for AMF.
I think this argument doesn’t quite go through as stated, because AMF doesn’t have an infinite funding gap. If everybody on Earth (or even, say, 10% of the richest 10% of people) acted on the version of contractualism that mandated donating significantly to AMF as a way to discharge their moral obligations, we’ll be well-past the point where anybody who wants and needs a bednet can have one.
That said, I think a slightly revised version of your argument can still work. In a contractualist world, people should be willing to give almost unlimited resources to a single identifiable victim than working on large-scale moral issues, or having fun.
Good question, Eli. I think a lot here depends on keeping the relevant alternatives in view. The question is not whether it’s permissible to coordinate climate change mitigation efforts (or what have you). Instead, the question is whether we owe it to anyone to address climate change relative to the alternatives. And when you compare the needs of starving children or those suffering from serious preventable diseases, etc., to those who might be negatively affected by climate change, it becomes a lot more plausible that we don’t owe to anyone to address those things over more pressing needs (assuming we have a good chance of doing something about those needs / moving the needle significantly / etc.).
Thanks for the reply.
I think “don’t work on climate change[1] if it would trade off against helping one currently identifiable person with a strong need” is a really bizarre/undesirable conclusion for a moral theory to come to, since if widely adopted it seems like this would lead to no one being left to work on climate change. The prospective climate change scientists would instead earn-to-give for AMF.
Or bettering relations between countries to prevent war, or preventing the rise of a totalitarian regime, etc.
I think this argument doesn’t quite go through as stated, because AMF doesn’t have an infinite funding gap. If everybody on Earth (or even, say, 10% of the richest 10% of people) acted on the version of contractualism that mandated donating significantly to AMF as a way to discharge their moral obligations, we’ll be well-past the point where anybody who wants and needs a bednet can have one.
That said, I think a slightly revised version of your argument can still work. In a contractualist world, people should be willing to give almost unlimited resources to a single identifiable victim than working on large-scale moral issues, or having fun.